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The notion that most people want black-robed judges, well dressed lawyers
and fine-paneled courtrooms as the setting to resolve their disputes is not
correct. People with problems, like people with pains, want relief, and they
want it as quickly and inexpensively as possible.,
... [I]n the fair administration of justice no man can be judge in his own
case, however exalted his station, however righteous his motives, and irre-
spective of his race, color, politics, or religion. This Court cannot hold...
petitioners ... constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law
and carry their battle to the streets . . . . [R]espect for judicial process is a
small price to pay'for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding
meaning to constitutional freedom.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-reliance, perserverance, ingenuity, and the noble notion of
rugged individualism have been pervasive themes in the American
lifestyle since the precolonial era. Not the least formidable of the
innumerable matters to test these qualities in pilgrims, pioneers,
and modern Americans, is the task of securing and nurturing a
comprehensive system of laws that commands the respect of the
citizenry and sustains an ordered society. The American legal sys-
tem has evolved into a complex and sophisticated amalgam of stat-
utes, procedures, actors, and forums. The benefits of this orderly
system of justice, however, can manifest themselves only to the ex-
tent that certain typically American, self-reliant behavior suffers a
degree of concomitant restraint. Ordered justice demands a sem-
blance of consistency; consistency necessarily precludes ad hoc, in-
dividually prescribed remedies and responses. The judicial scheme
survived despite its apparent contravention of American where-
withal and human nature, partly because the courts and laws pro-
vide an adequate and efficient alternative for redressing wrongs.
Additionally, a policing authority furthers the system's ability to
endure by managing those persons who wander beyond the legally
established bounds of permissible behavior. The American legal
system also owes its durability to its effective incorporation of a
significant number of the common individual methods of dealing
1. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, National Conference on Minor Dispute
Resolution (1977).
2. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967) (footnote omitted).
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with others that predate the system's refinement to its current dig-
nity. This Special Project examines lawful self-help-the prevail-
ing legal accommodations for extrajudicial lawful rights and reme-
dies engendered by the longstanding tension between the
imperatives of an established system of laws and the individual
needs and desires to avoid and remedy injury as effectively and
efficiently as possible.
"Self-help," in this Special Project, denotes legally permissible
conduct that individuals undertake absent the compulsion of law
and without the assistance of a government official in efforts to
prevent or remedy a legal wrong.3 Extrajudicial forms of dispute
resolution and citizens' arrests qualify as self-help under the Spe-
cial Project's definition; extreme actions like shooting the neighbor
because his dog attacked your cat, however, are not "self-help" for
purposes of the following discussion. Self-help, therefore, is a le-
gally recognized alternative or substitute for a judicial remedy.
Any exercise of self-help, of course, quickly may become unlawful
when a self-helper oversteps the limits of the privilege. One objec-
tive of this Special Project is to identify potential self-help situa-
tions and the legal boundaries of appropriate self-help responses.
The common law roots of many self-help privileges, 4 for exam-
ple, illustrate that self-help is by no means a nascent legal phe-
nomenon. In many respects, self-help was the progenitor of our
modern legal system. It was the law without the trappings-sans
black robes, pinstriped suits, and high vaulted ceilings. The rapid
growth and refinement of the American legal system apparently di-
verted legal commentators' attention from self-help. Nevertheless,
many self-help privileges survived. Today, the resounding concerns
that American courts are overburdened,' American society is un-
3. Cf. Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1973).
4. For example, the privileges of self-defense, see infra notes 73-106 and accompany-
ing text, and the right to escape from unlawful confinement, see infra notes 377-95 and
accompanying text, derive from the common law.
5. In his 1982 State of the Judiciary Address, Chief Justice Burger noted that annual
federal district court civil case filings increased from 35,000 to 180,000 between 1940 and
1981. That increase, which nearly doubled the yearly caseload of each judge to 350 cases per
year, was six times the size of the countries' population growth. W. Burger, State of the
Judiciary Address, (Jan. 24, 1982), reprinted in 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 274 (1982). From 1950 to
1981 annual federal apellate court filings climbed from 2800 to more than 26,000, thereby
increasing each judge's annual caseload from 44 to 200 cases. Id. Meantime, from 1967 to
1976 state appellate court dockets expanded eight times as fast as the rate of population
growth. Id. Chief Justice Burger also alluded to increased complexity of trials by noting that
although only 35 trials lasted for more than one month in 1960, five times that number
850 [Vol. 37:845
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duly litigious,6 the American criminal justice system is failing to
protect society,7 and the justice available through the American le-
gal system is neither swift nor effective,8 have redirected attention
to the law of self-help.
Dissatisfaction with conventional processes for preventing and
remedying legal wrongs encourages a greater reliance upon self-
help; private individuals may become more educated about their
self-help privileges and, thereby, exercise them more frequently.
This situation, in turn, dictates that courts, legislatures, and the
legal profession reassess the state of self-help and discard the anti-
quated and unnecessary, clarify and redefine the valuable, and de-
sign and implement new forms of self-help. Absent such efforts,
the citizenry, out of ignorance and frustration, may tear the deli-
cate veneer that overlies an ordered society.
Although this Special Project specifically addresses the self-
help options available to the common citizen, it also should edu-
cate lawyers, legislators, and judges. The extrajudicial nature of
self-help excludes none of the factions that traditionally make the
judicial machinery run smoothly. The lawyer must be capable of
advising a client on the potential legal consequences of his con-
duct, both prospectively and retrospectively. The lawyer also must
be qualified to counsel clients about alternative, nonlitigious means
of obtaining remedies for legal wrongs. Conflict management and
conflict resolution are two invaluable services that lawyers offer
their clients.9 A full comprehension of self-help options may
broaden the role of the legal profession, rather than shrink it as
occurred in 1981. Id.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
8. West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard Neely recently painted a pessimistic
picture of courtroom justice in America:
The point that most judges and lawyers miss is that the whole litigation process is
inexact-perfect justice under ideal conditions is illusory. To ask perfect justice of a
court system is like asking a skilled surgeon to perform brain surgery with a meat ax.
He might be able to do it 5 percent of the time if he is really skilled, but the smart
money does not bet on it.
R. Nmsrv, WHY CouRTs DON'T WORK - (1983).
9. Chief Justice Burger recently observed:
The obligation of our profession is, as has long been thought to be, to serve as healers
of human conflicts. To fulfill our tradtional obligation means that we should provide
mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the shortest possible time with
the least possible expense, and with a minimum of stress on the participants. That is
what justice is all about.
W. Burger, State of the Judiciary Address, supra note 5. See also W. Burger, the State of
Justice Address (Feb. 12, 1984), reprinted in 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 66 (1984).
1984]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
some lawyers fear. Similarly, the legislatures must remain mindful
of any discordance between the laws and public opinion, and of the
inadequacies of the judicial system, whether real or perceived. In
conjunction with the courts, the legislatures can fashion self-help
laws and remedies that benefit citizens to the greatest extent while
only minimally disrupting social order-in fact, such laws and rem-
edies can help preserve social order.
This Special Project examines the myriad forms of self-help
currently available to persons in American society. It groups and
discusses notable self-help rights, privileges, and remedies under
topical classifications that parallel traditional jurisprudential cate-
gories. Parts H through VI of the Special Project sketch the legally
fashioned contours and explore the legal, social, and political con-
sequences of self-help methods in tort law, criminal law and law
enforcement, commercial transactions, landlord-tenant relations,
and family law matters. Part VII explores the attorney's role in the
development and implementation of curative self-help procedures
such as mediation. In Part VIII the Special Project concludes by
examining the function, mechanisms, and merits of two increas-
ingly popular alternative dispute resolution processes-rent-a-
judge programs and the ombudsman-that offer hope for contin-
ued peaceable dispute resolution.
II. TORT
A. Introduction
Tort self-help is any extrajudicial act that cures, prevents, or
minimizes a tort. The earliest tort remedies were exclusively self-
help.l0 Early medieval plaintiffs, without courts on which to de-
pend or with only a few courts of limited jurisdiction to which they
could turn, often had to seek redress directly from the tortfeasor or
his family, usually by force of arms.11 This ad hoc system often led
to breaches of the peace and, not uncommonly, bloodshed.12 Exclu-
sive reliance on self-help also gave the strongest members of soci-
ety a disproportionate ability to recover's and led to an inequitable
distribution of remedial fruits. 4 These concerns and the desire to
10. See W. WALSH, A ISTORY OF ANGLO AmuRCAN LAW 24 (2d ed. 1932).
11. See J. JEuDwINE; TORT, CRIME, AND PoLIcE IN MEDIEVAL BRITAIN 24-25 (1917).
12. See id. at 25.
13. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENARIES ON Tm LAws OF ENGLAND 2 (T. Cooley 2d
ed. 1872) (one purpose of courts is to protect the weak from the strong).
14. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 100 (3d ed. 1923) (before es-
tablishment of a rule of law a person would use self-help whenever he had the power and
852 [Vol. 37:845
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centralize economic and judicial power caused medieval rulers to
establish a system of courts that generally discouraged self-help,
especially in the tort field. One commentator has described the
"first business of the law, and more especially of the law of crime
and tort" of fifteenth century courts as the suppression of self-
help.
15
The inability of medieval courts to stop all forms of self-help
and the judicial realization that some self-help was preferable to
formal legal redress spurred the development of indistinct guide-
lines for permissible self-help. As early as 1768 Blackstone recited
rules to govern the self-help privileges of self-defense, recapture of
property, and summary abatement of nuisance.' This equivocal
development of permissible self-help activity currently is evident
in the confusion with which courts approach contemporary tort
self-help law. Modern courts generally are dubious of or hostile to
self-help.'7 The rationale for this concern remains unchanged since
medieval times; self-help frequently leads to breaches of the peace,
violence, and inequities. One state supreme court justice recently
commented that "[s]elf-help may well be the first step toward
anarchy."'Is
This attitude of hostility, however, is not universal and some
modern courts and legislatures have chosen to validate certain nar-
row areas of tort self-help. The individual and societal interests
that self-help serves in these areas outweigh society's interest in
channeling the disputes through formal legal processes. Two prin-
cipal factors which indicate that self-help will be acceptable are
that the available judicial remedies are somehow inadequate and
the threat of a self-help remedy to society's interests in law and
order is minimal.
This part of the Special Project examines some of the major
the opportunity).
15. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 14, at 278.
16. See 3 W. BLACKMNSo, supra note 13, at 2-5. Blackstone suggested the following
rules to govern self-help privileges: (1) A party may repel force by force, and any breach of
peace that results is changeable to the attacker; (2) a party may retake his wrongfully taken
chattels but may not breach the peace in effecting such recapture; and (3) a party may
remove any nuisance that causes him harm but may not commit a riot to achieve such
abatement. Id.; cf. 2 W. HoLnswoRT, supra note 14, at 100 (early courts allowed self-help
that did not disturb the general public once the rule of law had become second nature to
society).
17. See, e.g., Helleman v. City of Tulsa, 79 Okla. Crim. 387, 394-95, 155 P.2d 254, 257
(1945) (court refused to allow party to take law into his own hands to abate a nuisance).




areas that fall within permissible tort self-help. Section B discusses
certain significant personal interests and the self-help privileges
that these interests create. This section includes an analysis of the
interest in bodily integrity and the privilege of self-defense, the in-
terest in reputation and the privilege to rebut defamatory state-
ments, and the interest in maintaining uncoerced religious beliefs
and the privilege of parents to "deprogram" adult children who
have joined religious cults. Section C explores the interest in own-
ership and possession of property and the privileges these interests
create. It includes an analysis of the privilege to defend one's pos-
session of property, the privilege to recover tortiously taken prop-
erty, the privilege of a merchant to detain and investigate sus-
pected shoplifters, and the privilege to summarily abate a
nuisance. Section D examines certain instances in which courts
have required the victim of a tort to attempt some type of self-help
remedy as a precondition to awarding complete relief.
B. Personal Interests and Self-Help Privileges
1. Bodily Harm
One commentator describes the interest in protecting one's
self from offensive bodily contact or confinement as "'the first law
of nature.' "19 The privilege20 of self-defense in both the tort and
criminal contexts, therefore, rests upon society's interest in permit-
ting an individual to take reasonable steps to protect his bodily
integrity when there is no time to resort to formal judicial
processes.2 1 In tort law this privilege shields the defending person
from liability for acts that ordinarily would result in liability.2
The self-defense privilege, therefore, includes the right to commit
a battery,28 an assault,24 or an imprisonment25 on one's attacker.
Because society places such a high value on bodily integrity, this
19. W. PRosszR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 19, at 109 (4th ed. 1971).
20. The term "privilege" in this part of the Special Project connotes an act or type of
behavior that courts recognize as legally permissible under certain conditions. The privi-
leged conduct might serve an important interest by preventing, minimizing, or curing a tort.
The same behavior, however, sometimes might be tortious or criminal because of judicial
reluctance to recognize the privilege under other circumstances. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SzcoND)
OF TORTs § 10 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 16, at 98.
21. W. PRossER, supra note 19, § 19, at 108.
22. Similarly, in the criminal law context, the privilege shields defenders from prose-
cution for their behavior. See infra notes 185-233 and accompanying text.
23. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 63 (1965).




right to use repelling force exists even if the defender misjudges
the degree of danger to his person, as long as the mistake is reason-
able under the circumstances.2 The threatened intrusion, however,
must be imminent, and the defender may use only the amount of
force reasonably necessary to ward off the attack.2 7 If he uses ex-
cessive force, the defender will be liable for the harm that the ex-
cess force causes, but the defender's overzealousness does not miti-
gate the liability of the attacker for any torts which he commits.
28
The loose limitations on the privilege of self-defense illustrate
the favorable judicial view of this concept in the tort context. Be-
cause certain concessions to instinctive human behavior are rea-
sonable and because effective self-help will prevent or minimize
the initial tort, such favorable treatment by the courts is justifia-
ble. Although utilization of the self-defense privilege creates a sig-
nificant risk of breaching the peace, an attacker has already raised
this spectre before a person must resort to self-defense. Fighting
fire with fire in these situations, therefore, often is the most effec-
tive method of minimizing the total personal and societal harm
that is possible. This privilege, while substantially similar to the
self-defense privilege in criminal law,29 differs significantly because
it shields the defender only from liability to his attacker.30 Tort
actions by an instigator against his intended victim, however, are
relatively rare.31
2. Reputation
The Supreme Court of the United States recently stated in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 2 that the "first remedy of any victim
of defamation is self-help-using available opportunities to contra-
dict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse
impact on reputation."33 Public and private individuals share this
26. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 19, at 109.
27. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 63, 70 (1965).
28. Id. § 71.
29. See infra notes 185-233 and accompanying text.
30. See RESTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS Ch. 4, Topic 1, Scope Note (1965).
31. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATRERIAS ON TORTS 113
(7th ed. 1982). Because of the infrequency of this type of civil litigation and the similarity of
the tort privilege to its criminal law counterpart, Part Ill of this Special Project provides a
more detailed discussion of self-defense in the criminal law context. See infra notes 185-233
and accompany text.
32. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
33. Id. at 344. The Court found the increased efficiency of this remedy to be one rea-
son for requiring public figures to probe the defendant's defamatory intent before allowing
collection of defamation damages. See id.
1984] 855
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qualified privilege of rebuttal, 4 and oral or written replies to a de-
famatory statement are not actionable unless they are false and
exhibit "actual malice"sk--the knowing or reckless disregard of
whether the reply was false. 8 A negligent defamatory reply to an
original defamatory verbal attack, therefore, is insufficient to sup-
port a cause of action.
This apparently broad self-help remedy becomes markedly
more narrow in practice and often is inadequate. It may protect
the rebutter from suits premised on his statements but, as the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged, "the truth rarely catches up with a
lie"37 and the self-help "remedy" of rebuttal often is ineffective at
salvaging damaged reputations. Fruitful channels for rebuttal usu-
ally are unavailable for both public and private individuals because
rebuttals rarely are "hot news" and, therefore, receive little media
attention.' Legislative attempts to fortify this self-help remedy
are tenuous; statutes requiring publication of rebuttals are highly
suspect as unconstitutional restrictions on freedom of the press.8 9
Additionally, one commentator has suggested that the Supreme
Court has created a disincentive to using the rebuttal remedy.
40
This assertion rests on the reasoning that an attempt to rebut, par-
ticularly in a public forum, may tend to prove that the rebutter is
a public figure, thereby requiring him to meet the heavy burden of
showing actual malice in the original defamatory act to recover
damages in a formal judicial setting. 1
34. See RESTATmNT (SzcoND) OF TORTS § 594, comment k (1977); see also Taskett v.
King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 458, 546 P.2d 81, 92 (1976) (Horowitz, J., dissent-
ing) (right to verbal self-defense of defamation); Phifer v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 871 (Wyo.
1968) (replies to defamatory attacks are not tortious unless the reply is false and made with
actual malice).
35. Phifer v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 871 (Wyo. 1968).
36. Id.
37. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
38. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971) (plurality opinion).
39. The United States Supreme Court held a Florida statute that required the publi-
cation of a rebuttal violative of the first amendment. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Although Tornillo applied only to the specific statute before
the Court, the Tornillo rationale logically could extend to most mandatory rebuttal statutes.
The Court did not address statutes requiring retractions. Id. at 258 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
40. See Note, In Defense of Fault in Defamation Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1735, 1747 (1979).
41. Id. This Note also suggested a method to enhance the rebuttal remedy in cases
concerning defamatory news reports. The author suggested that courts use an evidentiary
rule which would allow the plaintiff to prove actual malice by imputing to the reporter in-
formation that the reporter could have obtained at the time of the writing. This rule would
induce reporters to check carefully the accuracy of a story with its subject because courts
would hold reporters responsible for knowledge of any information or inaccuracy that such a
856 [Vol. 37:845
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Given these problems, the efficacy of rebuttal remains ques-
tionable, and a defamed party only cautiously should resort to it.
Protracted counterattacks enhance the possibility of breaches of
the peace. Zealous assertions and bitter reprisals, likewise, can sub-
ject a rebutting party to liability if the original defaming party
convinces a jury that actual malice existed in the rebuttal. Rebut-
tal, furthermore, may be insufficient to cure financial losses that
sometimes result from injuries to a person's reputation. Following
the Court's opinion in Gertz,4 the additional availability of judi-
cial protections for the significant interest in personal reputations4
makes rebuttal even less attractive. In Gertz the Court held that
the first amendment precludes only strict liability for defamatory
statements concerning private individuals." Most state courts that
have interpreted Gertz require only a showing of negligent defama-
tion to win damages. 45 Under this standard the plaintiff's prospects
of financial recompense through formal judicial proceedings are
good. Recourse to the formal judicial process also arguably will dis-
seminate the victim's attempts to restore his reputation as effec-
tively as a simple rebuttal. Of course, self-help rebuttal still merits
consideration because it allows defamed individuals to react imme-
diately, and it supplements the judicial remedy in cases in which
the court's vindication of a plaintiff's rights does not totally and
effectively restore the individual's reputation. Another possible
justification for continued judicial acceptance of rebuttal is the
concept's role as an accommodation to human frailty, which per-
mits the healthy venting of emotions to promote peaceful,
nonadversarial subsidence of potential conflicts.
4 6
check would have produced. This checking requirement would give the subject of the story a
chance before publication to exercise effective, preventative self-help by correcting any de-
famatory falsehoods. See id. at 1747-51; see also KARK-TV v. Simon, 280 Ark. 228,
656 S.W.2d 702, 709 (1983) (Dudley, J. concurring) (favors such a rule because, inter alia, it
would provide a viable self-help remedy).
42. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see supra notes 32-33 and accom-
panying text.
43. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (reputation is a funda-
mental liberty that the state cannot abridge without due process); cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976) (reputation is significant enough to deserve fourteenth amendment due process
protections only when some other interest accompanies it).
44. 418 U.S. at 347.
45. See R. SACK, LmEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PRoBLEms 251-53 (1980) (seventeen
states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia had adopted a negligence standard as of
1980).
46. One court has noted that the modern cause of action for defamation is a substitute
for the older, unhealthy self-help remedy of dueling. See Ashton v. Commonwealth, 405
S.W.2d 562, 567 (Ky. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
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3. Uncoerced Religious Beliefs and Deprogramming
The recent growth in religious cult activity in the United
States,7 has spurred the development of a new self-help rem-
edy-deprogramming. This process entails attempts by family or
friends to take an adult person 48 away from a religious cult and to
use various psychological methods to turn the person away from
the cult, the beliefs it espouses, and its practices. 49 The desire of
family and friends to rescue the individual from the perceived evils
of the cult frequently motivates such actions.50 Judicial review of
the legality of this remedy arises when, despite the deprogram-
ming, the person returns to the cult and sues her abductors under
a variety of legal theories. The tort cases that usually arise in this
area include claims for assault, battery,51 intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and false imprisonment.52 The false imprison-
ment cases, although infrequent, most clearly illustrate the self-
help issues. Usually, parents either kidnap their adult child53 or
trick the child into accompanying them away from the cult's prop-
erty." The parents then take the adult child to "professional
deprogrammers" or family friends who confine the child and at-
tempt to deprogram her. This confinement clearly constitutes a
prima facie case of false imprisonment because it forcibly curtails
the adult child's liberty without legal right.
55
One state supreme court recently addressed such a situation in
Peterson v. Sorlien,5" a case concerning a twenty-one year old
47. See Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the
First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1, 6 (1977) (one to three million Americans are mem-
bers of 200 to 1000 religious cults).
48. This discussion focuses on the problems attendant to deprogramming adults
rather than minors.
49. For a description of the techniques that deprogrammers use, see T. PATRICK & T.
DYLACK, LET OuR CHID Go! (1976); see also LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Reli-
gious Sects, 46 FORDHAm L. REV. 599, 603-08 (1978).
50. See Delgado, supra note 46, at 25-36 (perceived evils include destruction of family
relationships, forced marriages, poor medical care, and bad living conditions).
51. See, e.g., Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 718 (D.R.I.), affd mem., 588 F.2d 818
(lst Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979) (claims of assult and battery).
52. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1031 (1981) (claims of false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
53. See, e.g., id. at 127 (parents kidnapped daughter from college and religious
community).
54. See, e.g., Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. at 719 (parents tricked daughter into re-
turning home using pretext of ill mother).
55. See infra note 109.
56. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 1031 (1981).
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woman's false imprisonment claim57 against her parents and other
individuals who attempted to disaffiliate her from a religious cult.
The cult's use of coercive belief indoctrination techniques figured
prominently in the court's decision to sustain the legality of the
parents' drastic self-help deprogramming effort. The daughter
proved that her parents had taken her from college where she was
active in a cult and brought her to the home of a deprogrammer. 58
She also demonstrated that for the first three days of the process
the deprogrammer confined her against her will." By the fourth
day, however, the deprogramming apparently had worked, and the
daughter once again acted "'like her old self"' and voluntarily
remained with her parents for an additional ten days. 61 Subse-
quently, however, she returned to the cult from which her parents
had taken her and filed suit against her parents and the
deprogrammer. Despite the evidence that the defendants detained
the woman against her will, the jury concluded that no false im-
prisonment occurred" because she had voluntarily consented to
the confinement." The state supreme court sustained the judg-
ment and stated that a determination of whether the jury correctly
concluded that she had consented would entail consideration of
the daughter's initial resistance to the deprogramming efforts "in
light of her actions in the remainder" of her stay with her par-
ents. 4 The court then stated the following:
[W]hen parents, or their agents, acting under the conviction that the judg-
mental capacity of their adult child is impaired, seek to extricate that child
from what they reasonably believe to be a religious or pseudo-religious cult,
and the child at some juncture assents to the actions in question, limitations
upon the child's mobility do not constitute meaningful deprivations of per-
sonal liberty sufficient to support a judgment for false imprisonment.
Although the court expressly refused to endorse deprogramming
self-help as a "preferred alternative," 66 the court's choice of lan-
57. The woman also sued the hired deprogrammers for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Id. at 125.
58. See id. at 127.




63. The parents seemed to have realized the strength of their daughter's case because
they asked her to sign an agreement releasing them from liability for their actions before
she returned to the cult's headquarters. See id. at 127.
64. Id. at 128.




guage and willingness to adopt a "relating back"' 7 theory of con-
sent clearly reflect the court's sympathy for the parent's plight.6 "
This example of a self-help remedy defies the logic of tort self-
help doctrine.6 1 The Peterson court effectively created a remedy
without first identifying a legally cognizable cause of action; when
adults voluntarily join religious cults, neither they nor the cults
commit a legal wrong. One judge in Peterson correctly observed
that "sympathy for parents seeking to help their 'misguided' off-
spring, however well-intentioned and loving their acts may be,"
does not justify modifying the longstanding tort law of false im-
prisonment.7 0 The court's real motive may have been to allow a
self-help remedy for situations in which the first amendment pre-
cludes state creation of a statutory response to the concerns that
religious cult activity raises.7 1 Such legal legerdemain, however,
sanctions an especially troublesome species of tort self-help that
courts should not condone. The defendants' behavior in Peterson,
unlike other self-help remedies that this part of the Special Project
discusses, does not supplement or replace formal judicial remedies.
Instead, the Peterson court has carved out a narrow niche in tradi-
tional tort law that invites citizens tortiously to breach the peace72
in efforts to remedy situations which neither the courts nor legisla-
tures deem unlawful.
C. Property Interests and Self-Help Privileges
1. Defense of Property
The common law generally recognizes a person's privilege to
use reasonable force to defend his lawful present possessory inter-
est in realty or chattels.73 This privilege excuses any batteries that
67. Id. at 134 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
68. The court also briefly noted that "[w]ere the relationship other than that of parent
and child, the consent would have less significance." Id. at 128.
69. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
70. 299 N.W.2d at 133 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
71. The first amendment free exercise clause, applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, prohibits states from interfering with the practice of a religion ab-
sent a compelling state interest. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (assuming the
Unification Church is a religion within the protective sphere of the first amendment); Hef-
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (assuming the
Krishna society is a religion within the protective sphere of the first amendment).
72. See, e.g., T. PATRICK & T. DYLACK, supra note 49, at 96 (deprogrammers using
violence on subjects), quoted in LeMoult, supra note 49, at 636 n.294.
73. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 77 comment a (1965). The Restatement
also recognizes a privilege that excuses any assaults or false imprisonments resulting from
the use of force. Id. § 80.
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the defender commits through use of reasonable force to protect
his property from another person's tortious or criminal 74 act. The
justifications for this self-help remedy exemplify the cardinal con-
cerns that underlie all tort self-help mechanisms. First, the judicial
mentality reflects the American societal consensus that the interest
in peaceful possession and enjoyment of property is a paramount
concern of an ordered society.75 Second, judicious recourse to or
threatened use of self-help privileges may serve a deterrent func-
tion by preventing or minimizing tortious and criminal behavior
against property owners.
76
Courts and legislatures, however, significantly limit this self-
help privilege of protecting one's property. An essential precondi-
tion to its exercise is the apparent reasonable necessity to repel
forcefully the invasion of property. Courts typically construe the
requirement of necessity as an imminent threat of tortious behav-
ior.78 Force is permissible, therefore, if a reasonable person stand-
ing in the shoes of the self-helper would think that force was nec-
essary to defend her property against an immediate danger of
unlawful or tortious trespass, entry, or carrying off.79 Courts also
usually require that owners give a warning before resorting to the
self-help privilege of defending their property by force.80
Another principal limitation on the privilege to defend prop-
erty is that any force must be reasonable under the circum-
74. Cf. infra notes 73-106 and accompanying text.
75. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 21, at 113.
76. Cf. id.
77. See, e.g., Bunten v. Davis, 82 N.H. 304, 312, 133 A. 16, 20 (1926).
78. See RESTATEzmNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 77 comment g (1965).
79. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 21, at 114. Accordingly, a mistake concerning the
necessity of using force is excusable if the mistake was reasonable under the circumstances.
See, e.g., Smith v. Delery, 238 La. 180, 187, 114 So. 2d 857, 859 (1959) (defendant privileged
in shooting paperboy whom defendant reasonably mistook for an intruder).
80. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 77 comment j (1965). The privilege to use
self-help may not exist when a warning or request to desist would avoid the imminent dan-
ger because a court could hold the self-helper criminally liable for his actions. See, e.g.,
State v. Cessna, 170 Iowa 726, 153 N.W. 194 (1915). Section 3.06(3)(a) of the Model Penal
Code states:
The use of force is justified under this Section only if the actor first requests the person
against whom such force is used to desist from his interference with the property, un-
less the actor believes that:
i) such request would be useless; or
ii) it would be dangerous to himself or another person to make the request; or
iii) substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of the property which is
sought to be protected before the request can effectively be made.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(a) (1962).
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stances.8 1 A common measure of reasonableness is whether the
owner's force was proportionate to both the threatened property
interest and the force that the person threatening the property in-
terest used.8 2 The Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement)
provides that a person may use only the least amount of force that
is reasonably necessary to prevent or terminate the intrusion.8
Most courts,' however, agree with the Restatement's position that
the use of deadly force 5 is never reasonable in protecting simple
property rights, even if deadly force is the least amount of force
necessary to prevent or end the intrusion.8 Many state legislatures
have adopted statutes that similarly restrict the use of deadly
force. 87 If the interest in protecting property accompanies a self-
defense interest such as protecting one's self or family from an at-
tack, then the law may condone the use of deadly force.8 Most
81. W. PRossmR, supra note 19, § 21, at 114-17.
82. See id. § 21, at 115.
83. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 81 (1965). The issue of reasonableness usually
is a question for the jury. W. PRossER, supra note 19, § 21, at 114.
84. E.g., Anderson v. Jenkins, 220 Miss. 145, 150-51, 70 So. 2d 535, 538 (1954) (no
right to use deadly weapon to repel invasion of property); see Posner, Killing or Wounding
to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201, 218-22 (1971).
85. Deadly force or killing force means force that threatens death or serious bodily
harm. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 79 (1965).
86. See id.
87. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-411 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 197, 198 (West
1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.02 (West 1976); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 14:19 (West 1974); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.20 (McKinney 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.49 (West 1982).
88. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 21, at 115; see also W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-rr,
HANDBOOK ON CRnuNAL LAw § 55, at 400. These limitations also apply to the use of mechan-
ical devices to protect one's property. See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa
1971) (use of spring triggered gun to protect unoccupied barn unreasonable); Bohlen &
Burns, The Privilege to Protect Property by Dangerous Barriers and Mechanical Devices,
35 YALE L.J. 525 (1926). Indeed, the use of deadly mechanical devices to protect property
from theft or trespass may be criminal. See, e.g., State v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S.W.
817 (1924) (owner of chili stand guilty of manslaughter when a loaded shotgun that he had
rigged to the stand's window killed an intruder). Although some courts may acquit if a
death results from the use of such a device in a situation in which the owner would have
been justified in using deadly force if he had been present, W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra, §
55, at 401, the Model Penal Code completely prohibits the use of deadly mechanical devices.
Section 3.06(5) states:
The justification afforded by this Section extends to the use of a device for the purpose
of protecting property only if:
(a) the device is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing
death or serious bodily harm; and
(b) the use of the particular device to protect the property from entry or trespass is
reasonable under the circumstances, as the actor believes them to be; and
(c) the device is one customarily used for such a purpose or reasonable care is taken to
make known to probable intruders the fact that it is used.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(5) (1962).
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American courts, however, reject the early English propensity to
justify more readily the use of deadly force to prevent unlawful
intrusions into the property owner's dwelling.89 The judicial desire
and societal interest in avoiding excessive violence apparently
transcend the personal and societal need to protect the venerated
sanctity of the home through self-help.
2. Recovery of Property
The privilege to recapture property complements the prospec-
tive right to protect property interests without incurring liability
by providing property owners with a limited shield against tort lia-
bility for acts that they take to recover property which others
wrongfully have taken. 0 This privilege, however, allows a person to
use only nondeadly force."'
The chief historical justification for the privilege of recapture
was the significance that the common law placed on physical pos-
session as a determinate of ownership.92 The rightful owner needed
a swift and effective cure for wrongful possession lest he lose his
claim to the property because of a lack of adequate proof of owner-
ship. The remedy at law was inadequate for two reasons. First,
courts rarely would compel the return of specific property, instead
opting to award damages.9 Second, the judicial process was slow
and the rightful owner suffered deprivation of his property for the
length of the proceedings.9 4 Such prolonged disruptions in posses-
sion obviously could aggravate injuries and heighten the potential
for violence.
The limitations that modern courts impose on this privilege
89. W. LAFAv & A. Sco'rr, supra note 88, § 55, at 400. Under the early English view
one could use deadly force to prevent an unlawful intrusion into his residence if he warned
the intruder to desist and reasonably believed that such force was necessary to repel the
intruder. This heightened right to protect one's home arose from the sentiment that the
defense of one's home was as important as the defense of one's life. Id.
90. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 22, at 117-18. The Uniform Commercial Code
has preempted this privilege to some degree, especially with respect to conditional sales. A
subsequent section of this Special Project discusses the concern that attempted recapture of
property may constitute criminal behavior. See infra notes 252-75 and accompanying text.
This section explores current judicial attitudes toward recapture in the tort law context.
Most of the policy and practical concerns about the scope of the recapture privilege, how-
ever, apply equally in the criminal and tort context.
91. RzsTATzmzNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 106(b) (1965).
92. The common law considered physical possession a major attribute of ownership
and required proof of possession to effect most transfers. Note, The Right of Recaption of
Chattels by Force, 34 Ky. L.J. 65, 65 (1945).




reflect a judicial fear of the drastic nature and potential ramifica-
tions of this remedy. Courts view tortious dispossession, either by
force or by fraud, as a threshold requirement for recovering prop-
erty."5 Courts also require that the attempted recapture occur im-
mediately after dispossession or upon "fresh pursuit" of the wrong-
doer.96 A self-helping property owner who cannot meet these
prerequisites runs a risk of liability because the privilege to recover
property will not have attached. 7 A property owner also can use
only a reasonable amount of force to recover her property, and
some courts have held that force which causes a breach of the
peace is unreasonable." Of course, if the dispossessor forcibly re-
sists, the person attempting recapture can exercise the privilege to
meet and repel such force. 9 Finally, a court may hold the person
seeking recapture liable for a mistake concerning his right to the
property or the wrongfulness of the dispossession. 100
Unlike the defense of property privilege, the right to recapture
essentially gives the self-helper a license to be an aggressor. 10' Con-
sequently, the rules that require fresh pursuit and which limit the
permissible force to anything short of a breach of the peace may be
the courts' method of reducing the opportunity for blatant repri-
sals and the likelihood of violence in recapture situations. Despite
these constraints, the value of sustaining this privilege becomes
questionable because of the policies that currently guide courts in
the tort self-help area, 02 and the probability of violent breaches of
95. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 101 (1965).
96. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 22, at 118; cf. Allen v. People, 82 Ill. 610 (1876).
97. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 22, at 118. The Restatement requires pursuit
upon discovery without unreasonable delay. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 103 & com-
ment b (1965); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(1)(b)(ii) (1962) (in criminal prosecution, per-
mits force in recapture even after elapse of time if the recapturer believes that his victim
has no claim of right to the property).
98. See, e.g., Stuyvesant v. Wilcox, 92 Mich. 233, 52 N.W. 465 (1892) (right to recap-
ture property is subordinate to preservation of public peace); Hodgeden v. Hubbard, 18 Vt.
504, 507 (1846) (one can only retake fraudulently obtained property if it can be done with-
out breach of the peace). The Restatement, however, appears to allow any reasonable force
up to, but not including, deadly or killing force. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 106
(1965); accord Note, supra note 92, at 68 (arguing that all reasonable force should be per-
mitted regardless of breaches of the peace as an accommodation to human frailty).
99. See, e.g., Hodgeden v. Hubbard, 18 Vt. 504, 507 (1846).
100. See Estes v. Brewster Cigar Co., 156 Wash. 465, 472, 287 P. 36, 39 (1930); RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 100 comment d (1965). Under the Model Penal Code, how-
ever, that person might not be guilty of a criminal act. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.06(1)(b)(ii) (1962).
101. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 22, at 117.
102. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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the peace 03 seem to outweigh the societal benefits of recapture.
More importantly, however, the original justifications for allowing
recapture are inconsistent with current judicial practices. Courts
no longer consider physical possession the principal determinant of
ownership, and they increasingly are more willing to use the rem-
edy of specific performance. 1 The present judicial remedy, there-
fore, does not evince the same degree of inadequacy that influ-
enced the development of the original principle of recapture.
Furthermore, self-help in situations necessitating defense of prop-
erty is more justifiable than self-help in the recapture situation. In
the former, self-help may avert or minimize a tort when judicial
preventive measures are impossible. In recapture, however, the ob-
jective is to remedy a tort-related harm, and normal judicial pro-
ceedings can achieve this goal as effectively as self-help, yet with-
out the additional likelihood of violence or other breaches of the
peace. One possible justification for the continued recognition of
privileged recapture is that such a privilege comports with funda-
mental notions of fairness and "the frailties of human nature."
10 5
The natural reaction of one who experiences the wrongful dispos-
session of property frequently is to attempt to regain it, and judi-
cial imposition of liability on the wronged person for the results of
such natural behavior arguably is inequitable. °s
3. Merchant's Privilege to Detain Suspected Shoplifters
Shoplifting is one of the rare areas in which modern courts
and legislatures have enlarged the scope of self-help remedy to
meet changing circumstances. In the past ten years merchants suf-
fered an estimated annuial loss attributable to shoplifting that rose
from $7 billion 10 7 to $16 billion.108 One reason for this unchecked
increase was the unenviable position with respect to shoplifters in
103. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Gracen, 279 Or. 303, 306, 567 P.2d 546, 548 (1977) (defend-
ant in attempting to recapture stolen property wounded innocent bystander above the eye
with .357 magnum birdshot).
104. The judicial remedy still may be slow, but delay alone is not a sufficient rationale
for self-help because it would justify self-help in practically all cases.
105. See Note, supra note 92, at 68.
106. Recognition of the natural impulse to pursue the taker of one's property also may
help explain the "fresh pursuit" requirement, since a delay obviously would allow the ire of
the wronged party to subside, thereby negating the natural impulse justification. Conversa-
tion with Dean Wade, Jan. 4, 1984.
107. Comment, Shoplifting: Protection for Merchants in Wisconsin, 57 MARQ. L. REv.
141, 141 (1973).
108. Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1981, at 1, coL 5.
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which traditional common law placed merchants. Merchants his-
torically could use one of three alternative methods to handle sus-
pected shoplifters. First, the merchant could stop and search or
question a suspected shoplifter at the risk of facing a false impris-
onment claim by an innocent detainee.109 Second, the merchant
could gamble on being correct about the suspected shoplifter and
make a citizens' arrest, but this alternative risks liability for false
arrest and false imprisonment.1 0 Last, the merchant could ignore
the suspected shoplifter, thereby conceding the potential loss of
property but avoiding any liability under a false imprisonment
claim.
The first judicial attack on the merchants' dilemma occurred
in Collyer v. S.H. Kress & Co."" when the California Supreme
Court recognized a limited privilege for a merchant to detain on
his business premises a person whom the merchant had probable
cause to suspect of shoplifting.1 This court-fashioned privilege
permitted merchants to use reasonable force to detain a suspected
shoplifter for a reasonable period of time to further investigate the
incident.11 3 Although the Restatement eventually adopted Califor-
nia's approach,1 1 4 only a few other jurisdictions judicially have rec-
ognized this privilege.11 5 State legislatures, sensitive to the con-
cerns of their domestic businesses, subsequently have adopted
statutory versions of the merchant's privilege in almost all jurisdic-
tions that had failed judicially to recognize an immunity for
109. False imprisonment occurs when one loses either liberty of movement or freedom
to remain in the place of his lawful choice by force or threat of force. Moore v. Pay'N Save
Corp., 20 Wash. App. 482, 486, 581 P.2d 159, 162-63 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 120A comment a (1965); see, e.g., Zayre, Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 S.E.2d
710 (1966) (false imprisonment liability imposed on the store owner for a good faith mistake
as to shoplifting). Liability for mistakenly detaining suspected shoplifters also makes the
privilege to recapture property useless in suspected shoplifting situations. See supra notes
90-106 and accompanying text.
110. False arrest is an unjustified arrest that subjects the arrestor to liability for false
imprisonment. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 118 comment b (1965).
111. 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
112. See id. at 180-81, 54 P.2d at 23.
113. Id. at 181-82, 59 P.2d at 24.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120A (1965) (one who reasonably believes
that another has tortiously taken a chattel from his premises, or has failed to make due cash
payment for a chattel purchased or services rendered there, is privileged, without arresting
the other, to detain him on the premises for the time necessary for a reasonable investiga-
tion of the facts).
115. See Note, Torts-False Imprisonment and Arrest-Powers of a Merchant to De-
tain Suspected Shoplifters, 50 N.C.L. Rxv. 188, 193 (1971) (by 1971 the courts of eight
states had adopted merchant privileges).
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merchants to detain and conduct reasonable investigations of sus-
pected shoplifters. 116 The scope of the self-help right to detain a
suspected shoplifter, whether judicially or statutorily created, var-
ies among jurisdictions, 117 but a merchant's exposure to tort liabil-
ity for stopping and questioning a suspected shoplifter clearly is
much less under the.current laws than it was under the traditional
common law.118
The judicial and legislative creation of this new self-help privi-
lege is somewhat contrary to the usually restrictive policy of courts
and legislatures toward tort self-help. It is, however, an under-
standable accommodation to an indentifiable, costly problem and
an anomalous inconsistency in the law. The old common law dis-
couraged merchants from protecting their property and business
interests.119 The common law, therefore, effectively denied
merchants privileges analogous to the rights that it recognized for
the average citizen, such as the privileges to defend and recover
property.22 0 The modern approach to a merchant's privilege to de-
tain shoplifting suspects serves as a logical method to combat a
problem not readily amenable to a judicial remedy. The privilege
does not disturb dramatically society's interest in peace and order
because merchants exercise their right within the confines of their
places of business. Furthermore, merchants are not likely to abuse
the privilege because courts limit it -by making the merchants lia-
ble in tort for overstepping reasonable bounds, 21 and because the
economic disincentives of mistakenly or unnecessarily harassing
customers subdue the merchants' overzealousness. A narrowly de-
fined merchant's privilege to detain suspected shoplifters, there-
fore, serves a legitimate purpose in a difficult situation.
116. See Comment, supra note 107, at 155 n.46. Interestingly, although the courts
were the first to recognize the privilege to detain suspected shoplifters, the legislatures solid-
ified the privilege. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dep't Store, 12 Mich. App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347
(1968), rev'd on other grounds, 383 Mich. 90, 174 N.W.2d 765 (1970) (extending privilege
beyond business premises).
118. A merchant, however, may still be liable for slander if he uses defamatory lan-
guage toward a suspected shoplifter. See Zayre, Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 50, 147 S.E.2d
710, 713 (1966) (words falsely conveying the charge of a criminal offense involving moral
turpitude are slanderous per se).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
120. See supra notes 73-106 and accompanying text.
121. This limit, of course, applies to all self-help privileges. By overstepping the




4. Summary Abatement of Nuisance
The privilege to summarily abate a nuisance is a self-help
remedy arising from property interests that has existed at least
since the earliest reported cases.122 Two types of nuisance exist.
123
A private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a person's
right to use or enjoy his real property.12 4 A public nuisance, how-
ever, is an unreasonable interference with common public rights1 25
such as health, safety, morality, or convenience.1 2 Because the
tortfeasor's awareness of the nuisance is a prerequisite to permissi-
ble summary abatement, 127 self-help abatement applies only to in-
tentional nuisances. 2 s Similarly, self-help abatement chiefly con-
cerns private nuisance, although a limited privilege exists to abate
a public nuisance if the abater has suffered "special harm.
1 29
The current limitations on the privilege are not very strict. A
person may abate with the use of reasonable force any nuisance
that he suffers after the tortfeasor knows of the nuisance and fails
to take action to cure it.15 0 This privilege gives the abater the right
to commit a trespass and, in some instances, the right to destroy
the nuisance-creating property."1 Maddran v. Mullendore' 2 illus-
trates both of these privileges. The defendant grocery store owner
122. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at § 90, at
605 & n.67, citing Y.B. 14 Edw. 11, 422, pl. 3 (1322). Dean Prosser has described the law of
nuisance as an "impenetrable jungle." W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 86, at 571.
123. For an extensive discussion of the law of nuisance see Prosser, Private Action For
Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 997-1004 (1966); Note, Self-Help: A Viable Remedy
for Nuisance? A Guide For the Common Man's Lawyer, 24 ARiz. L. Rv. 83, 83-87 (1982).
124. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 89, at 591.
125. Id. § 88, at 583.
126. Note, supra note 123, at 84.
127. See RESTATEMENT (SscoND) OF TORTS § 201(c) (1965). This provision requires a
demand by the aggrieved landowner that the person causing the nuisance abate it. Presuma-
bly, the nuisance is intentional if it continues after the demand to abate.
128. Tort liability for creating a nuisance can be based on the theories of intentional,
negligent, or strict tort liability. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 87, at 574.
129. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 203(2) (1965). "Special harm" means an in-
jury different in kind, not just degree, from that which the general public suffers. Burgess v.
MN Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973), aff'd mem., 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir.
1977); Reynolds, Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 318, 332 (1978).
130. See State ex rel Herman v. Cardon, 112 Ariz. 548, 551, 544 P.2d 657, 660 (1976);
Note, supra note 123, at 94.
131. E.g., State ex rel. Herman v. Cardon, 112 Ariz. 548, 551, 344 P.2d 657, 660 (1976)
(plaintiff justified in destroying state built curb that restricted access to his property); see
W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 90, at 606; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 201 comment j
(1965).
132. 206 Md. 291, 111 A.2d 608 (1955). One author has discussed this case in depth.
See Note, supra note 123, at 89-90.
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in Maddran also owned the right of way through an alley between
his store and the plaintiff neighbor's residence.'" 3 Defendant had
used the alley for years to make deliveries to his store. A locked
gate blocked the alley, but plaintiff, pursuant to defendant's ease-
ment, always had provided defendant with a key.134 The neighbor
objected to defendant's increased use of the alley, especially for
deliveries of meat which she claimed dripped blood. Plaintiff con-
sequently put a new lock on the gate and refused defendant's em-
ployee access to the alley even after he had requested it. The em-
ployee then pulled the entire lock mechanism off the gate, and
plaintiff, in a further effort to block the employee's access, moved a
chair into the alley and sat down. After plaintiff refused to move,
the employee moved the chair out of the way and, as he walked
past, apparently brushed plaintiff with the meat.135 Plaintiff
brought suit for assault and battery and appealed after the trial
court directed a verdict for the store owner.13 6 The Maryland
Court of Appeals found that defendant was reasonably within his
property rights in using his easement for meat deliveries and held
that the employee's destruction of the lock and trespassing upon
the neighbor's property were privileged actions. Furthermore, the
court found that defendant was privileged in moving plaintiff and
battering her since the store owner was doing no more than abat-
ing a nuisance that had deprived him of his property rights in the
alley.137 Although plaintiff had argued that the court should have
required defendant to use the judicial system to enforce his right
to use the alley, 3 8 the court of appeals affirmed the privilege to
summarily abate a nuisance because recourse to the courts will be
too slow in most cases to provide effective relief."' The court, how-
ever, was careful to emphasize that the force which one uses to
abate a nuisance must be reasonable. Thus, because plaintiff had
suffered no actual physical injuries in the instant case, the trial
court properly directed the verdict for defendant.
40
The Maddran decision illustrates the potential limitations of
self-help abatement. The abater must act reasonably and show
133. 206 Md. at 295, 111 A.2d at 609.
134. Id. at 296, 111 A.2d at 610.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 297, 111 A.2d at 610.
137. Id. at 299-300, 111 A.2d at 612.
138. See id. at 297, 111 A.2d at 610.
139. Id. at 297, 111 A.2d at 610-11.
140. Id. at 302, 111 A.2d at 613.
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that any damage he caused was necessary to abate the nuisance. 141
Furthermore, the court likely will hold an abater liable for any per-
sonal injuries that result from his use of self-help abatement.142
Implicit in this limitation is the court's willingness to engage in a
retrospective balancing of the risk of violence that an attempted
self-help abatement creates. In effect, the court uses this balancing
analysis to delineate the boundaries of privileged activity; and if
the court feels that the abater's self-help activity creates an unrea-
sonable risk of violence or harm as evidenced by physical injury,
for instance, the court will not extend the liability shield of privi-
lege to the abatement.
Several factors justify the apparent judicial willingness to im-
pose minimal guidance on the privilege of summary abatement.
First, incidents involving summary abatement of nuisances usually
have an essentially local flavor. The nuisance maker and the self-
help abater often are neighbors, and many courts may be reluctant
to encourage property owners to escalate every neighborly disa-
greement into a civil lawsuit.143 Second, in many instances sum-
mary abatement could settle the problem more quickly, inexpen-
sively, and equitably than a formal judicial proceeding.1 44 Last,
courts may depend upon the traditional notion of an individual's
unquestioned dominance over his real property to justify the privi-
lege of property owners to summarily abate nuisances which
threaten that interest.1 45 Despite these considerations, however,
more definite judicial guidance is necessary in this area, in addition
to good common sense, because the potential for breaches of the
peace and violence in summary abatement situations is significant.
If courts continue to condone summary abatement of nuisances,
therefore, individuals should exercise this privilege with great care.
141. Accord Fick v. Neilson, 98 Cal. App. 2d 683, 220 P.2d 752 (1950); RzSTATEzENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 201 comment o (1965).
142. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 201 comment k (1965); W. PROSSER,
supra note 19, § 90, at 606. Of course, if the nuisance creator instigates the violence, the
abater could exercise his privilege to inflict injury in self-defense. See supra notes 19-28 and
accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 234, 175 N.E. 490, 491 (1931)
(common sense dictates that it is preferable for an individual to protect himself from a
nuisance than to subject his neighbors to possibly vexatious suits).
144. Also, a judicial remedy may be difficult to fashion for a given nuisance. See
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970) (court divided over type of remedy to award for curing pollution nuisance).
145. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 90, at 605.
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D. Judicially Required Self-Help
Judicially required self-help may seem anomalous given mod-
ern courts' hesitant, limited acceptance of tort self-help remedies.
Tort law, however, sometimes requires a person to exercise self-
help as a prerequisite to obtaining a full and effective judicial rem-
edy for an injury.44 The "avoidable consequences" or "mitigation
of damages" rule is the most notable form of self help that courts
require tort victims to exercise. This tort damages principle re-
quires injured parties to make all reasonable self-help efforts nec-
essary to minimize tort injuries.1 7 Courts will not award compen-
satory damages for any portion of an injury attributable to the
victim's failure to employ reasonable self-help to minimize the se-
verity of the harm.1
4 8
Mitigation of damages, unlike the previously discussed tort
self-help privileges, is a judicial mandate. It does not create a priv-
ilege to do something which, except for the circumstances, would
be tortious, and it requires only that the victim do what is reasona-
ble and legal. 4 9 When a self-help privilege exists, therefore, the
tort victim usually may choose between exercising her right to self-
help or securing a remedy through formal legal proceedings. In a
mitigation of damages situation, however, the tort victim must
choose between using all reasonable measures to mitigate the dam-
ages and forfeiting any judicial remedy for injuries that result from
her failure to mitigate. This form of self-help reflects the law's in-
terest in equitably apportioning liability for tortious behavior.
The logic supporting the mitigation of damages rule does not
apply to the rare cases in which courts classify the failure to cure
or prevent a tort by exercising a self-help privilege as a type of
contributory negligence that limits or bars a judicial remedy. An
146. Under a broad interpretation of tort "self-help," the doctrines of contributory
negligence and comparative negligence are classifiable as judicially required types of self-
help. Courts may deny any or part of a judicial remedy to an individual who contributes to
his own injury by failing to exercise reasonable care. The law requires each individual to
make reasonable efforts to avoid harm that the unreasonable behavior of others causes. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965) (contributory negligence is conduct by the
plaintiff that shirks the duty to protect himself); UNIFORM ComPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1
(1979) (negligent conduct by claimant will proportionately diminish recoverable damages).
147. See W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 65, at 422-23. These efforts may include seek-
ing appropriate medical attention, replacing a converted chattel, or protecting one's prop-
erty from further invasions.
148. Id. § 65, at 423-24.
149. The mitigator, however, may be liable for the costs of any unreasonable steps
taken. Also, the initial costs of reasonable mitigation measures may make mitigation infeasi-
ble for some victims. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 950 comment c (1979).
1984]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Illinois appellate court recently ruled in Mahurin v. Lockhart1 50
that the plaintiff's failure to exercise his privilege of summary
abatement of a nuisance raised a question of contributory negli-
gence for the jury to consider.15 Plaintiff in Mahurin sued to re-
cover for injuries that he sustained from the fall of a neighbor's
tree limb which extended over plaintiff's property. The appellate
court remanded the case with instructions that the jury should
consider whether plaintiff's failure to exercise his privilege of en-
tering his neighbor's yard and severing the limb constituted con-
tributory negligence. 152 The court, thereby, took an ill-considered
step toward converting the privilege of summary abatement of nui-
sance, a longstanding alternative to judicial dispute resolution, into
an essential precondition to recovering damages for injuries result-
ing from nuisances. This holding is plainly inequitable because it
places the injured party in a quandary. Actionable nuisances are
prerequisites to the privilege of summary abatement, but actiona-
ble nuisances frequently are difficult to identify.153 The Mahurin
rationale penalizes the injured party for failing to anticipate the
court's characterization of a condition as a nuisance. Even when
the privilege is easier to identify, however, the victim should be
able to opt for a formal judicial remedy. The Mahurin position
also could penalize the injured party because he chose to avoid the
risks of disturbance and violence that self-help remedies engender.
Courts should be wary of confusing the rationales and principles of
required damage mitigation and discretionary self-help measures.




Commenting on the role of individuals in the American crimi-
nal law system, one court observed "[t]hat no person should take
the law into his own hands is so basic to our legal tradition that it
needs no citation."" Although this remark may typify the reluc-
150. 71 Ill. App. 3d 691, 390 N.E.2d 523 (1979).
151. Id. at 694, 390 N.E.2d at 525.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text. This difficulty is especially ap-
parent when trees create a nuisance. See Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N.E. 490
(1931) (holding that overhanging branches from a neighbor's tree are not a nuisance).
154. State v. Kyles, 169 Conn. 438, 443, 363 A.2d 97, 99 (1975). Courts have demon-
strated their adherence to this proposition through their treatment of jury instructions. In
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tance of courts and legislatures to relinquish or to share their au-
thority over preventing crime, protecting citizens, and appre-
hending, prosecuting, and punishing criminals, these sentiments
clearly have not precluded the exercise of self-help in criminal
matters. The term "self-help" in the criminal law context denotes
two distinct but often related concepts. First, many forms of self-
help constitute criminal activity for which the state may prosecute
and punish the self-helper.1 55 Under specified circumstances, how-
ever, the law permits an individual to take identical self-help mea-
sures without incurring criminal liability. These privileges are de-
fenses against criminal prosecution in much the same way that tort
self-help privileges are shields against tort liability."' In fact, the
criminal and tort privileges, because they share similar and well-
established rationales, are often virtually coterminous. 57 Second,
many individuals and groups actively participate in crime preven-
tion, criminal arrests, punishment, and retribution. These self-help
measures, whether intended to supplement or supplant the role of
the state as the guardian of public safety and justice, are neither
consistently lawful nor unlawful. In these situations a privilege or
duty to act sometimes exists. In other situations, however, self-
helpers might incur tort or criminal liability. 5 8 Society has a stake
in every exercise of self-help that violates the law because it
threatens public peace, order, and administration of justice.
State v. Puryear, 30 N.C. App. 719, 729, 228 S.E.2d 536, 543 (1976), the court found no error
in the following jury instructions:
Now, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, you should not decide this case upon the
basis of your own standard of morals, nor upon what you might like the law to be.
(No person is justified in taking the law in his own hands. No person is justified to
constitute himself the keeper of the morals of his fellowman. No person is justified in
acting as judge, jury and executioner. You should not decide this case upon the basis of
sympathy for anyone, nor upon the basis of anger at anyone. You should decide this
case upon the basis of the law that I have given you and the facts as you find them to
be.)
Cf. People v. Johnson, 83 M11. App. 3d 586, 588, 404 N.E.2d 531, 533 (1980) (the examination
of a defendent on the question whether any person has the right to take the law into his
own hands was improper because the question has no bearing on the defendent's guilt).
155. The prohibitions set forth in criminal statutes typically define the boundaries of
permissible self-help activity.
156. See supra notes 19-106 and accompanying text.
157. For example, part H, section B, subsection 1 discusses the rationale underlying
the privilege of self-defense concerning tort liability. This privilege, with almost identical
limitations, also exists in susbstantive criminal law. See infra notes 185-283 and accompany-
ing text.
158. Some instances of self-help raise the issue of whether the acts of a private citizen
might subject the state to liability or responsibility under the state action theory. See infra
note 367 for a discussion of the exclusionary rule.
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Courts and legislatures have not retracted their recognition of
the legitimacy and benefit of some self-help measures. 159 They are,
however, understandably more wary and critical of self-help in
criminal law contexts than in tort law contexts. In addition to their
concern about the heightened potential for violence that stems
from self-help in criminal contexts, legislators and judges
probably feel that citizens should resort first to courts and law en-
forcement officials before using self-help methods of remedying
criminal activity. For example, a Michigan Supreme Court Justice,
demonstrating this attitude, regarded the intrusion of private citi-
zen groups into the domain of law enforcement and public safety
as one of the most unfortunate phenomena of recent decades.160
Public concern over the increasing incidence of crime"' ampli-
fies the likelihood of the public's recourse to extrajudicial self-help
measures to protect itself and punish criminals.62 Coincidentally,
however, the citizenry is ignoring the basic purpose of the organ-
ized judicial system by engaging in self-help. The criminal justice
system evolved out of governmental and societal concern with
maintaining order and preventing chaos in society.163 The substan-
tive and procedural structure of the modern criminal justice sys-
tem is the product of decades of development and refinement
aimed toward the goal of creating an effective system that the pub-
lic can rely upon and trust. 1 4 Ironically, the complexity and com-
159. One court that discussed the applicability of a self-defense statute recently ob-
served that "while it can be acknowledged that one element of a mature criminal justice
system is to narrow the areas where individuals may resort to self-help in the infliction of
punishment or the taking of life, no court has seen fit to abolish the concept of self-de-
fense." State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d 550, 556 (W. Va. 1981).
160. Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 577, 198 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
161. In a speech urging enactment of the Reagan Administration's proposed changes
in the federal criminal justice system, former United States Attorney General William F.
Smith warned that violent crime has increased 85% in the past 10 years and is now at a
"crisis level." N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1983, at D12, col. 5.
162. See, e.g., State v. Levi, 259 La. 591, 595, 250 So. 2d 751, 753 (1971).
163. State v. Higgins, 338 A.2d 159, 164 (Me. 1975).
164. See C. REmBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND (1980), for a fascinating description of the
evolution of the American legal system. Two of the most notable features of our criminal
justice system that influence the public's faith in its effectiveness are open judicial trials and
sentencing procedures. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571
(1980). The Court in Richmond Newspapers observed that the citizenry must be able to see
that the judicial system is acting in its best interest. Id. One commentator suggested that
open judicial forums placate society's urge to punish. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity
to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1961). This commentator sug-
gested that the judicial process of accusation and determination of guilt satisfies society's
urge to punish as much as the actual execution of punishment. Id.
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prehensiveness of this procedural structure may encourage some
citizens to spurn formal judicial processes.1 65 Self-help in many
cases, unfortunately, is antithetical to order and peace because it
allows individuals to disregard legal rules and determine for them-
selves what is law.116
Courts and legislatures strongly encourage reliance on the for-
mal judicial processes rather than self-help in several ways. Legis-
latures, of course, provide and maintain police forces charged with
promoting public safety and protecting society against crime. Ad-
ditionally, legislatures may specifically prohibit or permit self-help
activity. 167 Courts may impose criminal penalties on persons who
deliberately bypass adequate judicial remedies and participate in
illegal self-help activities.' 8 Courts also interpret and apply law in
a manner that condones 69 or condemns certain self-help actions.
Clearly, courts avoid establishing presumptions that authorize self-
help as an alternative to the criminal justice procedures because
they fear that unrestrained self-help in criminal matters could lead
to anarchy.
The retributive function of sentencing convicted criminals also may suppress tempta-
tions to resort to vigilante justice. See, e.g., State v. Christopher, 133 Ariz. 508, 510, 652 P.
2d 1031, 1033 (1982). Although retribution no longer is the primary objective of criminal
sentencing, see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949), it remains a consideration.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 394-95 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court stated that
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that in-
stinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promot-
ing the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organ-
ized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment
they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy--of self-help, vigilante jus-
tice, and lynch law.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 451).
165. See United States v. Fay, 323 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1963) (Lumbard, C.J.,
concurring).
166. In United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947), the Supreme
Court cautioned against self-help remedies because "[i]f one man can be allowed to deter-
mine for himself what is law, every man can." Id. at 312.
167. The privilege of self-defense is an example of self-help that courts and legisla-
tures expressly have permitted.
168. For example, when a truck driver drove through a fence to gain entry to a drive-
way that he had the right to use, the court convicted him of criminal trespass. State v.
Moore, 243 Ga. 594, 255 S.E.2d 709 (1979).
169. Courts are more likely to condone peaceful self-help measures than forceful ones
because they pose only a minimal threat to social order. In Wyche v. Hester, 431 F.2d 791
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), the court held that, despite the law's
general condemnation of self-help, nonforcible attempts to gain admittance to establish-
ments that the federal civil rights acts regulate are immune from prosecution. Id. at 794-95.
The court also remarked that the protestors must pursue a statutory remedy. Id. at 795.
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A notable example of a court's express refusal to acknowledge
the propriety of self-help retribution for criminal acts occurred in
Crumpton v. Confederation Life Insurance Co., 170 a recent life in-
surance contract dispute case. In Crumpton, a woman murdered
the insured decedent who she claimed had raped her. The plaintiff
in the insurance contest sought payment from Confederation Life
under the policy's accidental death clause. The insurance company
argued that the death was not accidental because the decedent
should have foreseen that the woman he raped would attempt to
injure him.17 1 The court instructed the jury that the law did not
require it to find that murder of the insured decedent was the nat-
ural result of his actions. The court observed that, although "rape
and assault are violent actions, one does not necessarily anticipate
that the victim will sometimes later take the law into her own
hands."',
Self-help in the criminal context survives despite this atmo-
sphere of general disapproval. The persistence of self-help perhaps
is attributable to public frustration with and contempt for the
American criminal justice system, which many people perceive as
inadequate or ineffective.1 78 Two recent and striking examples of
strong public support for private self-help actions reflect the atti-
tudes that some citizens harbor about police, courts, and legisla-
tures. First, in August 1983 an elderly woman repelled her attack-
ers in Manhattan's Port Authority bus terminal by threatening
them with an unloaded .32 caliber revolver. 7 4 The police arrested
the woman on a weapons charge, but later dropped the charges
and released her. A group of private citizens rewarded the woman
by replacing her confiscated weapon and awarding her five hun-
dred dollars.' 5 The second incident presents a more shocking ex-
ample of public support for self-help responses to criminal acts. In
a Buffalo, New York housing project, a young girl described to her
father and a group of neighbors the man she said had sodomized
170. 672 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1982). The court in Crumpton acknowledged that the
question might be closer if the woman had shot the insured decedent during the rape. Id. at
1255. Cf. State v. Graves, 252 N.C. 779, 780, 114 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1960) (the court granted a
retrial of a rape case because the prosecutor told the jury that because rape was the kind of
crime that naturally tempts people to take the law into their own hands, the jury ought to
recommend the death penalty to dissuade people from engaging in self-help retribution).
171. Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 1248, 1251 (5th Cir. 1982).
172. Id. at 1255.





her.1" 6 Recognizing the description, the group rushed to the alleged
attacker's apartment and repeatedly stabbed, kicked, and beat the
man while a television crew filmed the episode.1 77 The girl's father
spent one night in jail before being released on an unsecured
$10,000 bond. 1 7  A defense fund established for the father by
neighbors17 9 attracted contributions from several states,180 while
Albany's mayor issued statements that supported the father's ac-
tion.1 8' Although support for the self-helpers in these cases was not
unanimous, 28 the public responses exemplify the alarming un-
dercurrents of support in society for self-help, lawful and unlawful,
in the field of criminal activity.
The American criminal justice system and substantive crimi-
nal law contain accommodations that allow private citizens to pro-
tect themselves, maintain social order, and vent their frustrations
about crime and the legal system. Criminal law, for example, gives
citizens the right to defend themselves, their property, and third
persons against criminal conduct.183 The law also authorizes more
active citizen participation in crime-fighting.
1 8 4
This part of the Special Project examines judicial, legislative,
and societal treatment of self-help responses to crime. Part B re-
views the privileges of individual citizens to defend themselves,
their property, and third persons. Part C addresses the role of pri-
vate citizens in crime prevention and criminal arrests. More impor-
tantly, part C explores vigilantism, from its historical roots to con-
176. Street Sentence, Tnw, Aug. 15, 1983, at 15.
177. Id. Many people were supportive of Williams' self-help. A Buffalo bartender said
that Williams "should have kept on stabbing. He did what any father would have done, and
he shouldn't be charged." Id. Paul J. Cambria, Williams' defense attorney, stated that
"[c]op after cop came up to him in the cell and congratulated him." Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. A Buffalo city councilman also established a defense fund for the father.
Winerip, Rape Case: Vengeance and Furor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1983, at B1, col. 1.
180. This fund attracted contributions from Iowa, Utah, Florida, and Delaware. Street
Sentence, TM, Aug. 15, 1983, at 15.
181. Id. Buffalo Mayor James Griffin also remarked that "if a guy raped my daughter,
he would have got the same thing from me." Winerip, Rape Case: Vengeance and Furor,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1983, at B1, col. 1.
182. In the Buffalo incident, the father's prosecutor, Richard J. Arcara, asked, "[i]f
you allow people to put themselves above the law, where do you draw the line?" Street
Sentence, TiME, Aug. 15, 1983, at 15. "The reason we have a whole system of laws is to
prevent vigilante-style justice. We cannot turn our system of justice to the streets." Winerip,
Rape Case: Vengeance and Furor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1983, at B1, col. 1. Buffalo City
Court Judge Wilbur P. Trammell agreed with Arcara that this "kind of anarchy is no good
for anyone, especially minorities." Street Sentence, TIME, Aug. 15, 1983, at 15.
183. See infra notes 188-275 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 276-355 and accompanying text.
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temporary practices. Part C also discusses citizen action groups,
which are organized to discourage and combat crime. Part D exam-
ines the right to resist unlawful arrests, and the privilege to escape
from police incarceration.
B. Self-Help and Criminal Liability
1. Self-Defense
(a) Historical and Theoretical Background
The privilege of self-defense is perhaps the most notable form
of self-help in criminal law. The privilege allows persons to use
reasonable force against an aggressor to protect themselves against
tortious or criminal attacks. 185 When persons properly exercise the
self-defense privilege, courts will not hold them criminally liable
for their actions. Thus, self-defense may be a complete defense to
murder, manslaughter, and assault and battery.186
Although courts in contemporary society embrace the self-de-
fense privilege,' 87 English common law did not recognize this privi-
lege. 88 Persons who acted in self-defense risked absolute criminal
liability.189 Rulers in early societies prohibited self-defense to dis-
courage violent self-help activity that could disrupt societal order
and threaten their ruling authority. 90 As societies became more
stable these concerns about self-defense dissipated. Initially, the
law recognized self-defense as a "mitigating factor" in, rather than
a complete defense to, the commission of a criminal act.'9'
In 1532 the English legislature codified the privilege to use
deadly force in self-defense under certain circumstances. 99 This
185. W. LAFAvE & A. ScOTr, HANDBOOK ON CRnmNAL LAW 391 (1972).
186. Id.; see also J. Smith & B. HOGAN, CRnaNAL LAW 361 (5th ed. 1983).
187. See supra note 159.
188. Donovan & Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on
Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 435, 442 (1981).
189. Id.; see also Brown, Self-Defense in Homicide from Strict Liability to Complete
Exculpation, 1958 Cinn. L. Ray. 583, 583-84 (discussing examples of strict liability in early
English self-defense cases).
190. See Donovan & Wildman, supra note 188, at 442; Brown, supra note 189, at 583.
Brown argues that the elimination of self-help was essential to the establishment of social
control and discipline in early societies. Early rulers had to counter the natural instinct for
self-preservation with laws of strict liability to create an ordered governable society where
previously "the savage law of the jungle" had prevailed. Id.
191. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 188, at 442.
192. See R. PERKmNS, CRnaNAL LAW 998 (2d ed. 1969). The statute stated:
That if any person or persons, at any time hereafter, be indicted or appealed of or for
the death of any such evil disposed person or persons attempting to murder, rob, or
burglarily to break mansion-houses, as is above said, that the person or persons so
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statute, however, failed to clarify the nature and scope of the privi-
lege to use deadly or nondeadly force in self-defense. 19 3 Until the
early 1800S194 the English criminal law characterized murders
committed in self-defense as "excusable" homicides. 5 Unlike
"justifiable homicides,"19 which were homicides "commanded or
authorized by law, 1 1 97 an excusable homicide did not completely
shield the self-helpers from criminal liability.198 Persons who com-
mitted homicide in self-defense forfeited their goods and chattels
to the King and had to apply for royal pardon.99 The King
granted royal pardons so routinely that chancellors eventually be-
gan to grant pardons without applying to the King. 00 Coinciden-
tally, self-defense evolved into a complete defense for homicide. In
1829 England statutorily adopted this view of self-defense.201
Commentators attribute the contemporary prevalent accept-
ance of self-defense to American society's recognition that self-de-
fense is necessary and beneficial to society.20 2 Professor Robinson
describes self-defensive acts as conduct that society generally con-
demns as harmful, but tolerates under certain circumstance to
indicted or appealed thereof, and of the same by verdict so found and tried, shall not
forfeit or lose any lands, tenements, goods or chattels, for the death of any such evil
disposed person in such manner slain, but shall be thereof, and for the same fully ac-
quitted and discharged, in like manner as the same person or persons should be if he or
they were lawfully acquitted of the death of said evil disposed person or persons.
24 Hen. 8, ch. 5 (1532) (quoted in R. PERKINS, supra at 998 n.30).
193. See R. PERKINS, supra note 192, at 997-98. See id. at 998-1004 for an exhaustive
discussion about the confusion that enactment of 24 Hen. 8 precipitated.
194. Id. at 1001 n.60. In 1829 the Parliament adopted a statute concerning the use of
deadly force in self-defense. The statute stated in part "that no punishment or forfeiture
shall be incurred by any person who shall kill another by misfortune, or in his own defence,
or in any other manner, without felony." 9 Geo. chs. 4, 31, §10 (1829) (quoted in Note,
Criminal Law-Self-Defense--A Duty to Retreat, the Rule Now Hits Home-Common-
wealth v. Shaffer, Mass. 326 N.E.2d 880 (1975), 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 100, 102 n.11 (1975).
195. See R. PERKINS, supra note 192, at 1002.
196. See id. at 1001-02.
197. See id. at 1001. Justifiable homicides included executing a judicially imposed
death sentence, killing an enemy at war, killing while apprehending a felon or preventing his
escape, and killing to prevent a felony of surprise or violence. Id. at 1001-02.
198. See id. at 1001; see also Note, Crimes: Justifiable Homicide; Killing in Necessary
Defense of Person, 13 CORNEL L.Q. 623, 624 n.3. (1927) (discussing the distinction between
justifiable and excusable homicide).
199. R. PERKINS, supra note 192, at 1001; see also Donovan & Wildman, supra note
188, at 442-43; Note, supra note 144, at 102 n.1.
200. R. PERKINS, supra note 192, at 1001.
201. Note, supra note 194, at 102 n.11. One commentator noted that "the right to kill
in self-defense was slowly established, and is a doctrine of modern rather than medieval
law." Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARv. L. REV. 567, 567 (1903).
202. See generally Brown, supra note 189, at 583. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses:
A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 214-15 (1982).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
avoid greater societal harm.20 3 According to Professor Robinson's
theory, the protection of an individual's right to bodily integrity
against threatened harm outweighs the risks of violence and harm
that an individual causes while trying to defend himself against
tortious or criminal acts.2 °4
(b) The Limits of Self-Defense
An act of self-defense generally is a complete defense against
criminal liability 0 5 when it complies with four requirements: first,
the defender is not the aggressor; second, the defender reasonably
believes that his adversary is threatening him with an imminent
danger of unlawful bodily harm; third, the defender reasonably be-
lieves that he must use force to avoid the danger; and last, the
defender uses no more force than is reasonably necessary to defend
himself.20
6
The privilege of self-defense is not available to an individual
who initiates a conflict with unlawful force. Because a victim law-
fully may use force to fend off an aggressor, the aggressor is not in
imminent danger of unlawful harm as the privilege requires.207 If
the aggressor initiates a confrontation using nondeadly force and
the victim counters by using disproportionately deadly force, the
aggressor lawfully may defend himself because the victim's reliance
on unreasonable force is unlawful.20 8 Similarly, the self-defense
privilege is available to an aggressor if after he withdraws from the
conflict or reasonably attempts to communicate his withdrawal to
the victim, the victim continues to use harm-threatening force
against him.2 °9
An individual will not receive the self-defense privilege unless
203. Robinson, supra note 202, at 220. Professor Robinson summarized this position
by stating that "triggering conditions permit a necessary and proportional response." Id. at
216 (emphasis in original).
204. Id. at 214.
205. If a self-defender accidentally injures an innocent third-party, he will not incur
criminal liability for that injury unless his conduct was reckless. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr,
supra note 185, at 396.
206. Id. at 391. Professor Perkins states the general self-defense rule as follows: "One
who is himself free from fault is privileged to use force in the effort to defend himself
against personal harm threatened by the unlawful act of another if the force he uses for this
purpose is not unreasonable under all the circumstances." R. PsRKms, supra note 192, at
995.
207. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 185, at 394-95.
208. Id. at 395.
209. See, e.g., State v. Goode, 271 Mo. 43, 48-49, 195 S.W. 1006, 1007 (1917); State v.
Broadhurst, 184 Or. 178, 237, 196 P.2d 407, 431 (1948).
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he reasonably believes that an aggressor confronted him with an
imminent threat of unlawful bodily harm.210 A threat of future
harm generally will not satisfy the imminency requirement because
the defender may be able to avoid the harm by resorting to a
nonforceful means of protection. For example, the defender may
have time to summon law enforcement officers to his aid before the
threatened future harm occurs. This requirement of the self-de-
fense privilege reinforces the notion that the value of preventing
harm is more important than preserving pride and eliminating
fear.
The self-defense privilege will not protect an individual unless
he reasonably believes he must use force against an aggressor.211
Under this standard juries use an objective reasonable person stan-
dard in determining whether self-defenders reasonably believed
they needed to use force.2 12 The Model Penal Code213 and a few
courts2 1 ' advocate an "honest belief" standard. This standard re-
quires only that defenders honestly believe in the necessity of us-
ing force to defend themselves regardless of whether the honest
belief was reasonable. Thus, the honest belief standard favors self-
defenders by shielding them from criminal liability for negligently
perceiving the need to use forceful self-defense.1 5
The self-defense privilege allows individuals to use no more
force than is reasonably necessary to defend themselves against an
aggressor. The self-defender, in response to the aggressor's unlaw-
ful attack, 1 may use only an amount of force that relates reasona-
210. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.48 (West
1982). Section 3.04(1) of the MODEL PENAL CODE also preserves the imminent harm require-
ment by allowing defenders to use force to defend against the unlawful attacks only "on the
present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
211. See, e.g., Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895).
212. IL PERKINS, supra note 192, at 994.
213. Section 3.04(1) of the Model Penal Code states in pertinent part that "the use of
force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
force by such other person on the present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962)
(emphasis added).
214. See, e.g., Vigil v. People, 143 Colo. 328, 353 P.2d 82 (1960); State v. Cope, 78 Ohio
App. 429, 67 N.E.2d 912 (1946).
215. W. LAFAvE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 185, at 394.
216. Id. at 392. Unlawful force generally means a tortious or criminal act. The Model
Penal Code defines unlawful force as follows:
"[U]nlawful force" means force, including confinement, which is employed without the
consent of the person against whom it is directed and the employment of which constitutes
an offense or actionable tort or would constitute such offense or tort except for a defense
(such as the absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity; duress; youth; or diplomatic
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bly and proportionally to the amount of harm threatened and the
interest he seeks to protect.117 The law distinguishes between
deadly and nondeadly force. 18 In certain situations only the use of
nondeadly force may be appropriate while other more threatening
and potentially dangerous situations might authorize defenders to
use deadly force. 19 The self-defense privilege, however, does not
permit defenders to counter nondeadly force attacks with deadly
force.2 o
(c) Duty to Retreat
The self-defense privilege requirement that defenders use only
the amount of force they reasonably believe is necessary to avoid
injury raises the question of whether defenders have a duty to re-
treat from an aggressor's illegal attack and avoid using force if re-
treat is possible. Historically, law did not require innocent defend-
ers to retreat from a murderous assault. 2 1 Rather, they could
forcefully defend against the murderous assault.22  If they became
entangled in a "chance medley"-a nondeadly quarrel that sud-
denly turned deadly-law required them to "retreat to the wall"
before forcefully defending themselves.223 Professor Perkins asserts
that a substantial minority of American courts failed to recognize
the English common law distinction between application of the
duty to retreat rule in murderous assault and chance medley situa-
status) not amounting to a privilege to use the force.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(1) (1962).
217. Robinson, supra note 202, at 218. For example, less force may be allowable to
protect property than to protect life because society places a greater value on life.
218. The Model Penal Code defines deadly force as follows:
"[D]eadly force" means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which
he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Pur-
posely firing a firearm in the direction of another person or at a vehicle in which an-
other person is believed to be constitutes deadly force. A threat to cause death or seri-
ous bodily harm, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's
purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if neces-
sary, does not constitute deadly force ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (1962).
219. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19 (1979); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-902 (Harrison 1983).
220. R. PERKINS, supra note 192, at 996; see, e.g., People v. Williams, 56 il1. App. 2d
159, 205 N.E.2d 749 (1965). Sikes v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 429, 200 S.W.2d 956 (1947);
see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-902 (Harrison 1983); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
221. R. PERKINS, supra note 192, at 999-1000.
222. Id. at 1004.
223. Id. at 1000, 1004.
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tions. Consequently, he believes that this misinterpretation of the
retreat rule has caused a minority of jurisdictions to apply the
chance medley duty to retreat rule to the innocent victims of mur-
derous assaults.22  i
Today American courts almost universally hold that the duty
to retreat is not a prerequisite to using nondeadly force in self-
defense. The use of deadly force in self-defense, however, has gen-
erated more judicial disagreements. 2 5 The majority of American
jurisdictions do not require defenders to retreat, even if they may
do so safely, before using deadly force to defend themselves against
what they reasonably believe to be an unlawful threatened inflic-
tion of death or serious bodily harm.22 6 A substantial minority of
courts, 17 and somhe state legislatures, 28 however, have adopted the
Model Penal Code's rule of retreat22 9 and require defenders to re-
treat before using deadly force. These jurisdictions do not require
defenders to retreat if they cannot do so safely.23 0 Nor do they re-
quire defenders to retreat if the attack occurs within their home or
place of business.23 1 These courts, however, sometimes require re-
treat if the assailant is a co-occupant of the defender's home or
place of business. 232 Because a successful retreat prevents harm to
both aggressors and defenders, a duty to retreat before the use of
deadly force seems to be a desireable limitation on the privilege of
self-defense.2
224. Id. at 1004.
225. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 174 A.2d 881 (1961).
226. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 185, at 395; see, e.g., Brown v. United States,
256 U.S. 335 (1921); People v. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 P. 783 (1887).
227. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 185, at 395-96; see, e.g., United States v.
Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973); King v. State, 233
Ala. 198, 171 So. 254 (1936).
228. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b) (1979); HAwAu PENAL CODE § 304(5)(b)
(1976); N.Y. PENAL § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney, 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2)(ii)
(Purdon 1983); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(2) (Vernon 1974).
229. MODEL PENAL CODE 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1962).
230. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 174 A.2d 881 (1961).
231. See, e.g., State v. Baratta, 242 Iowa 1308, 49 N.W.2d 866 (1951); People v. Tom-
lins, 213 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E. 496 (1914).
232. See, e.g., State v. Grierson, 96 N.H. 36, 69 A.2d 851 (1949); see generally Com-
ment, Criminal Law: Privilege of Non-Retreat in the Home Not Applicable if Victim and
Accused Co-Occupy Dwelling, State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), 35 U. FLA. L.
REV. 167 (1983).
233. Although Professor Fletcher believes that more states probably will incorporate a
duty to retreat into the self-defense privilege to use deadly force, he acknowledges the influ-
ence of the principle of autonomy on the laws of self-defense. G. FLETCHER, REMINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 868 (1978). In contrast to the notion that society tolerates the use of force in
self-defense as a "lesser evil," see id. at 869, the principle of autonomy views forceful self-
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2. Defense of Others and Crime Prevention
The privileges to use force to defend other persons and to pre-
vent or terminate the commission of a crime 28  give private citizens
additional lawful opportunities to enhance public safety and law
enforcement.23 5 As with the privilege of self-defense,23 6 a rule of
reasonableness governs the type and amount of force that a de-
fender may use while exercising these two privileges. 23 7 The law
typically permits defenders to use deadly force only in response to
life-threatening aggression.2 8 These privileges, for example, do not
permit defenders to use deadly force merely to stop a car theft;3 '
but they might permit a defender to use deadly force to prevent
defense as the "absolute right [of the defender] to counteract aggression" against the "vital
interests" of his integrity and domain. Id. at 860. German courts seem to have embraced the
principle of autonomy in self-defense matters by rejecting the duty to retreat in virtually all
cases. Id. at 865. The principle of autonomy has survived in American jurisprudence in cases
concerning self-defense in a defender's home or place of business. Id. at 868. Professor
Fletcher acknowledges the possibility that as American sentiments about violence change,
the absolutist rationale for self-defense may gain prominence in American law. Id.
234. The privileges of crime prevention and defense of others overlap in many cases
because a defender, by aiding the victim of an unlawful attack, also foils a crime such as
assault ormanslaughter. See W. LAFAvw & A. Scorr, supra note 185, at 406.
235. See id. The power to make a citizen's arrest supplements the self-helper's law
enforcement repertoire. At common law, a private citizen could arrest another person in
specified circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Swarovski, 557 F. 2d 40 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); State v. Parker, 378 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. App. 1964). This
power understandably is less extensive than the arrest power of a police officer since police
officers receive special training in handling criminal matters and are responsible for law
enforcement. See United States v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1035 (1975); State v. Nolan, 354 Mo. 980, 192 S.W.2d 1016 (1946); State v. Tripp, 9 N.C.
App. 518, 176 S.E.2d 892 (1970). Generally, a person may arrest another person for commit-
ting a felony or misdemeanor in his presence that results in a breach of peace, People v.
Olguin, 187 Colo. 34, 528 P.2d 234 (1974), Banks v. Food Town, Inc., 98 So. 2d 719 (La. App.
1957), if the arresting person acts promptly, Ogulin v. Jeffries, 121 Cal. App. 2d 211, 263
P.2d 75 (1953), or within a reasonable time after the offense, Jackson v. Superior Court, 98
Cal. App. 2d 183, 219 P.2d 879 (1950). These privileges may permit a person to arrest an-
other person for a felony not committed in the arrestor's presence if the arrestor reasonably
believed that the arrested person committed the crime. See, e.g., State v. Iverson, 187
N.W.2d 1 (N.D.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971). A police officer's call for assistance in
making an arrest requires citizens to respond. See, e.g., Moyer v. Meier, 205 Okla. 405, 238
P.2d 338 (1951). The private citizen's authority to make an arrest forcefully in these cases is
coextensive with the police officer's authority. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fields, 120 Pa.
Super. 397, 183 A. 78 (1936).
236. See supra notes 185-233 and accompanying text.
237. See W. LAFAv & A. Scor, supra note 185, at 398, 406.
238. Id. at 393, 407; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(5)(a)(ii) (1962) (delineating
the permissible use of deadly force in preventing a crime).




commission of a dangerous felony such as rape or murder. 40 These
privileges extend only to persons who reasonably believe that an
aggressor imminently threatens to harm another person or commit
a crime.2 41 Courts will impose criminal liability242 on defenders who
do not satisfy these requirements.
Many states once limited the defense of others privilege to sit-
uations in which the defender had a personal or familial relation-
ship with the defended person.243 Many states today permit de-
fenders to protect any third person. 44 Courts have disagreed,
however, concerning the liability of defenders who reasonably mis-
240. See W. LAFAvz & A. Sco-rr, supra note 185, at 406-07; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 143(2) (1965) (limits the privilege to use deadly force to attempts to prevent
dangerous felonies that pose a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm to the
victim).
241. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 185, at 406; see MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.07(5)(a)(1962).
242. For a discussion of tort liability for similar acts, see supra notes 19-31 and accom-
panying text.
243. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 185, at 397; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.08 (1962).
244. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 185 at 398; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05
(1962). No state, except Vermont, presently requires a person forcibly to defend another
person or to prevent a crime. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56, at 340
(4th ed. 1971); Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 51
(1972). Vermont adopted a statute that imposes a criminal fine on persons who fail to assist
another "exposed to grave physical harm." VT. STAT. Ai. tit. 12, § 519 (Equity 1973) (Duty
to Aid the Endangered Act). The Vermont Supreme Court, however, has held that this stat-
ute does not create a duty to intervene in fights because such intervention would imperil the
intervenor. State v. Joyce, 139 Vt. 638, 641, 433 A.2d 271, 273 (1981). Despite the Vermont
statute and the arguments that a moral obligation exists to render some assistance to per-
sons in danger, other legislatures and courts have declined to transform these moral obliga-
tions into legal duties. See W. LAFAv & A. ScoTr, supra note 185, at 183.
Public indignation aroused by infamous displays of public disregard for lawfulness and
compassion eventually may fuel more vigorous efforts to create incentives and legal duties to
assist fellow citizens. For example, almost twenty years ago an assailant brutally beat and
stabbed to death a young woman, Kitty Genovese, "while 38 witnesses watched the killing
from the safety of their apartments and failed to call police." D'Amato, The "Bad Samari-
tan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 798, 799 (1975); Dowd, 20 Years After Kitty Genovese's
Murder, Experts Study Bad Samaritan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1984, at 15, col. 1. More
recently, four men attacked and repeatedly raped a woman in a crowded barroom while
other patrons allegedly watched and cheered. No one attempted to rescue the victim. Clau-
sen, Press & Taylor, The Duties of a Bystander, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1983, at 79; Kennedy,
A Cause Celebre on Trial, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 2. Regrettable incidents like
these cry out for some means of encouraging, if not requiring, citizens to assist imperilled
victims and to help police enforce laws. Statutory rewards for rescuers and duties to assist
others under specified circumstances are possible methods of accomplishing this objective.
Presently, however, the privileges that immunize defenders from criminal liability, and
"Good Samaritan" statutes, which shield rescuers from civil liability for rendering aid in
emergency situations, see J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 399 (1975),
represent the legal boundaries of encouraging or requiring self-help in the criminal context.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
construe a confrontation and rush to aid a party in danger of law-
ful rather than unlawful bodily harm. This situation sometimes oc-
curs when a defender observes a plainclothed police officer forcibly
arresting someone or when a defender perceives as an unlawful ag-
gressor a person who lawfully is defending himself against attack.
These circumstances sometimes cause well-intentioned defenders
to intervene on the behalf of the wrong person. Courts have taken
two approaches to this situation.4 5 Some courts hold that the de-
fender, as an "alter ego" of the person he seeks to defend, may use
defensive force against an aggressor if the attacked person justifia-
bly could have used force to defend himself.4 6 Under this rule,
courts will hold the defender criminally liable for harm he caused
by unknowingly intervening against a plainclothed policeman or
inadvertently coming to the aid of an aggressor even though the
defender's behavior was reasonable. The Model Penal Code2' 7 and
many new state criminal codes2 4 8 permit defenders to use force in
defending another person if they reasonably believe that the per-
son being defended is the victim of an unlawful attack.249 Thus,
courts that follow this view will not impose liability on defenders
for mistakenly defending aggressors unless their belief was not
reasonable.
If the expansion of the privileges to defend others and to pre-
vent crime reflects a societal decision to encourage persons to assist
fellow citizens in danger, the alter ego theory subverts this objec-
tive. The alter ego theory imposes an unusually high standard of
care on defenders and threatens criminal liability for breach of this
standard. Persons aware of potential exposure to criminal liability
for mistakenly using force to defend the wrong person during an
apparent criminal attack in many instances probably will decide
that cautious nonintervention is the most reasonable course of ac-
tion. The alter ego theory unfairly subjects defenders to criminal
liability even if defenders believe they are acting reasonably.250
Clearly, a privilege to defend others and to prevent crime based
upon a reasonable belief standard strikes a better balance between
promoting citizen participation in preventing criminal lawlessness
and discouraging reckless intermeddling in criminal law
245. W. LAFAvw & A. ScowT, supra note 185, at 398-99.
246. See, e.g., People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
247. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (1962).
248. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTt, supra note 185, at 399 & n.8.
249. See, e.g., State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 211 A.2d 359 (1965).




3. Defense and Recapture of Property
The law permits persons to use reasonable force without in-
curring criminal liability to protect their property from unlawful
trespass and to recapture their property2 1 when another person
unlawfully carries it away.2 5 The scope of these privileges substan-
tially mirrors the tort law privileges of forceful protection 53 and
recapture254 of property. These privileges protect defenders only if
they reasonably perceive an immediate threat to the property and
reasonably believe that using force is necessary to protect the
property.2 55 The Model Penal Code slightly relaxes these condi-
tions by requiring defenders to believe honestly, rather than rea-
sonably, that they must use force to defend or recapture their
property.256 This standard seems to reflect more accurately the
privileges' practical scope because an honest belief would negate
the finding of the specific intent element required for conviction of
many crimes.5  Although defenders might escape liability for one
crime under the Model Penal Code's honest belief standard, they
still might incur criminal liability for a lesser offense that does not
require a showing of specific intent 2 5  or tort liability to the per-
sons against whom they used force.215 Thus, the full contours of
the defense and recapture of property privileges are observable
only against a broad range of potential civil and criminal liability.
As in tort law, an individual may use reasonable force to re-
capture his real or personal property immediately in response to
dispossession. 260 The common law, however, prohibits the use of
251. The Model Penal Code broadens this privilege by permitting defenders to pre-
vent or to terminate unlawful conduct against property in "his possession or in the posses-
sion of another person for whose protection he acts." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(I)(a)
(1962).
252. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr supra note 185, at 399.
253. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
255. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoT, supra note 185, at 399-400.
256. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(1)(1962).
257. Cf. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 185, at 399 n.2.
258. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 403 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (although
the defendant was not guilty of robbery because he lacked specific intent, he was guilty of a
misdemeanor for taking money he mistakenly believed was his. Edwards v. State, 49 Wis. 2d
105, 111-13, 181 N.W.2d 383, 387 (1970).
259. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
260. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 185, at 402; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.06(I)(b)(i), (ii)(1962).
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force to recapture property if the recapture attempt does not occur
soon after the time of dispossession.2" Despite this common law
limitation on recapture, many jurisdictions have demonstrated
some tolerance for the use of force in the recapture of property
through their disposition of robbery cases that arose from recovery
of property and collection of debts.
Although one element of the crime of robbery is intent to
steal,262 many courts regard a bona fida claim of right to the taken
property as a factor that negates the intent to steal element of rob-
bery,6 even though the self-helper resorted to violence or intimi-
dation in taking the property.26' Judicial sentiment concerning this
defense in robbery prosecutions, however, varies according to the
basis for the property right claim. Courts carefully scrutinize prop-
erty right claims particularly in cases concerning the recovery of
alleged debts.2 65 Courts regularly reject the property right claim
defense as justification for forcible takings of property in robbery
cases in two situations: first, when the self-helper has taken more
money or property of greater value than the amount allegedly
owed;266 and second, when the claim is for an unliquidated
261. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 185, at 402. But see MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.06(1)(b)(ii)(1962) (permits forcible recapture of tangible movable property if the "actor
believes that the person against whom he uses force has no claim of right to the possession
of the property"). Most states have statutes that prohibit forcible retaking of real property
even by a person entitled to possession. W. PaossER, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAw OF TORTS § 23
(3d ed. 1964). The Model Penal Code, on the other hand, permits forcible recapture of prop-
erty when an "exceptional hardship" otherwise might result. MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.06(1)(b)(ii)(1962).
262. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 185, at 692. Robbery is a common law felony
that has become a statutory felony in all American jurisdictions. Id. Professors LaFave and
Scott describe robbery as "larceny-plus" because the crime consists of larceny's six ele-
ments--"a (1) trespassory (2) taking and (3) carrying away of the (4) personal property (5)
of another (6) with intent to steal it-plus two additional requirements: (7) that the prop-
erty be taken from the person or presence of the other and (8) that the taking be accom-
plished by force or putting in fear." Id.
263. Id. at 694; see, e.g., State v. Hardin, 99 Ariz. 56, 406 P.2d 406 (1965); People v.
Karasek, 63 Mich. App. 706, 234 N.W.2d 761 (1975). The court in State v. Goldsberry, 160
Kan. 138, 146, 160 P.2d 690, 695 (1945), stated:
An intent to steal property and bona fide claim of right to take it are incompatible.
One who takes property in good faith, under fair color of claim or title, honestly believ-
ing that he is its owner and has a right to its possession or that he has a right to take it,
is not guilty of larceny even though he is mistaken in such belief. Id. (quoting 32 Am.
JuR. 936, § 41).
264. See, e.g., Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 138 S.E.2d 28 (1964).
265. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sleighter, 495 Pa. 262, 266-67, 433 A.2d 469, 471
(1981).
266. See, e.g., State v. Trujillo, 7 Or. App. 236, 489 P.2d 977 (1971); Crawford v. State,
509 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim. 1974); Bass v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 172, 206 S.W.2d 599 (1947).
19841 SELF-HELP
amount.167 In unliquidated amount cases, courts have rejected lack
of specific intent defenses against robbery charges when self-help-
ers have forcibly collected unliquidated claims for tort damages, 2 6
unliquidated claims for the reimbursement of the purchase price of
property when the value of that property was uncertain due to de-
preciation,'" unliquidated claims for the purchase price of goods
when no one had agreed upon the value of the goods,270 and unliq-
uidated claims for the cost of a prostitute's services.2 71 These deci-
sions exhibit a rational response to the obvious hazards of allowing
one party to unilaterally assess the value of an unliquidated claim
and then forcibly enforce the claim.72 In addition, the unliqui-
dated property right claim defense to robbery easily can mask the
recapturer's true intent to steal. The potential for abuse and vio-
lence favors a judicial rather than a self-help resolution to cases
concerning recapture of property to satisfy unliquidated property
right claims.
Some jurisdictions are even more critical of the bona fide
claim defense to robbery2 73 and refuse to recognize a right to forci-
In Crawford, the defendant took an amount clearly greater than the $14 over which he
asserted a right to recover. Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.2d at 585.
267. See Thomas v. State, 165 Miss. 897, 148 So. 225 (1933).
268. People v. Poindexter, 255 Cal. App. 2d 566, 63 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1967); Henderson
v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 167, 192 S.W.2d 446 (1946).
269. Williams v. State, 317 So. 2d 425 (Miss. 1975) (sales receipt for a pair of shoes is
an unliquidated claim after the buyer wears the shoes because this causes them to depreci-
ate in value).
270. State v. Lewis, 121 Ariz. 155, 589 P.2d 29 (1978) (defendant forced the victims at
gunpoint to write and cash a $200 check for a camera and calculator that the victims
claimed they had not offered to buy).
271. State v. Bonsen, 128 Ariz. 95, 623 P.2d 1251 (1981).
272. One state supreme court justice, fearing abuses of permissive judicial treatment
of forcible debt collection concluded: "public policy ... unequivocally dictates that the
proper forum for resolving debt disputes is a court of law, pursuant to legal process-not
the street, at the business end of a lethal weapon." People v. Butler, 65 Cal. 2d 569, 577, 421
P.2d 703, 708, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 516 (1967) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
273. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 124 N.J. Super. 189, 192, 305 A. 2d 800, 802 (1973); Com-
monwealth v. Sleighter, 495 Pa. 262, 266, 433 A.2d 469, 471 (1981).
In Sleighter, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted a view about self-help that
one justice previously expressed in a concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. English, 446
Pa. 161, 163-64, 279 A.2d 4, 5 (1971), which states:
In these days when crime is rampant and disobedience and defiance of Law and Order
are so widespread, it would be folly to permit a person who had an adequate remedy at
law to take the law into his own hands and attempt to recover his property or his
property claims by force or violence or by any other violation of the law. No matter
how worthy a defendant's or any person's objective may be, Law and Order must be
preserved. To allow a creditor to resort to violence or force to recover a debt would be
an unwarranted Procrustean stretch of a creditor's legal rights.
The Sleighter court's willingness to countenance only peaceful recapture of property, based
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bly recapture property despite claims of ownership in the recap-
tured property.27' Expressing opposition to forcible recovery of
property, one court chastised forcible property recovery as being
"utterly incompatible with and [having] no place in an ordered
and orderly society such as ours, which eschews self-help through
violence.
27 5
C. Citizen Activism and Law Enforcement
The public's seemingly persistent concern about crime and the
ability of organized law enforcement agencies to combat crime ef-
fectively sometimes spurs private, supplementary law enforcement
and crime prevention activity.2 7 6 Citizens contribute to these ad-
junct crime fighting efforts individually 77 and as members of or-
ganized groups devoted to restoring and preserving safe streets and
neighborhoods. 27 8 Although the American law enforcement struc-
ture contains areas that are appropriate for citizen participation,
the state has retained the power, with few exceptions,7 to control
the process of determining guilt and innocence and executing pun-
ishment. Citizen self-help in the criminal justice system, therefore,
rests on a continuum between clearly impermissible and clearly
permissible activity. Citizen participation in vigilante, neighbor-
hood watch, and "Guardian Angels" groups represent three types
of citizen self-help crime fighting methods that lie in different
upon a bona fide property right claim, see 495 Pa. at 267, 433 A.2d at 471, apparently ig-
nores Pennsylvania's criminal law statutes. In 1973 Pennsylvania enacted a version of the
Model Penal Code. Section 507(a)(2)(ii)(B) provides that the use of force against another
person to recapture tangible movable property is justifiable when the actor "believes that
the person against whom he uses force has no claim of right to the possession of the prop-
erty." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 507(a)(2)(ii)(B) (Purdon 1983) (tracking MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.06(1)(b)(ii)(1962). The facts of Sleighter seemed to influence the court's negative
attitude toward forcible self-help. In Sleighter a jury found the appellant guilty of second
degree murder and robbery for beating to death a man who owed him an illegal gambling
debt. The court expressed concern that its approval of forcible collection of an illegal obliga-
tion only would encourage the use of violence in the collection of such debts. Common-
wealth v. Sleighter, 495 Pa. at 267, 433 A.2d at 471.
274. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 15 Or. App. 498, 516 P.2d 753 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Dombrauskas, 274 Pa. Super. 452, 459, 418 A.2d 493, 497 (1980); Elliott v. State, 2 Tenn.
Crim. 418, 454 S.W.2d 187 (1970).
275. State v. Ortiz, 124 N.J. Super. 189, 192, 305 A.2d 800, 802 (1973).
276. See, e.g., infra note 300.
277. See supra notes 187-275 and accompanying text.
278. See infra notes 280-355 and accompanying text.
279. The privilege to use deadly force in specified circumstances represents one of the
few instances in which self-helpers may punish a criminal physically. The privilege of self-
defense necessarily encompasses the privilege to kill an attacker in self-defense. See supra
note 219 and accompanying text.
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places on this continuum.
1. Vigilantism
Law enforcement officials undoubtedly welcome the prospect
of serving a community of "vigilant" citizens who watchfully and
lawfully seek to detect and prevent crime. These officials, however,
treat "vigilante" action, which typically occurs when citizens of a
community band together and violently280 exercise police power
authority in an unlawful manner,281 as abhorrent to the fair and
predictable administration of justice.82 Society has affixed the la-
bel "vigilantism"283 to these extrajudicial group efforts to enforce
criminal laws.
Vigilantes typically regard themselves as enforcers of justice
who maintain social order and punish criminals when official law
enforcement authorities cannot or will not perform their duties.
This philosophy is intrinsically paradoxical because vigilante
groups violate the law, often heinously, in the name of law and
order.284 Whether vigilante conduct reflects frustration with inade-
quacies in the criminal justice system, expedient vengeance, or
fundamental disagreement with contemporary behavioral norms
and criminal laws, vigilantism aggravates the social ills that crime
inflicts upon society.
Professor Burrows has identified the following three historical
phases of vigilantism in America: classic vigilantism, neovigilant-
ism, and pseudo-vigilantism.2 85 The initial phase--"classic vigilan-
tism"-appeared soon after the American Revolution in the late
280. W. BURROWS, VIGMAN! (1976) at xa.
281. Unlike spontaneously formed lynch mobs, vigilante groups typically have an or-
ganized structure and exist for a continuing period of time. Brown, The American Vigilante
Tradition, in THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AmmcA 158 (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969)
(Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence).
282. Vinson v. State, 432 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). Vigilantism is not a
uniquely American phenomenon. Vigilante groups have been observed in Spain ("Gueril-
leros del Cristo Rey"), Cuba ("Committees of Defense of the Revolution"), and Argentina
("Group for Action and Liberty"). W. BuRRows, VIGILAM ! 15 (1976). Brazil's "Esquadrao
da Morte" (Death Squad) executes accused criminals it believes society cannot rehabilitate
and should not permit to remain free before trial. The Death Squad's membership allegedly
consists mainly of off-duty police officers. A 1970 poll indicated that 60% of Sao Paulo's
residents favored the squad's activities. Justica e feita, 99 VEJA 26, 26-32 (July 29, 1970),
cited in H. J. Rosenbaum & P. C. Sederberg, Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment
Violence, 6 CoMPARATnIvs PoLmcs 541 (1974).
283. The words "vigilante" and "vigilantism" are American words derived from the
French and Latin word "vigilant." A. MADISON, VIGILANTISM IN AmEmuCA 1 (1973).
284. W. BURROWS, supra note 280, at 7.
285. Id. at 15-16.
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1700s. " Classic vigilantism describes the frontier justice afforded
cattle rustlers, horse thieves, murderers, thugs, and desperados.
Several pragmatic law enforcement considerations that prevailed
in the late 1700s, but which no longer exist in contemporary soci-
ety, cast classic vigilantism in a slightly more respectable light
than the vigilante practices of today. First, the isolated nature of
frontier communities and the limited number of law enforcement
officers available to serve these communities made the pursuit of
criminals by law officers difficult and unwise. A chase by law of-
ficers in pursuit of criminals, which sometimes lasted days or
weeks because of poor transportation, often endangered communi-
ties by leaving them unguarded.2 87 Second, the expense of pursu-
ing, capturing, trying, convicting, and punishing criminals often
strained the economic resources of developing frontier communi-
ties. Consequently, the threat of increased taxes motivated the
frontier community's biggest taxpayers to organize vigilante groups
intended to effect cost efficient justice.2 " Last, rampant corruption
and ignorance2 89 in the frontier criminal justice system and inade-
quate prison facilities29 0 in frontier towns prevented the justice
system from earning the respect and confidence of citizens.29 1
Thus, vigilantism reigned as a common method of administering
criminal justice in frontier America.
Professor Burrows states that the "neovigilante" era, the sec-
ond phase in the evolution of American vigilantism, began in 1856
with the establishment of the San Francisco Committee of Vigi-
lance.2 2 The Committee of Vigilance consisted of approximately
2000 to 6000 San Francisco citizens, predominantly business-
men,2 9 3 who patrolled streets, held trials, and hung convicted de-
fendants.2 9 Neovigilantism, unlike classic vigilantism, was essen-
tially an urban phenomenon directed at minority, ethnic, religious,
286. Id.
287. Id. at 18.
288. Id. at 18-19.
289. Id. at 19.
290. See W. GARD, FRoNTmR JusrcE 275 (1949). San Francisco's jail in 1849 was a
dismantled brig. Id. at 272. Los Angeles law enforcement authorities once chained convicted
criminals to a log in an old adobe building, id., and other frontier communities kept
criminals in outdoor iron cages. Id. Frontier communities also chained prisoners to trees,
stakes, stable stalls, poles, and windmills. See id. at 273-74.
291. W. GARD. supra note 290, at 275.
292. W. BuRRows, supra note 280, at 94.
293. Id. at 96.
294. Id. at 94-125.
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and political groups. 295 Neovigilantism undoubtedly was a vehicle
of prejudice, intolerance, and hatred, perhaps a reflection of cul-
tural immaturity in urban America at that time.
Professor Burrows labels the contemporary phase of American
vigilantism as pseudo-vigilantism-a composite of neovigilantism
and classic vigilantism that stems from the racial strife and rising
crime rates of the 1960s and 1970s.2"  For example, vigilante
groups have formed in Chicano barrios and black communities to
eradicate drug trafficking and addiction problems that city police
were unable to control. 97 In New York City's Crown Heights dis-
trict, for example, the Maccabees, "a protective patrol force," or-
ganized to protect Hasidic Jews from muggings, beatings, and rob-
beries.29 8 More disturbing examples of pseudo-vigilantism have
arisen out of the activities of secret vigilante organizations such as
the Ku Klux Klan, 99 and the cases which have manifested the se-
cret intentions of law enforcement officials who abused their au-
thority in the name of justice.3 00
Courts emphatically have condemned vigilantism because of
the practice's illegal and startlingly violent nature.0 1 Contempo-
rary society probably never will condone vigilante justice, but soci-
ety should heed the message that outbreaks of this behavior some-
times suggest. Although many instances of vigilantism probably
reflect extremist behavior, some vigilante activity also may suggest
a latent societal feeling of dissatisfaction with the operation of
criminal laws and the justice system. If society ignores these
messages, widespread vigilantism and community violence, in time,
once again could threaten society as it did in the 1960s and 1970s.
295. Id. at 16.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 990 (1975); Chicago's Black Vigilantes, NEWSWERK, Sept. 27, 1971, at 75; Rasp-
berry, War on Drug Dealers, Wash. Post., Feb. 9, 1972, at A15, col. 6.
298. W. BuRows, supra note 280, at 256-58.
299. "[Ain absolute evil inherent in any secret order holding itself above the law '[is]
the natural tendency of all such organizations... to violence and crime."' United States v.
Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 335 (E.D. La. 1965), quoting REPoirT
OF THe Jonr SELEcT Comrsrrz, n.2, 463 (Minority Report).
300. In United States v. Otherson, 637 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1980), a jury found several
members of the United States border patrol guilty of beating, kicking, slapping, and punch-
ing an illegal alien. One officer explained their conduct as follows: "[W]e find it necessary to
do things like this because the criminal justice system doesn't do anything to these
assholes." Id. at 1278. The court stated that the "appellants can hardly have supposed their
brand of vigilante 'justice' to be legal." Id. at 1285 n.16.
301. See, e.g., id.
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2. Citizen Action Groups
(a) Neighborhood Watch Programs
Neighborhood watch programs currently are popular s0 forms
of organized citizen participation in law enforcement that
originated in colonial America. °30 Members of neighborhood watch
programs contribute to crime prevention and law enforcement by
serving as the eyes and ears of the police.30 Participants in typical
watch programs serve as observers of their communities and report
suspicious and criminal activity to the police.305 Unlike vigilante
groups, which frequently break the law while apprehending, judg-
ing, and punishing criminals, neighborhood watch programs usual-
ly fight crime legally through less active measures .30 The primary
functions of local citizens in these programs include maintaining a
very conspicuous, concerted effort to monitor neighborhood activ-
ity, and reporting crime to the police. More active watch groups
conduct routine neighborhood foot and automobile patrols.
307
Law enforcement officials, mindful of rising crime rates and
their own limited crime-fighting resources, understandably wel-
come and encourage neighborhood watch programs that facilitate
police operations.0 ' Since the New York City Police Department
first sponsored a neighborhood watch program in the late 1970s,
the number of citizen participants has grown from 30,000 to
81,000.309 Over two million Americans now belong to watch pro-
grams in approximately 80,000 communities.3 10 Recent evaluations
302. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
303. Wilson & Kelling, Broken Windows, A'r. MoNmLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29, 36.
304. Our Neighbors' Keepers, 69 A.B.A. J. 1805, 1806 (1983).
305. Id.
306. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 303, at 36. Although citizens who participate in
neighborhood watch groups typically fight crime peacefully and passively, some groups have
pursued this method of crime-fighting more aggressively. The leader of the citizens' patrol
in Beliville, New Jersey, for example, commented that the patrol looks for outsiders and
questions and follows unfamiliar visitors. "[W]e ask them their business .... If they say
they're going down the street to see Mrs. Jones, fine, we let them pass. But then we follow
them... to make sure they're really going to see Mrs. Jones." Id. This type of conduct, in
addition to being inhospitable, obviously raises a greater likelihood of a breach of peace
than merely reporting suspicious activity to the police.
307. See Our Neighbors' Keepers, supra note 304, at 1805.
308. Cf. infra note 309.
309. Our Neighbors' Keepers, supra note 304, at 1806.
310. Id. Another recent study estimated that over five million Americans currently are
participating in neighborhood watch programs. The Best Offense .... THE WILSON QTLY.
136, 136 (Spring 1983).
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of the effectiveness of these programs are encouraging. One study
strongly suggested that neighborhood watch programs appreciably
deter criminal activity.3 11 This study found that communities
which employed neighborhood watch programs achieved up to an
eighty-five percent reduction in crime rates.1 2
The apparent success of neighborhood watch programs weighs
strongly in favor of expanding the development of these programs
throughout the country. When properly channeled, the community
pride and safety consciousness that underlie these programs gener-
ate a very effective and lawful self-help crime prevention tool.
3 1 3
Law enforcement and government officials effectively can capital-
ize on this resource by promoting neighborhood watch programs
and helping communities design and maintain these programs. Po-
lice guidance and cooperation also help to ensure that aggressive
neighborhood watch programs do not trigger violence or become
vigilante groups.3 1
(b) The Guardian Angels
The "Guardian Angels" is probably the most highly publicized
and controversial private citizen's law enforcement organization in
the United States.315 The Angels' active and professed reliance
upon lawful self-help privileges and rights to discourage crime and
protect the public from criminal activity provokes hearty debates
on the merits of self-help's role in crime prevention and law en-
311. Figgie International, Inc. sponsored the study and Research and Forecasts, Inc.
conducted it. Our Neighbors' Keepers, supra note 304, at 1806.
312. This study evaluated local neighborhood watch programs in Denver, Detroit,
Philadelphia, Jacksonville, and Springfield, Mass., and statewide programs in California,
Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id.
313. Richard Shapiro, director of the New York City Police Department's Urban par-
ticipation programs, describes the simplicity of the psychology that underlies enthusiastic
citizen participation in neighborhood watch programs: "People identify with their neighbor-
hood. If you tell them to protect their family, there's no question. So they extend their
family to the neighborhood. Nobody lives in New York City. They all live in neighbor-
hoods." Our Neighbors' Keepers, supra note 304, at 1806. This enthusiasm is not present in
all cases. A study of the effectiveness of Seattle's watch program revealed an initial burst of
enthusiasm after which the crime rate decreased, but the crime rate rose again after the
enthusiasm dissipated. The Best Offense..., supra note 310, at 137.
314. One observer commented that the common element in successful neighborhood
watch programs is "the creation of an alliance among community residents, police officials,
and city administrators." For Neighborhoods the Payoff is Safety, 69 A.B.A. J. 1805, 1806
(1983).
315. Gardener, Guardian Angels Get a Mixed Reception, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1981, §
11, at 1, col. 1.
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forcement.311 The Guardian Angels originated as a small group of
youthful citizens who organized in 1978 to patrol the New York
City subways. 17 Within four years, however, the Guardian Angels'
national membership increased to over 2000,318 and by late 1982,
forty-two Guardian Angels chapters existed throughout the United
States and Canada.3 19 Observers of the Guardian Angel phenome-
non, however, disagree over whether this rapid expansion warrants
applause or concern.32 0
All new Guardian Angels' members receive intensive instruc-
tion in first aid, cardio-puhnonary resuscitation, and martial arts
during the first two and one-half months of training.32 1 The Guard-
ian Angels also educates its members about relevant state and local
citizen's arrest laws. 22 Upon completing this training, the Angels
assign new members to patrol the streets and subways in desig-
nated neighborhoods. The organization's policy prohibits its mem-
bers from carrying weapons while on patrol.32 3 The members, how-
ever, do carry handcuffs, which they use when making citizen's
arrests.2 4 As the training in martial arts suggests, 25 the Angels'
leadership allows members to use physical force while preventing a
crime or apprehending a criminal.3 26 This policy has caused gov-
ernment and law enforcement officials to express concern about
the propriety and legality of the Guardian Angels' activities.32 7
The Angels' avowed purpose of preventing crime,3 28 their con-
316. See infra notes 332-33, 339 & 346 and accompanying text.
317. Robbins, Effectiveness of Guardian Angels Called Uncertain, N.Y. Times, Aug.
7, 1981, at AS, col. 2. The organization's success led to the incorporation of the group in
1981 as The Alliance of Guardian Angels, Inc., a tax exempt, nonprofit corporation. Gar-
dener, supra note 315, at 1.
318. See Narvaez, Jersey Rules Out Special Inquiry in "Angel" Death, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 5, 1982, at B6, col. 6.
319. McFadden, Guardian Angels Seized in Protest at Schurz Park, N.Y. Times, Oct.
4, 1982, at B3, col. 6.
320. Gardener, supra note 315, at 17.
321. Gardener, supra note 315, at 17. Angels' candidates must receive the recommen-
dation of a current member. Guardian Angels must be at least 16 years old and willing to
work two patrols a week. Id. Guardian Angels' members cannot have a criminal background.
McQueeny, "Guardian Angels" Get Mixed Reception, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1981, § 11, at 31,
col. 5.
322. Gardener, supra note 315 at 17.
323. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1982, § 23, at 3, col. 1.
324. Id. For a discussion of the legal ramifications of citizen's arrests, see supra note
235 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
326. Gardener, supra note 315, at 17.
327. See infra notes 332 & 335-39 and accompanying text.
328. Robbins, supra note 317.
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spicuous public presence, 2 9 their willingness to testify at trial, and
their policy of using physical force to protect victims and arrest
criminals presumably serves as an effective deterrent to criminal
activity.33 0 Although the Guardian Angels do not advocate lawless
conduct and violence as a means of achieving law and order,
3 3 1
some government officials unfairly have labelled the Guardian An-
gels as a vigilante group.332 Rather, the Guardian Angels seem to
be an active and aggressive species of neighborhood watch
group,3 3 3 despite their refutation of this classification.3s
The aggressive nature of their activities, and their willingness
to use force when needed to protect crime victims and apprehend
criminals deeply concerns government and law enforcement offi-
cials. Numerous commentators and government and law enforce-
ment officials have expressed their fears that the Guardian angels
may do more harm than good,3 3 5 especially because the Angels
329. Id. The Guardian Angels wear highly visible red berets and custom made T-shirts
displaying the Guardian Angel insignia while on patrol See Our Neighbors' Keepers, 69
A.B.A. J. 1805, 1806 (1983).
330. The comments of Jeff Ferguson, who at the age of 16 became the leader of Eliza-
beth, New Jersey's Guardian Angel chapter, suggest the value that the Angels' see in their
willingness to report to self-help defense and crime prevention privileges to fight crime. Fer-
guson remarked: "You can't have a neighborhood watch group in the ghetto because a per-
son will get a very bad reputation as a rat .... It's better for us to take a physical stand
because the people here understand that better." Gardener, supra note 315, at 17.
331. The occasional instances in which members of the police have arrested and
charged Guardian Angels' members with illegal activity do not qualify the Angels as a vigi-
lante group. In several of these reported incidents, the Angels' crime prevention efforts were
not grounds for the arrest. In October 1982, for example, the police arrested 24 Angels and
charged them with disorderly conduct when they refused to abandon cardboard shacks that
they were occupying to protest the needs of homeless people. McFadden, supra note 319.
See Guardian Angels in Joliet Arrested for Camping, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at A10,
col. 6; Goldman, Angels Say Role Riding Subways Hinges on Public, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1981, at B7, col. 1; Burglary is Tied to Guardian Angels, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1981, at 3,
col. 2. In a few instances, the police cited Angels for violating the law in connection with
performing their crime prevention duties. On February 13, 1981, police arrested ten Guard-
ian Angels and charged them with rioting or inciting a riot as the result of a melee that
erupted in a New York subway. Witnesses and melee participants disputed the circum-
stances of the fight involving Angels, undercover police, and subway passengers. Eleven
Subway "Angels" Held in Melee, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1981, at 26, col. 3. These isolated
episodes fall far short of the type of organizational policy characteristic of vigilante groups.
See supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
332. New York City's Mayor Koch, for example, referred to the Angels as vigilantes.
He later withdrew this remark, probably realizing that he had overstated his concern about
the Angels' activity in New York City. See Cummings, Should Subway "Angels" Get a
Halo?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1980, at E6, col 3.
333. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 303, at 29, 36.
334. Id.
335. Elizabeth, New Jersey's Mayor Dunn, for example, painted an unflattering pic-
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sometimes use force in their crime-fighting activities. These critics
worry primarily that the Angels will become lawbreakers them-
selves, use force unnecessarily, and aggravate the problem of crime
in society.336 The remarks of a president of New York City's transit
police union represent a familiar refrain that Guardian Angels'
critics sound: "With their lack of training in the amount of force
that can be used in making a civilian arrest, they can wind up with
an assault. 3 37 Other critics fear that the Angels could evolve into a
vigilante group.338 Consequently, many law enforcement officials
wish the Guardian Angels would confine their activities to serving
as "eyes and ears" of the police.3 39
The criticisms about the Guardian Angels' use of force in
crime-fighting seem misdirected. The Guardian Angels, as a rule,
exercise only the well-established criminal law self-help privileges
of self-defense,3 0 defense of others, 41 and crime prevention.2
Members of the Guardian Angels, because of their training, proba-
bly are more familiar with the limits of lawful citizen action than
are most citizens. 43 If the Guardian Angels exercise these privi-
leges more frequently than other citizens, they naturally will ex-
ceed the bounds of these privileges more often. The criticism that
Angels who intervene in criminal activity are more likely than any
other intervening private citizen to use force unnecessarily or ex-
ture of the Guardian Angels. He stated that the Guardian Angels, who established a chapter
in his city, would do more harm than good. Mayor Dunn described the Angels as "nothing
more than a sophisticated group of young people banded together to form a street gang.
Their whole attitude can be looked on as contrary to what an American democratic society
expects." Gardener, supra note 315, at 1.
336. A director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, for example, maintained that
the American criminal justice system traditionally has emphasized delegation of law en-
forcement duties only to trained professionals in order to prevent volunteer, neophyte
crime-fighters from breaking the law. Cummings, supra note 332.
337. Id.
338. New Haven, Connecticut Deputy Police Chief John Moriarity stated that the an-
gels could become a vigiliante group. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1982, § 23, at 3, col. 1.
339. Trenton, New Jersey's Police Chief John Prihoda, commenting on violent citi-
zen's arrests that Guardian Angels have made, said: "If they're going to get involved physi-
cally with a perpetrator, and there's a confrontation between them, then it's a problem. If
they'd just be our eyes and ears, a neighborhood watch group.., that would be fine."
Gardener, supra note 315. The Guardian Angels' founder and national leader, Curtis Sliwa,
previously had expressed his organization's position on this issue as follows: "If we had just
wanted to serve as 'eyes and ears,' we could have joined the ... auxiliary police." Fowler,
"Angels" Refuse Auxiliary Status, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1980, at B3, col. 5.
340. See supra notes 205-33 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 234-50 and accompanying text.
342. Id.
343. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
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cessively, however, is baseless speculation. Critics of the Guardian
Angels instead should direct their scrutiny toward the scope of the
criminal law self-help privileges that the Guardian Angels use in
their crime-fighting efforts.3 4 If society decides to retract the scope
of these privileges, or make them more difficult to comply with,
society then lawfully could limit the Guardian Angels' legal author-
ity to conduct their crime-fighting activities. This step, unfortu-
nately, also would limit the ability of all private citizens to prevent
criminal activity and to protect themselves, their property, and
each other from criminal attack. The Guardian Angels' continued
growth reflects, in part, the support of some state and local law
enforcement officials,3 4 5 as well as popular support. The Guardian
Angels' success in the face of grave concerns about their activities
also reflects the lack of legal authority of local and state officials to
prohibit, disband, or penalize the Guardian Angels except when
the organization's members break the law. The Guardian Angels
and similar groups, therefore, probably will remain fixtures of city
life. This reality suggests that state and local law enforcement au-
thorities should make strong efforts to ensure that the Guardian
Angels understand and comply with the law. These efforts proba-
bly would be the surest method of preventing the Guardian Angels
from becoming a vigilante organization.
To date, government and law enforcement officials generally
have not cooperated with the Guardian Angels.ss Officials in sev-
eral cities, including Chicago, Illinois and Stamford, Connecticut
have resisted the group's efforts to organize local chapters."" In
addition to the fears of violence and vigilantism associated with
the Guardian Angels, two other factors have contributed to this
generally uncooperative spirit. First, Guardian Angels groups, and
similar groups, are most likely to organize in communities in which
344. See supra notes 205-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the following
criminal law privileges: Self-defense, defense of others, defense of property, and crime
prevention.
345. Bronx District Attorney Mario Merola, for example, has asserted that charges
that the Guardian Angels are vigilantes are "nonsense." "The municipal and state govern-
ments have not met their obligations to provide the kind of security that's needed on the
subway, in the parks or on the streets. How do we say to any citizens who want to do some
good that they should not be involved?" Cummings, supra note 332.
346. One Guardian Angels' group leader estimated that in late 1982, local police and
38 of 40 Angels' chapters did not cooperate with each other. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1982, at 3,
col. 1.
347. Robbins, supra note 317; N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1982, § 23, at 3, col. 1. Some city
administrations, however, have welcomed the Guardian Angels into their communities.
Trenton, N.J. and New Orleans, La. are two such cities. See Gardener, supra note 315.
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crime rates are high and citizens perceive that local police and law
enforcement officials have been unable to control crime. Law en-
forcement officials in such communities, aware of citizen frustra-
tion and doubts about the quality of their crime prevention efforts,
more likely feel an unhealthy sense of competition with or hostility
toward aggressive citizen crime-fighting groups like the Guardian
Angels. 8 Moreover, groups like the Guardian Angels probably or-
ganize in crime-ridden communities out of frustration about the
inability of law enforcement officials to prevent crime, and thus,
probably lack the desire to cooperate with these officials in many
cases. This unfortunate scenario demonstrates the compelling need
for city officials and citizen group leaders to acknowledge the mu-
tual advantages of cooperation and to take affirmative steps to-
ward fostering a spirit of cooperation between these groups and
law enforcement officials.
The memorandum of understanding between the Guardian
Angels and New York City government and law enforcement offi-
cials demonstrates the value of open discussion and cooperation
between these entities. 49 The memorandum contains a promise by
all parties to "work together cooperatively."350 The Guardian An-
gels agreed to register with the police department, to wear official
identification cards while on duty, and to notify the police depart-
ment of their patrol routes. 51 The Police Department promised to
appoint a liaison officer to work with the Guardian Angels and to
provide the Guardian Angels with some training. 52 Similar cooper-
ative efforts between law enforcement officials in other cities and
348. A New York Times editorial summarized this problem: "[A]wareness has grown
that the police are unable to prevent much of the crime that engulfs a community. That
creates fertile ground for voluntary crime fighters, but it also poisons the atmosphere for
their relations with authorities." Editorial, A Way to Remember Frank Melvin, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 5, 1982, at 14, col. 1.
349. After a lengthy dialogue, New York City officially recognized the Guardian Angels
on May 29, 1981, pursuant to a memorandum of understanding that the Guardian Angels
leadership, the New York City Police Departmentand the New York City Transit Authority
jointly executed. Guardian Angels Get City Recognition, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1981, at 27,
col. 1.
350. Id.
351. Id. Guardian Angel founder, Curtis Sliwa expressing the Angels' policy toward
cooperating with the police, stated: "We will remain independent. City officials should have
the right to know where we are, when we are patrolling and who we are. They do not have
the right to tell us when and where we do it." Ivins, Police Will Train Subway "Angels"
Under City Plan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, at B5, col. 1. The Angels earlier had rejected
New York City officials' invitation to become an auxiliary police force. Fowler, supra note
339, at B3, col. 5.
352. Editorial, supra note 348, at 14, col. 1.
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local Guardian Angels chapters might allay many of the fears and
misunderstandings that prevent these cities from enjoying the ben-
eficial service that aggressive citizen action groups can provide.
The fear that official recognition of Guardian Angels groups
may result in vicarious municipal liability for the injury these
groups cause is the second obstacle that prevents more fruitful co-
operation between the Guardian Angels and city officials. 53 Al-
though prudent, this concern should not prevent city officials and
police authorities from developing a cooperative relationship with
citizen action groups. Courts are unlikely to hold that a city au-
thorized the member of a citizen crime-fighting group to commit
criminal or tortious acts merely by acknowledging the presence of
or cooperating with a citizen's group that exercises lawful privi-
leges in an effort to reduce crime.3 54 In most cases official recogni-
tion of these groups would constitute nothing more than endorsing
established rights and laws. 55 If a citizen's group became noted for
unlawful conduct, the city should withdraw official recognition for
and cease cooperating with the group. Unlawfulness, however, is
not a characteristic of the Guardian Angels and the cities should
not refuse to develop a fruitful relationship with the Guardian An-
gels and similar groups. Moreover, this relationship probably
would decrease the possibility of these groups' engaging in unlaw-
ful conduct.
D. Self-Help Concerning Police and State Action
1. Resisting Unlawful Arrests and Excessive Force
Although the common law permitted persons to use reasonable
force to resist unlawful arrests,358 modern courts and legislatures
353. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 332. New York City's Mayor Koch refused to
give mayoral authorization to the Guardian Angels because he feared that courts might hold
the city liable for any judicial claims against the group. Id.
354. State use of licensing laws to control and minimize the dangers of handgun use is
analagous to municipal recognition of and cooperation with Guardian Angels groups con-
cerning the vicarious liability issue. States do not incur tort liability when the owner of a
hardgun injures another person with the gun even though the license granted the gun owner
authorized that person to own and lawfully use the gun. Similarly, mere municipal coopera-
tion with a citizen's group that aggressively exercises criminal law privileges to fight crime
should not subject the municipality to liability if a group member injures another person
while acting criminally or tortiously.
355. See supra notes 205-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criminal
law privileges that the Guardian Angels use in fighting crime.
356. See Queen v. Tooley, 2 14. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Reprint 349 (1709). For a discus-
sion of the historical development of the common law right to forcibly resist unlawful arrest,
see Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128 (1969); Comment,
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have exhibited an increasing reluctance to condone forceful resis-
tance of unlawful arrest.3 57 The foundational principle of this com-
mon law privilege is that persons rightfully may resist and protect
themselves from any unlawful interference with their fundamental
personal liberties.358 The modern rule governing resisting unlawful
arrest modified the common law by prohibiting persons from re-
sisting an arrest that a peace officer made while performing his du-
ties.359 The Model Penal Code essentially codified this approach.3 6 0
Several policy considerations provide a sound basis for the ju-
dicial and legislative trend toward prohibiting persons from re-
sisting unlawful arrests. Perhaps the predominant force behind
The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest: An Outdated Concept?, 3 TULSA L.J. 40 (1966).
The common law rule allowing one to resist unlawful arrest is still controlling in some
states. See White v. State, 601 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
357. Courts in several states have eliminated the common law right to resist unlawful
arrest. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969); State v. Lockner, 20 Ariz. App.
367, 513 P.2d 374 (1973); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div.
1965); City of Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St. 2d 173, 324 N.E.2d 735 (1975). Other states
allow the right to resist unlawful arrest only if the resistance is without violence. See Low-
ery v. State, 356 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. App. 1978). Federal constitutional law does not give
individuals a right to resist unlawful arrest. United States ex. rel. Kilheffer v. Plowfield, 409
F. Supp. 677 (D.C. Pa. 1976). Several state courts have upheld the constitutionality of stat-
utes that abolished the common law right to resist lawful arrest. See, e.g., People v. Curtis,
70 Cal. 2d 374, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969) (upholding constitutionality of CAL.
PENAL CODE, § 834a (West 1970)); People v. Carroll, 133 Ill. App. 2d 78, 272 N.E.2d 822
(1971) (upholding constitutionality of ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-7 (1971)); State v. Rams-
dell, 109 R.I. 320, 285 A.2d 399 (1971) (upholding constitutionality of R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-7-
10 (1970)).
358. See Columbus v. Holmes, 107 Ohio App. 391, 152 N.E.2d 301 (1958). See
Chevigny, supra note 356, at 1136-47 for additional justifications offered to explain the com-
mon law right to use force in resisting unlawful arrest.
359. See People v. Burns, 18 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1961) (one's constitutional rights are not
violated by requiring one to refrain from forcibly resisting any arrest made by a peace of-
ficer); Lowery v. State, 356 So.2d 1325 (Fla. App. 1978) (one cannot forcibly resist even an
unlawful arrest made by a peace officer); Moore v. Chicago Police Bd., 41 Ill. App. 3d 343,
355 N.E.2d 745, (1976) (one cannot resist an arrest made by a known peace officer even if
the arrest is unlawful and without a warrant or probable cause); City of Independence v.
Elder, 653 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. App. 1983) (one cannot resist an unlawful arrest made by a
person empowered with police authority); State v. Lawrence, 142 N.J. Super 208, 361 A.2d
69, (1976) (one cannot forcibly resist arrest if he knows or has good reason to know that the
arrestor is a peace officer engaged in performance of his duties). The justification for this
restriction of the right to resist unlawful arrest is that citizens should be law abiding and
should accept duly constituted authority even though law enforcement officials sometimes
may abuse this authority. These obligations are conducive to maintenance of an orderly
society in which an aggrieved person can resort to redress by peaceful means. Burns, 18 Cal.
Rptr. at 923.
360. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) (1962). Section 3.04(2)(a)(i) prohibits persons
from using force to resist, lawful or unlawful arrest, if they know that the arrestor is a peace
officer.
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this trend is the recognition of the dangers inherent in the exercise
of this privilege and the numerous effective options and safeguards
available to arrested persons. Forcible resistance to arrests threat-
ens several undesirable results. First, it could cause violent con-
frontations that could injure arrestors, arrestees, and innocent by-
standers, 6 1 and disrupt civil order.'6  Because arresting police
officers probably will counter forcible resistance to arrest by using
additional force, the threat of a relatively innocuous arrest escalat-
ing into a violent, injury causing confrontation is particularly
acute.363 This strong propensity for harm led one court to conclude
that the "[u]se of self-help to prevent unlawful arrest presents too
great a threat to the safety of individuals and society to be
sanctioned."36"
A second danger inherent in recognizing the privilege to forci-
bly resist unlawful arrests is that it entrusts the determination of
lawfulness to a layperson acting in a threatening situation. The
question whether an arrest is unlawful is not an issue that the par-
ties to an arrest can best decide while engaged in a heated street
confrontation.3 '5 Rather, judicial consideration of this issue proba-
bly would yield a more proper and peaceful result in most cases.
Last, giving citizens a broad right to use force in publicly resisting
arrest arguably would cast a public image of law enforcement offi-
cials as inadequate and disorderly law enforcers. This image, even
if inaccurate, would damage public confidence in law enforcement
officials and impair their effectiveness at fighting crime.
The judicial and legislative trend toward prohibiting and se-
verely limiting the common law privilege to use force in resisting
an unlawful arrest also has evolved because new remedies, which
were unavailable at common law, now offer substantial reparation
to victims of unlawful arrests. Unlawful arrest victims now can ob-
tain civil damages, injunctions, or administrative remedies within a
reasonable time after unlawful arrests.366 Procedural safeguards
361. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965).
362. Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. App. 1981); State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d
607, 611 (Iowa 1978).
363. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969). One commentator observed that the
right to resist unlawful arrests has little practical utility because the exercise of this right
frequently results in an arrest being made because of the individual's resistance. Comment,
The Right to Resist Unlawful Arrests, 7 NATURAL REsouRCEs J. 119, 125 (1967).
364. Ford v. State, 538 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
365. Id.; State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super, 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965).
366. See Chevigny, supra note 356, at 1147; Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Viola-
tions of Individual Rights, 39 MNN. L. REV. 493 (1955). One court noted that the common
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and constitutional rights, such as the rights to post bond, to coun-
sel, and to prompt arraignment, and application of the exclusion-
ary rulee 7 substantially alleviate the harm that unlawful arrest
law rule developed in a time when self-help was a more necessary remedy to resist intru-
sions upon an individual's freedom:
[It] was developed largely during a period when most arrests were made by private
citizens, when bail for felonies was usually unattainable, and when years might pass
before the royal judges arrived for a jail delivery. Further, conditions in English jails
were then such that a prisoner had a excellent chance of dying of disease before trial.
Fields v. State, 178 Ind. App. 350, 354, 382 N.E.2d 972, 976 (1978) (quoting Warner, The
Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942)).
367. The exclusionary rule requires state and federal courts to exclude at trial any
evidence against a defendant and other evidence derived therefrom that government officers
or their civilian deputies or agents acquired in violation of fourth amendment standards.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous At-
tack of "Reasonable Good Faith," 36 VAn. L. REv. 1511, 1512 (1983); Uviller, The Acquisi-
tion of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some Constitutional Premises and Practices in
Transaction, 35 VAND. L. Rxv. 501, 501 n.1 (1982). In Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921), the United States Supreme Court decisively limited the application of the exclusion-
ary rule to evidence obtained by government agents. Id. at 467. The Court stated that,
the Fourth Amendment protects only against searches and seizures which are made
under governmental authority, real or assumed, or under color of such authority. If
papers have been seized, even though wrongfully, by one not acting under color of au-
thority, and they afterwards come to the possession of the Government, they may be
properly used in evidence.
Id. Thus, Burdeau permits prosecutors to use in criminal prosecutions evidence seized by
private citizens even though the citizens might have committed a crime to obtain the evi-
dence. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1981); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). Today, every federal circuit court has reaffirmed the Burdeau
philosophy. See, e.g., United States v. Andrini, 685 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Shuckahosee, 609 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980); United
States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Keuylian, 602 F.2d 1033
(2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v.
McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979). Except for Mon-
tana, see Duran v. Buttrey Food, Inc., 616 P.2d 327, 333 (Mont. 1980) (construing 1972
MoNr. CoNsr. art. II, §11), all state courts follow the Burdeau construction of the exclusion-
ary rule in cases concerning evidence obtained in searches made by private citizens. See
Note, Intrusion, Exclusion, and Confusion, 41 MONT. L. Rzv. 281, 281 (1980); see, e.g., M.J.
v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. App. 1981); State v. Boynton, 58 Hawaii 530, 574 P.2d 1330
(1978); People v. Sellars, 93 1ll. App. 3d 744, 417 N.E.2d 877 (1981); State v. Bakker, 262
N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1978); State v. Keyser, 117 N.H. 45, 369 A.2d 224 (1977); People v. Adler,
50 N.Y.2d 730, 409 N.E.2d 888, 431 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).
The Supreme Court has indicated clearly that deterrence of police misconduct in ob-
taining evidence is the primary function of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1965); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1960); see also Ingber,
supra note 367, at 1517. Consequently, a pervasive rationale underlying courts' refusals to
exclude evidence that private citizens have obtained unlawfully, in addition to the absence
of police conduct, is that the exclusion of the evidence effectively would not deter the pri-
vate conduct. See, e.g., Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 632, 522 P.2d 674, 676 (1974).
The exclusionary rule probably would be ineffective against private action for two reasons.
First, the desire to obtain evidence sufficient to secure a criminal conviction usually does not
1984] SELF-HELP 905
motivate private citizens to obtain evidence unlawfully. Second, many private citizens are
unfamiliar with the law, and consequently, unaware of the exclusionary rule. See W.
LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.6 at 112-13 (1978). Many courts and commentators further
assert that available criminal and civil sanctions against individuals who unlawfully obtain
evidence for a criminal prosecution are adequate deterrents to unlawful private searches and
seizures. See id. at 113 n.21; see generally Recent Development, Evidence Illegally Ob-
tained by Private Persons Held Admissible in State Civil Action, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 168,
173 (1963). Additional reasons for not suppressing privately seized evidence include the
fears that such a policy would give defendants too much protection or cause citizens to take
more drastic self-help measures against criminal activity out of frustration with the criminal
justice system. Horvitz v. State, 433 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. App. 1983). Proponents of an
expanded exclusionary rule argue that by admitting tainted evidence at trial, courts are
actually encouraging vigilantism. See People v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. Rptr. 716, 730 n.11,
598 P.2d 877, 890 n.11 (1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting); State v. Van Haele, 649 P.2d 1311, 1316
(Mont. 1982) (Sheeby, J., concurring). But see Gunter v. State, 257 Ind. 524, 275 N.E.2d
810, 812 (1971).
Evidence obtained in searches by private citizens, however, may be inadmissible under
the exclusionary rule if the citizens acted as agents or instruments of the state. See, e.g.,
United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1980); Cash v. Williams, 455 F.2d 1227,
1230-32 (6th Cir. 1972); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921). Thus, courts will
exclude evidence obtained by a private citizen if the citizen received encouragement or di-
rect assistance from government officials in obtaining the evidence. See, e.g., United States
v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 (1979); OKC Corp. v. Wil-
liams, 461 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Tex. 1978); People v. Barber, 94 IM. App. 3d 813, 419 N.E.2d
71 (1981); but see United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Keuylian, 602 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Lamar, 545 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.)
cert.denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977) (acted pursuant to an express statutory endowment of gov-
ernmental purpose); United States v. Shuckahosee, 609 F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919 (1980) (acted after being recruited and compensated by govern-
ment officers); United States v. Walter, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981); State v. Boynton,
58 Hawaii 530, 574 P.2d 1330 (1978); but see United States v. Vlen, 479 F.2d 467 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974), or was in other ways an agent of the state. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dansberry, 500 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (arrest by police officer outside
his jurisdiction is state action); State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 1978); State v. Filipi,
297 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1980); Moore v. State, 562 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); but
see People v. Leutkemeyer, 74 Ml. App. 3d 708, 393 N.E.2d 117 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
938 (1980).
The varying judicial conclusions regarding the presence of state action in cases concern-
ing private citizen searches reflect the case-by-case approach courts necessarily apply in
these situations. Both the belief of courts about the function of the exclusionary rule and an
empirical analysis of instances of this form of self-help may influence the determination of
courts about whether the nexus between the state and private citizens presents a sufficient
foundation for applying the exclusionary rule to unlawfully obtained evidence. If available
criminal and civil sanctions fail to deter widespread private vigilante group seizures of evi-
dence, some courts might grow more inclined to find state action and exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence more often. Similarly, if possible, some state courts might follow the
Montana court's lead by applying the exclusionary rule to unlawful private searches and
seizures. See State v. Helfrich, 183 Mont. 484, 600 P.2d 816 (1979). Furthermore, some
courts, by embracing the exclusionary rule's preservation of judicial integrity function, see
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961), simply might extend the rule's application to evi-
dence obtained in unlawful private searches as an imperative means of keeping criminal
proceedings free from the taint of unlawfulness. Courts should reserve these expansions of
the exclusionary rule's application until and unless the courts ascertain that presently ex-
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causes individuals.3 68
Despite the blossoming judicial hostility toward the right to
resist unlawful arrest, courts continue to sustain the right of indi-
viduals to use reasonable force in resisting a police officer's use of
excessive force in making lawful and unlawful arrests;6 9 individu-
als may invoke the privilege of self-defense to justify resisting a
police officer's use of excessive force to make an unlawful arrest.3 70
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in commenting
about the privilege, emphasized that "the [citizen] may defend
himself by the use of such force, not because its use is necessary to
protect him from the unlawful arrest, but because it is the only
way in which he can protect himself from death or serious bodily
harm."' 71 One court aptly articulated the rationale for this rule as
follows: "[A]lthough liberty can be restored through legal process,
life and limb can't be repaired in the court room. 37 2 Thus, the
right of individuals to defend themselves against unwarranted in-
friction of physical injury during unlawful arrests outweighs the
threat of "intolerable disorder" that accompanies this form of self-
help.7 3 Courts have limited the right of individuals to use the self-
defense privilege in this context to situations in which no alterna-
tive action will protect the arrested person. If arrested individuals
know they can avoid an arrester's excessive use of force by submit-
ting to the arrest, the self-defense privilege does not authorize
them to resist the arrest forcibly.37' This sensibly limited self-de-
isting civil and criminal sanctions are not effective deterrents to increasing incidence of un-
lawfully obtained evidence against criminal defendants by private citizens.
368. See State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965) (self-help
is no longer necessary in this era of constantly expanding safeguards for the accused in
criminal trials); Ford v. State, 538 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
369. See State v. Nunes, 546 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. App. 1977); State v. Anderson, 40 N.C.
App. 318, 253 S.E.2d 48 (1979).
370. See State v. Hernandez, 651 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. App. 1983).
371. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 65 comment f (1977). Section 65 of the Re-
statement provides:
(1) Subject to the statement in Subsection (3), an actor is privileged to defend himself
against another by force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, when
he reasonably believes that (a) the other is about to inflict upon him an intentional
contact or other bodily harm, and that (b) he is thereby put in peril of death or serious
bodily harm or ravishment, which can safely be prevented only by the immediate use of
such force.
Id.
372. State v. Nunes, 546 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Mo. App. 1977).
373. Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926, 929-31 (Fla. App. 1981).
374. State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 270 A.2d 277 (1970). See also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 65 comment f (1977). Once the apparent threat or actual use of excessive
force has passed, the self-defense privilege does not authorize arrested persons to retaliate
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fense privilege and other protections against unlawful arrest,375 to-
gether with the dangers that forcible resistance of unlawful arrest
poses,376 weigh strongly in favor of the judicial and legislative trend
toward proscribing the common-law right to use force in resisting
unlawful arrest.
2. Escape
The modern trend in judicial and legislative treatment of de-
fenses that prisoners have to escape from official confinement
377
exemplifies another eroding category of self-help. Many courts and
legislatures, prior to this trend, recognized the right of prisoners to
argue unlawful confinement as a defense to the crime of escape$7'
because lawful detention was a precondition to unlawful escape.379
with force against their arrestors. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 12 Cal. App. 3d 232, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 521 (1970).
375. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
377. This discussion uses the term "escape" to mean an unauthorized departure from
the custody of law enforcement officials. See R. PERKNS, supra note 192, at 500. Thus,
escape includes conduct ranging from a suspect's flight from a police officer's custodial ar-
rest to a convict's escaping from a penitentiary. Id. at 500, 506.
378. See, e.g., Brown v. Cato, 147 Conn. 418, 421, 162 A.2d 175, 177 (1960); State v.
Higgins, 338 A.2d 159, 163 (Me. 1975); People v. Alexander, 39 Mich. App. 607, 609, 197
N.W.2d 831, 833 (1972); see also Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1430, 1433-37. Section 242.6(3) of the
Model Penal Code addresses the effect of legal irregularity in detention as follows:
(3) EFrcT OF LEGAL IMuIGULARrrY iN DETENTION. Irregularity in bringing about or
maintaining detention, or lack of jurisdiction of the committing or detainting authority,
shall not be a defense to prosecution under this Section if the escape is from a prison
or other custodial facility or from detention pursuant to commitment by official pro-
ceedings. In the case of other detentions, irregularity or lack of jurisdiction shall be a
defense only if:
(a) the escape involved no substantial risk of harm to the person or property of
anyone other than the detainee; or
(b) the detaining authority did not act in good faith under color of law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.6(3) (1962). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit more
clearly defined the term "custody" as follows:
Although there must be an escape from custody, it is not necessary that the escapee at
the time of the escape be held under guard or under direct physical restraint or that the
escape be from a conventional penal housing unit such as a cell or cell block; the custody
may be minimal and, indeed, may be constructive.
United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728, 731 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976).
379. See R. PmuuINs, supra note 192, at 502. A precise meaning of "lawful" and "un-
lawful" custody, however, is not discernible from the numerous cases addressing the escape
defense of unlawful confinement. See, e.g., Harding v. State, 248 Ark. 1240, 455 S.W.2d 695
(1970); see also Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1430, 1433-34 n.14. For example, a judicial determina-
tion that a prison's conditions violate state and federal constitutional prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment do not necessarily render custody unlawful. See State v. Al-
cantaro, 407 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. App. 1981).
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Prisoners also could assert duress and necessity80 as defenses to
escape from lawful and unlawful confinement. 81 Prevailing judicial
380. Courts and commentators have distinguished between the duress and necessity
defenses to escape. They recognize necessity as an affirmative justification for a defendant's
decision to escape rather than suffer the harm that his conditions of confinement threaten.
See infra note 381. Prisoners have asserted the necessity defense, for example, arguing that
they attempted escape from confinement to avoid injury during a prison fire, People v.
Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929), or to obtain emergency medical treatment,
People v. Martin, 100 Mich. App. 447, 298 N.W.2d 900 (1980). The duress defense, on the
other hand, negates the intent element of escape. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d
1087, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). Prisoners have asserted the duress
defense to escape when they attempted escape because they feared being beaten by prison
officials, Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 576 P.2d 1129 (1978) (holding that courts should
consider the duress defense only when beatings occurred within 48 to 72 hours of escape), or
feared being assaulted homosexually by other prisoners, People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App.
482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974). See Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 678, 694-98, for a discussion of cases
which suggest that courts might accept duress and necessity as legitimate defenses for pris-
oners who escaped to avoid sexual abuse.
Defendants usually assert the duress and necessity defenses successfully only if several
conditions existed at the time of escape. See People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831-
32, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115-16 (1974). First, prisoners must receive specific threats that in-
duce a reasonable and imminent fear of serious physical harm. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr,
supra note 185, at 374, 381. Second, prisoners must exhaust their legal remedies concerning
a specific threat of harm, see People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831, 118 Cal. Rptr.
110, 115 (1974), or demonstrate that they either did not have the time or opportunity to
exhaust available remedies or that doing so would have been futile. Id. Third, prisoners
must surrender themselves to law enforcement officials as soon as reasonably possible after
the conditions justifying their escape have passed. See id.; United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d
1087, 1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1977).
Last, some courts have held that a prisoner who justifiably attempts to escape under the
duress or necessity defenses may not use force or violence against prison officials or other
innocent persons while attempting escape. See People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823,
118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
381. See G. Fxrcann, supra note 233, at 829-30; Gardner, The Defense of Necessity
and the Right to Escape from Prison-A Step Toward Incarceration Free from Sexual
Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 110, 118 (1975); see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 309 (defining
the duress defense). Section 3.01 of the Model Penal Code contains provisions recognizing
justifiable conduct as an affirmative defense. Section 3.02 defines justifiable conduct as
follows:
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself
or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or de-
fenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise
plainly appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a
choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification
afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which reck-
lessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 302 (1962).
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attitudes, however, tend to disfavor these three defenses to the
crime of escape because this self-help measure tends to jeopardize
the orderly administration of prisoner confinement and the safety
of law enforcement officers and prisoners. 2 While generally not
disputing the legitimacy of any right of escape, courts have cur-
tailed the effectiveness of escape defense by rejecting as illegiti-
mate many of the proffered justifications for escape.383 Recent case
law indicates that courts, faced with the threat of social disruption
and physical injury associated with escapes, have been assessing
the adequacy of available alternative courses of action that prison-
ers can take to obtain relief from unjust or extraordinarily hazard-
ous imprisonment.3 8 The courts largely agree that prisoners
should attempt escape only as a remedy of last resort because ex-
isting judicial and administrative procedures protect prisoners in
most cases.385
Legal custody, from which escape is a crime,386 may exist even
though the law might require law enforcement officials to release
the prisoner at a later time.387 The state bears the burden of prov-
ing lawful custody in prosecutions for escape.8 Courts formerly
held confinement unlawful when an aura of illegality or other ir-
regularities tainted the confinement process. In these cases, courts
held that the tainted nature of confinement justified escape. "9
382. Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1430, 1433. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stanley, 498 Pa. 326,
446 A.2d 583 (1982).
383. See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1430, 1433. But see State v. Alcantaro, 407 So. 2d 922
(Fla. App. 1981) (noting some relaxation of the general rule that intolerable living condi-
tions in prisons are not a form of duress that justifies escape).
384. See, e.g., State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073
(1972) (prisoner had available alternative of reporting threats from other prisoners to prison
authorities).
385. See, e.g., Dempsey v. United States, 283 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1960) (prisoner denied
relief because he had never requested available medical aid from prison authorities); People
v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975) (prisoner denied relief because he
had time prior to escape to resort to courts).
386. Escape from the lawful custody of a private person also may be a criminal of-
fense. See Johnson v. Sheriff, 90 Nev. 19, 518 P.2d 161 (1974); see also Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d
664 (1976).
387. R. PERKINS, supra note 192 at 503; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.6(3).
388. See, e.g., Farrier v. Faulk, 102 Fla. 886, 136 So. 601 (1931); McGinnis v. State, 460
S.W.2d 690 (Mo. 1970); State v. Jordan, 247 N.C. 253, 100 S.E.2d 497 (1947); see also An-
not., 70 A.L.R.2d 1430, 1433 n.5 (1960).
389. See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1430, 1433 (1960); see, e.g., State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452,
456 (1829). One court articulated the policy supporting this perspective as follows:
The right to personal liberty is accorded a pre-eminent position under our system of
law and government,. . . so that there is something to be said for the view that the citizen
improperly deprived of his liberty should be entitled to recover it by any means available to
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This view, however, eroded substantially as courts adopted a strict
construction of the term "unlawful custody." 90 Courts today have
demonstrated care in their criminal escape decisions not to estab-
lish a policy that permits or encourages prisoners to decide subjec-
tively whether their imprisonment is legal, or that transforms judi-
cial review of recaptured prisoners' escape defense claims into a
retrial of the original proceeding that resulted in incarceration. In
harmony with this judicial attitude, courts have adopted the rule
that requires prisoners to proceed through established legal chan-
nels to challenge the legality of confinement, rather than to at-
tempt escape, when confinement is under color of state law.
391
These courts fear that a more permissive rule would create chaos
in prisons and severely hinder law enforcement.
3 2
Courts have developed other legal rules designed to persuade
prisoners to use established legal procedures in challenging the le-
gality of confinement rather than to attempt escape. For example,
courts have refused to allow prisoners to attack collaterally the
constitutionality of their imprisonment in escape trials.93 The fed-
eral courts also have held that escapes made during the pendency
of proceedings for relief in state court constitute a deliberate by-
pass or abandonment of available state remedies.3" Consequently,
these escapes constitute failures to exhaust state remedies and dis-
entitle recaptured prisoners to their right to federal habeas corpus
relief.39 5 Courts, through these rules, clearly have demonstrated a
desire to create a policy that persuades prisoners to use judicial
him, Nat Coelum, and it seems hard that one improperly imprisoned should be subjected to
further punishment for merely asserting the right to liberty guaranteed him by the
Constitution.
Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d at 1432 (1960).
390. Id.; see R. PaRuaNs, supra note 192, at 503.
391. See Petition of Lynch, 379 Mass. 757, 780, 400 N.E.2d 854, 857 n.2 (1980).
392. See In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 745, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 178, 408 P.2d 948, 954
(1965); State v. Jackson, 500 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. App. 1973); cf. State v. Dennon, 473 S.W.2d
741 (Mo. 1971) (prisoners may not justify forcibly resisting prison officials on grounds of
unlawful confinement). Courts similarly have rejected juvenile detainees' assertions that
their unlawful confinement justified escape, H v. Murphy, 512 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. App. 1974),
or assault of an official, Wintjen v. State, 433 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1968).
393. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. State, 161 Me. 248, 253 211 A.2d 290, 293 (1965).
394. See, e.g., Fowler v. Leeke, 509 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1979), appeal dismissed with-
out opinion, 644 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Annot., 61 A.L.R. Fan. 938 (1983).
395. See, e.g., Strickland v. Hopper, 571 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842
(1978); Ruetz v. Lash, 500 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Smith v. Jackson,
234 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1956); Fowler v. Leeke, 509 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1979), appeal dis-




procedures to challenge the legality of their confinement and that
dissuades prisoners from attempting escape.
IV. SELF-HELP IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
A. Introduction
The process of bargaining and agreeing upon the terms of a
contract is essentially a form of self-help that parties commonly
employ in commercial transactions. In the most basic of contracts,
the contracting parties negotiate the terms of their contractual re-
lationship and establish the private law that governs their relation-
ship.3s ' Any contractual agreement, provided it meets certain legal
requirements,3 9 7 -legally obliges the agreeing parties to fulfill and
abide by the terms of the agreement. The failure of either party to
comply with a valid contractual agreement entitles the aggrieved
party to a judicial remedy. The flexibility of the contract negotia-
tion process, the ability of individuals to structure commercial
agreements in a workable manner, and judicial doctrines such as
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and unconscionabil-
ity,3 " which encourage individuals to bargain fairly and freely,
have made the creation of commercial contracts one of the most
prevalent self-help tools in contemporary society. The inherent
limitations and ambiguities of language, misunderstandings be-
tween contracting parties, changes in circumstances, unanticipated
events, and bad faith inevitably cause contractual disputes and
force parties to rely on courts to interpret and enforce their con-
tractual rights. Alternatives to judicial resolution of contractual
disagreements are available to contracting parties, however, and
the parties may either incorporate such alternatives into their con-
396. Authorities define "contract" in various ways, but generally a contrat is "a trans-
action involving two or more individuals whereby each becomes obligated to the other, with
reciprocal rights to demand performance of what is promised by each respectively." Gardner
v. City of Englewood, 282 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Colo. 1955) (citing Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1817)). The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
defines "contract" as "[t]he total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement
as affected by [law]." U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1977).
397. The requirements of a valid contract are "parties competent to contract, proper
subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation."
Detroit Trust Co. v. Struggles, 289 Mich. 595, 599, 286 N.W. 844, 846 (1939). For a discus-
sion of the legal requirements of a valid enforceable contract, see J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON
CoNTRACTS (2d rev. ed. 1974).
398. See J. MuRRAY, supra note 397, §§ 350-354, at 735-58 for a discussion of the
historical development of the doctrine of unconscionability and related doctrines at common
law and under the UCC. These doctrines developed to ensure that parties exercised free will
when they entered into contracts. Id. §§ 350-351, at 735-40.
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tract at the outset of the transaction or elect to use them when the
need arises. Although these options do not require judicial inter-
vention, they are additional self-help measures whose legitimacy
and legality courts recognize and enforce pursuant to state com-
mon law or statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code("UCC"9).399
Nonjudicial methods of settling disputes that arise in conmer-
cial settings promote smoother business relationships by avoiding
courtroom animosity and irritation. These self-help measures also
may save disputing parties time and money by facilitating prompt
dispute settlement. This part of the Special Project examines sev-
eral self-help measures available in commercial transactions. Sec-
tion B reviews liquidated damages provisions and the right to re-
possession under both the common law and the UCC.40 0 Section C
then discusses the role of commercial arbitration as an alternative
399. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law jointly created the UCC. The UCC's drafters designed it to encourage
substantially uniform regulation of commercial transactions throughout the United States.
See J. CArAmARi & J. PERMLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1-7 (2d ed. 1977); J. WHrrZ & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1 (2d ed. 1980). The District of Columbia, the
United States Virgin Islands, and every state except Louisiana had enacted the UCC with
minor variations by 1979. J. WHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra, § 1, at 1. See, e.g., infra notes
428-475 and accompanying text for judicial treatment of self-help remedies under the UCC.
400. The UCC provisions concerning warehousemen's statutory liens, UCC §§ 7-209
and 7-210 (1977), represent the codification of another self-help alternative to judicial trials
that might affect common citizens engaged in commercial transactions. Section 7-102(1)(h)
defines a "warehouseman" as "a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire."
U.C.C. § 7-102(1)(h) (1977). Whenever a person warehouses goods that a warehouse receipt
covers, the warehouseman acquires a lien in the person's property that the receipt covers
and that the warehouseman possesses. U.C.C. § 7-209(1) (1977). The lien secures, among
other things, storage, labor, insurance costs, and expenses that the warehouseman incurs in
preserving the stored goods. Id. Section 7-210 sets forth the procedures for the self-help
enforcement of a warehouseman's lien, which warehousemen may exercise in addition to all
other rights that the law gives creditors against their debtors. U.C.C. § 7-210(7) (1977). Sec-
tion 7-210 permits a warehouseman to enforce a lien on goods that a merchant, in the course
of his business, stores with the warehouseman by publicly or privately selling the goods
without invoking any judicial proceedings. U.C.C. § 7-210(1)-(2) (1977). First, however, the
warehouseman must notify all persons known to claim an interest in the goods. U.C.C. § 7-
210(1) (1977). Also, the warehouseman must conduct the sale in a "commercially reasonable
manner." Id. This standard of commercial reasonableness for foreclosure, however, does not
apply to the sale of noncommercial storage with a warehouseman. U.C.C. § 7-210(2) and
comment 1 (1977). A warehouseman seeking to enforce a lien against an owner of household
goods in storage, for example, must comply with the more precise and restrictive procedures
set forth in § 7-210(2). A warehouseman's failure to comply with the requirements of § 7-210
may subject him to liability for damages to the person or entity warehousing goods with
him. U.C.C. § 7-210(9) (1977). Accordingly, the warehouseman might opt to satisfy his claim




method of settling contractual disputes.
B. Self-Help in Contractual Matters
1. Liquidated Damages Provisions
Liquidated damages provisions incorporated into contracts af-
ford contracting parties a legally enforceable 01 form of prophylac-
tic self-help. 02 Contracting parties that agree to a liquidated dam-
ages clause agree that a specific sum expressed in the clause is a
just remedy for one party's breach of the contract.403 Thus, in the
event of a breach, the parties can resolve the question of appropri-
ate damages without resorting to litigation unless the liquidated
damages clause itself becomes the point of contention.' 0 '
The common law doctrine of freedom to contract provided the
jurisprudential roots for judicial enforcement of liquidated damage
clauses. 405 Even at common law, however, courts refused to enforce
contractually agreed upon penalty provisions.40  These courts ana-
lyzed three questions in distinguishing enforceable liquidated dam-
age clauses from unenforceable penalty provisions: first, whether
the breach caused an uncertain or inestimable amount of dam-
ages; 407 second, whether the parties intended to provide for dam-
ages as opposed to a penalty for breach of their contract;40 and
last, whether the stipulated damages constituted a reasonable esti-
401. As early at 1829, courts of law distinguished liquidated damages from penalties in
a manner similar to the way in which courts draw this distinction today. See C. MCCORMUCK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 147 (1935). Today, courts will not enforce penalty
provisions even though the contracting parties ostensibly have agreed to them by incorpo-
rating them in their contracts. Courts define a penalty as a contractual provision intended
to induce a party to refrain from breaching a contract and to punish the party if the induce-
ment is ineffective. Penalty provisions typically require breaching parties to pay the ag-
grieved party something of greater value than performance of the contract. See, e.g., Berger
v. Shanahan, 142 Conn. 726, 732, 118 A.2d 311, 314-15 (1955).
402. See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); South-
west Eng'g Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965);
Callanan Rd. Improvement Co. v. Colonial S. & S. Co., 190 Misc. 418, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 194
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
403. J. MURRAY, supra note 397, § 234, at 473.
404. Id. at 473-76.
405. See J. C .ARmw & J. PRmLo, supra note 399, at § 14-31; C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 401, at § 147. Concern for parties' freedom to contract has not restrained courts from
refusing to enforce penalty provisions and other provisions they deem unreasonable. See
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
406. J. CALAmum & J. PmuLo, supra note 399, at §§ 14-31.
407. See City of Memphis v. Ford Motor Co., 304 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1962).
408. See Berger v. Shanahan, 142 Conn. 726, 118 A.2d 311(1955).
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mate of the potential loss to the aggrieved party. 0 A close analysis
of caselaw concerning liquidated damages, however, reveals that
the third part of this test usually weighs most heavily in courts'
dispositions of these cases, while the first two factors receive only
superficial attention. 10 In addition, courts typically judge the rea-
sonableness of estimated potential damages from the time of con-
tracting rather than the time of breach.411
Article 2 of the UCC, which governs the sale of goods, 12 spe-
cifically authorizes the use of liquidated damages clauses in com-
mercial contracts.413 Section 2-718(1) provides that "[d]amages for
breach by either party may be liquidated. '414 A valid liquidated
damages clause under section 2-718(1) is enforceable only if it satis-
fies two requirements that closely resemble the common law liqui-
dated damage clause requirements. First, the contracting parties
must make a fair and reasonable effort to fix just compensation for
the anticipated loss that a potential contract breach would
cause.41 5 The UCC states that unreasonably large liquidated dam-
409. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 120 (1907).
410. See Central Trust Co. v. Wolf, 255 Mich. 8, 237 N.W. 29 (1931); Callanan Rd.
Improvement Co. v. Colonial S. & S. Co., 190 Misc. 418, 72 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1947). Courts have upheld clauses labeled "penalties," while invalidating clauses labeled
"damages." See J. CALAMA & J. PERILO, supra note 399, § 14-31, at 565-66. For a discus-
sion of liquidated damages provisions under the UCC, see infra notes 412-24 and accompa-
nying text.
411. See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907). But see infra notes 424-25 and accompanying
text.
When no actual loss results from a breach, however, courts sometimes stray from this
analysis. See, e.g., Massman Constr. Co. v. City Council, 147 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1945). But
see Southwest Eng'g Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir.) (holding that a liquidated
damages clause was enforceable even though the government suffered no actual damages
because parties reasonably anticipated damages would result when they made the contract),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965).
412. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977). See id. §§ 2-105(1), 2-107. Courts increasingly are applying
the provisions of Article 2 by analogy to nonsales commercial transactions such as bailments
and leases. W. HAwKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 4 (3d ed. 1976); J. CALAMAiuI & J. PER.r.o,
supra note 399, § 1-7, at 16-17.
413. Section 2-718(1) of the UCC, the liquidated damages provision, states:
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but
only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfea-
sibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1977).
414. Id.
415. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979);
Mellor v. Budget Advisors, Inc., 415 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1969). Northwestern Motor
Car, Inc. v. Pope, 51 Wis. 2d 292, 294-95, 187 N.W.2d 200, 202 (1971). Comment 1 to UCC §
2-718 states that ". . . liquidated damage clauses are allowed where the amount involved is
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age estimates will make the clause void as a penalty.416 In Coast
Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc.,'117 for example, a provision for a
fifteen percent cancellation charge was not a penalty under the
Washington version of section 2-718(1) because the seller actually
showed damages substantially in excess of fifteen percent of the
contract price.41 8 But in Nu Dimensions Figure Salon v. Becerra4
1 9
the court held that a clause which required a breaching party to
pay an aggrieved party the full contract price even before the par-
ties had performed any services was unconscionable and unreason-
able. 420 Between these two extremes courts probably confront
many cases in which the reasonableness of a damage estimate
presents a much closer question. In these cases, the courts likely
will place greatek weight on other equitable considerations such as
the availability of alternative remedies for the aggrieved party and
the relative bargaining strength of the parties at the time of
contracting.
The second precondition to enforceability of a liquidated dam-
ages clause under the UCC is that the harm a contract's breach
causes is difficult to estimate accurately. 42 1 For example, in E.C.
Ernest, Inc. v. Manhattan Construction Co. of Texas,422 the Fifth
Circuit enforced a liquidated damages provision in a construction
contract that provided for payments of $250 per day for each day
of delay. The court reasoned that neither of the parties disputed
the conjectural nature of measuring damages and that loss caused
by delay in completion of the building was difficult to quantify.
428
The UCC liquidated damages clause requirements differ from the
common law requirements in that courts may determine reasona-
bleness of the clause under the UCC at either the time of con-
tracting or the time of breach.' 2 ' Thus, even if the agreed damage
reasonable in the light of the circumstances of the case."
416. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) and comment 1 (1977). An unreasonably small liquidated dam-
ages provision also might be void as a penalty. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) comment 1 (1977); see
Varner v. B.L. Lanier Fruit Co., 370 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
417. 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071 (1978).
418. Id. at 911, 587 P.2d at 1079-80.
419. 73 Misc. 2d 140, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1973).
420. Id. at 142-43, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 271-72.
421. Dave Gustafson & Co. v. State, 83 S.D. 160, 165, 156 N.W.2d 185, 188 (1968).
422. 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 US. 1067 (1977).
423. Id.
424. If the amount "is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused
by the breach," courts will uphold the provision. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
See also J. CALAmAsi & J. PERmLLo, supra note 399, § 14-35, at 569. This provision codifies
the approach that some courts have taken in cases in which no damage occurred. See supra
1984] 915
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
figure was not reasonable at the time the parties made the con-
tract, courts will enforce that provision if the figure reasonably ap-
proximates the actual damages that the contract breach caused.
Contracting parties can benefit from the use of liquidated
damages clauses especially when the potential damages that would
result if one party breached the contract would be uncertain and
difficult to assess. Additionally, liquidated damages provisions can
benefit parties engaged in commercial transactions by protecting
their expectation interests and aid courts by providing approxima-
tions of the damages that would result if a party breached the con-
tract.425 Because of the changing nature of contractual relation-
ships and continued concern about adhesion contracts and
bargaining inequality, however, courts have continued to play an
active role in resolving contractual disputes and enforcing contrac-
tual rights.42 6 Thus, contracting parties who use liquidated damage
clauses as a self-help device must exercise care in drafting their
contracts.2 7
2. Repossession
(a) The Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code
In a typical secured transaction a debtor signs an agreement
granting a creditor an interest in the debtor's property. If the
debtor defaults under the security agreement, the secured creditor
may then repossess428 the property that serves as security without
bringing a judicial action or enlisting the aid of a state official.429
note 411 (discussing enforcement of arbitration clauses in the absence of damages).
425. See Sweet, Liquidated Damages in Calfornia, 60 CALiF. L. REV. 84, 88-89 (1972);
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 401, at §§ 146-149.
426. See Sweet, supra note 425, at 85-89.
427. Id. at 89. For an additional discussion of liquidated damages provisions, see
Gantt & Breslauer, Liquidated Damages in Federal Government Contracts, 47 B.U.L. REv.
71 (1967); Comment, Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Common Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract Damages 58 Nw. U.L. REV.
1055 (1978).
428. This discussion uses the term "repossession" to describe two situations. First, the
term denotes an actual repossession of goods, such as when a seller retains a security inter-
est in the goods sold in exchange for the purchasing credit he extends to the buyer. If the
buyer defaults on his debt to the seller, the seller can satisfy the debt by taking possession
of the goods. Second, this discussion also uses the term "repossession" in reference to the
situation in which a creditor, upon a debtor's default, takes possession of property which the
debtor pledged as security for the loan. In this situation, however, the creditor never owned
the collateral.
429. See Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights:
An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 5 (1973). The conventional
installment contract for the purchase of an automobile illustrates a common repossession
916 [Vol. 37:845
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This right to self-help repossession has a common law heritage
based on the right to contract freely.430 At common law the terms
of a security agreement generally conferred and defined the scope
of the right of a repossession.431 Courts, however, extended the
right of repossession to a secured party even when the agreement
did not expressly authorize it. 452 The scope of the right to reposses-
sion at common law often depended on the form of security agree-
ment that the parties used.43 3 Regardless of the form of security
agreement, however, the common law promoted peaceful reposses-
sion," but tolerated some uses of force. 3 5
Article 9 of the UCC4 3 6 codified the common law right to self-
help repossession. 3 7 Because Article 9 applies to virtually all types
of security agreements,4 s it practically eliminates the varying stan-
situation. If the purchaser fails to make the required payments, the creditor, having a secur-
ity interest in the automobile, may repossess it.
430. The right to repossess can be traced back through English common law to Greek
and Roman times. See McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess,
47 S. CAL. L. REv. 58 (1973). Repossession clauses first appeared in the United States in the
form of chattel mortgages and conditional sales contracts. See, e.g., Miller v. Steen, 34 Cal.
138 (1867) (conditional sales contract); Meyer v. Gorham, 5 Cal. 323 (1855) (chattel
mortgage).
431. At common law, most jurisdictions allowed contracting parties to agree among
themselves to their rights and duties in secured transactions. See Burke & Reber, supra
note 429, at 12.
432. See, e.g., Wixom v. Davis, 57 Cal. App. 620, 207 P. 694 (1922).
433. Although courts recognized the right to repossess under chattel mortgages and
conditional sales contracts, courts and legislatures treated each form of security agreement
differently. See McCall, supra note 430, at 75-76; Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: 1, 57
YALE L.J. 518 (1948).
434. See, e.g., McCarty-Green Motor Co. v. House, 216 Ala. 666, 114 So. 60 (1927);
Abel v. M. H. Pickering Co., 58 Pa. Super. 439 (1914).
435. Some courts and commentators believed that creditors could use "necessary
force" in repossessing collateral. See, e.g., Silverstin v. Kohler & Chase, 181 Cal. 51, 54,183
P. 451, 452 (1919); L. JONES, TaE LAW OF CHArrEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §
1339, at 426 (6th ed. 1933); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs, §§ 100-111 (1964).
436. American jurisdictions have enacted different versions of Article 9. These varia-
tions are mainly attributable to modifications in Article 9 that local legislators have made,
and the differences between the 1972 and 1962 versions of Article 9 that different states
have adopted. See WHmTE & SUMMERS, supra note 399, at 1 n.1. The differences between the
treatment of repossession under the 1962 and 1972 versions of Article 9 are minor. Section
9-504 of the 1972 Code lightened the burden that the 1962 Code placed on creditors to
provide notice prior to dispossessing of collateral. U.C.C. § 9-504 (Appendix II) 1977 (Rea-
sons for 1972 Change).
437. See, e.g., Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672, 675 (W.D. Va.
1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 8-9, 295 A.2d 402, 406 (1972).
438. Section 9-102(2) states that Article 9 "applies to security interests created by
contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's
lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract
and lease or consignment intended as security." U.C.C. § 9-102 (1978).
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dards of permissible self-help repossession that existed at common
law. 3 9 Indeed, the law of repossession is an area of law to which
the UCC's drafters hoped to bring some uniformity and order.40
Section 9-503441 authorizes secured parties442 to take possession of
collateral upon a debtor's default. Secured parties must dispose of
repossessed collateral in accordance with the rights443 and proce-
dures4" outlined in section 9-504." In addition, consistent with
the concept of freedom to contract,446 section 9-503 also permits
parties to secured transactions to agree to alternative measures the
creditor can take if the debtor defaults.4' 7
In light of the common law and section 9-503, courts generally
have acknowledged the validity of self-help repossessions made
439. In re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 11, 14 (3d Cir. 1966).
440. See McCall, supra note 430, at 76.
441. Section 9-503 of the UCC states:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession
of the collateral In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the
security agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble
the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by
the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a
secured party may render equipment unusuable, and may dispose of collateral on the
debtor's premises under Section 9-504.
U.C.C. § 9-503 (1977). Section 9-105(1)(c) defines "collateral" as "the property subject to a
security interest,... [including] accounts and chattel paper which have been sold." U.C.C.
8 9-105(1)(c) (1977).
442. With the exception of transactions listed in § 9-104, Article 9 applies to two types
of transactions that create security interests: (1) "to any transaction (regardless of its form)
which is intended to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures," U.C.C. 9-
102(1)(a) (1977); and (2) "to any sale of accounts or chattel paper." U.C.C. 9-102(1)(b)
(1977).
443. Section 9-504(1) of the UCC provides in pertinent part that "a secured party
after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then
condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing." U.C.C. § 9-
504(1) (1977).
444. Section 9-504(1) also sets forth the apropriate order for applying the proceeds
from the disposition. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a)-(c) (1977).
445. Section 9-504 also specifies the proper method of distributing surplus proceeds
that remain after a debtor satisfies his indebtedness to a creditor, prescribes the proper
methods for disposing of repossed collateral and the requirements concerning notification of
a debtor about disposal of collateral, describes the possessory rights of the purchasers of
collateral, and authorizes the transfer of the secured party's rights and duties to third par-
ties. U.C.C. §§ 9-504(2)-(5) (1977).
446. Cf. J. WHmT & R. Summeas, supra note 399, § 2, at 7 (noting that freedom of
contract is the rule rather than the exception under the UCC).
447. See, e.g., McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971). The
phrase "[u]nless otherwise agreed" in section 9-503 authorizes parties to secured transac-
tions to retain the right to state expressly in their agreement the form of remedy they would
prefer if the debtor defaulted. U.C.C. 8 9-503 (1977).
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pursuant to expressed contractual provisions."8 In Global Casting
Industries, Inc. v. Daley-Hodkins Corp.,"9 for example, a security
agreement expressly authorized the creditor to enter the debtor's
premises and take possession of several pieces of equipment and
machinery.450 The court upheld the repossession even though the
creditor, after discovering that the debtor had changed the lock on
the door, used an unauthorized locksmith's key to enter the
debtor's premises.5 1
Article 9, however, more severely restricts the permissible
methods of taking possession of collateral than did the common
law. Although the common law sometimes tolerated a creditor's
use of necessary force to repossess collateral,452 section 9-503 per-
mits force only "if [it] can be done without breach of the peace." 453
The courts have interpreted this provision as prohibiting reposses-
sions that include violence, actual or potential force, intimidation,
fraud, or trickery.45' The UCC's breach of peace language and the
judiciary's broad interpretation of this language suggests that
courts and legislatures today seek to discourage violent activity by
prohibiting self-help repossession that is "fraught with the likeli-
hood of resulting violence."'
55
448. See, e.g., Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); McCormick
v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Hunt v. Marine Midland Bank-Cen-
tral, 80 Misc. 2d 329 363 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1974); Frost v. Mohawk Nat'l Bank, 74 Misc. 2d 912,
347 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1973). Similarly, courts have relied upon the freedom to contract ration-
ale in upholding express repossession agreements in retain installment contracts. See, e.g.,
Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.) (installment sales contract
authorized truck repossession),cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); John Deere Co. v. Cata-
lano, 186 Colo. 101, 525 P.2d 1153 (1974) (upholding an agreement in a retail sales contract
that provided for summary repossession of a farm combine for default under a retail sales
contract and a security agreement that provided for repossession without notice); Cook v.
Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1974) (upholding a security agreement that authorized repos-
session of a defaulted mobile home).
449. 105 Misc. 2d 517, 432 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1980).
450. Id. at 517-18, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
451. Id. at 521, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
452. See supra note 435.
453. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1977).
454. See, e.g., Morris v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d
683 (1970) (defining breach of peace as a violation of public order and not just violations of
the law); Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651 (1970).
455. See, e.g., Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 29, 254
N.E.2d 683, 686 (1970).
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(b) Constitutional Challenges to Self-Help Repossession
Debtors have used due process arguments to attack the legal-
ity of self-help repossession and UCC section 9-503.46 The Su-
preme Court set the stage for a flood of constitutional challenges to
repossession in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 7 In Sniadach
the Court invalidated on due process grounds a prejudgment gar-
nishment procedure that deprived a wage earner of wages without
a hearing or the opportunity to defend himself prior to the full
judicial trial on the merits of the claim. 458 The Court extended its
reasoning in Sniadach to the seizure of personal property by state
officials under writs of replevin in Fuentes v. Shevin.4 59 The Court
held that the due process clause required the state to give debtors
notice and a hearing before depriving them of their property
rights.
460
Following Sniadach, debtors typically have attacked the legal-
ity of repossession under UCC section 9-503 on fourteenth amend-
ment due process grounds. 46 1 Because the Fuentes procedural re-
quirements of hearing and notice pertain only to state action and
not to the conduct of private citizens,'46 2 a successful due process
challenge requires courts to find that repossession constituted state
action.6 In addition to proving state action, aggrieved debtors
456. See Burke & Reber, supra note 429, at 5.
457. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For a comprehensive analysis of the Sniadach decision, see
McDonnell, Sniadach, The Replevin Cases and Self-Help Repossession-Due Process
Tokenism?, 14 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. Rv. 437 (1973). McCormick v. First Natl Bank, 332
F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971) was the first reported self-help repossession case to challenge
the constitutionality of UCC § 9-503. See also cases cited infra at notes 466-74 and accom-
panying text.
458. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 341-42.
459. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
460. Id. at 97.
461. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). For a brief discussion of the "state action" requirement
see infra note 1158.
462. Id. The Constitution protects citizens only from state actions. Green v. First
Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672, 673 (W.D. Va. 1972). The court in Green held that
"because the operation of the statute involved [§ 9-503] does not require the aid, assistance,
or interaction of any state agent, body, organization or function, the state has not deprived
the plaintiff of his property." Id. at 675 (emphasis in original). For a good discussion of state
action, see Burke & Reber, State ActionCongressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1003 (1973).
463. See, e.g., Greene, 348 F. Supp. at 675; Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.
Super. 1, 8, 295 A.2d 402, 405 (1972); Helfinstine v. Martin, 561 P.2d 951, 956-58 (Okla.
1977); see Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Self-Help Repossession Under Section 9-503
Does Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 SzTON HALL 629 (1973).
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must demonstrate that repossession deprived them of a property
interest sufficiently significant to violate the notice and hearing re-
quirements of due process.46 Although debtors frequently demon-
strate that repossession deprived them of a significant property in-
terest, they have enjoyed only limited success in constitutionally
challenging creditor conduct of repossession pursuant to section 9-
503465 because courts frequently have refused to hold that repos-
session constituted state action.6 6 In Benschoter v. First National
Bank, 67 for example, the court held that a creditor's private, pre-
judgment, self-help repossession of collateral did not constitute
state action because no state official participated in the proce-
dure.468 Similarly, in Turner v. Impala Motors,'6 ' the Sixth Circuit
held that mere statutory authorization of repossession through the
enactment of UCC 9-503 did not constitute state action.7 ° In Tur-
ner, the debtor relied on Reitman v. Mulkey471 to support his
claim that statutory authorization constituted state action. The
court distinguished Reitman as a case concerning racial discrimi-
nation and reasoned that section 9-503 merely codified the com-
464. See Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. at 17, 295 A.2d at 410.
465. Debtors have been even less successful in attacking § 9-503 on other constitutinal
grounds. For instance, in McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.
Fla. 1971), the court rejected a debtor's contention that authorizing a bank to take posses-
sion of an automobile without a judicial proceeding under § 9-503 violated the debtor's con-
stitutional right to acquire, possess, and protect property, and the fourth amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 607-08.
466. See, e.g., James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974);
Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); rev'g, Adams v.
Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Green v. First
Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.
Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972). See generally Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due
Process for the Consumer: What's Due for the Creditor, 24 CAsE W. Rs. 7 (1972) (arguing
that if the state was not responsible for creating the conditions that resulted in one-sided
private lawmaking, consumer creditor contracts are not state action); Note, Self-Help Re-
possession: The Constitutional Attack, The Legislative Response, and the Economic Impli-
cations, 62 Gao. L.J. 273 (1973) (arguing that state authorizing or permitting contract
clauses with self-help provisions is sufficient proof of state action).
467. 218 Kan. 144, 542 P.2d 1042 (1975).
468. Id. at 151, 542 P.2d at 1048.
469. 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974).
470. Id. at 611. For examples of other cases rejecting this claim, see supra note 466.
See Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d at 329; Messenger v. Sandy Motors,
Inc., 121 N.J. Super. at 8, 295 A.2d at 405-06. But see Boland v. Essex County Bank &
Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973) (holding that state action exists when a creditor
repossesses collateral pursuant to the state's version of § 9-503, because the statute "encour-
ages" such action).
471. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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mon law.'72
By declining to invalidate the repossession procedures in sec-
tion 9-503 on constitutional grounds, courts have exhibited wisdom
and practicality in handling self-help in commercial transactions.
Courts would have intruded improperly into the private parties'
freedom of contracting if they had invalidated the repossession
procedure that section 9-503 authorizes. 473 This judicial attitude
sustains the validity of a self-help remedy that facilitates commer-
cial transactions, helps maintain the relative openness of existing
credit structures, and prevents the increasing costs of conducting
commercial transactions that might result from the imposition of
more formalized methods of remedying defaults in secured trans-
actions.4 74 The courts, however, could better promote continued
beneficial use of repossession by providing clear, comprehensive,
and fair standards that help determine what acts constitute a
breach of the peace.'7 5 These standards would help guide creditors
toward compliance with the hazy rules that courts and legislators
have established to ensure peaceful self-help repossession.
C. Commercial Arbitration
1. The Scope and Mechanics of Commercial Arbitration
Commercial arbitration' 76 is a process that parties expressly
agree to use47 7 to resolve disputes arising in contractual relation-
472. Turner, 503 F.2d at 611-12.
473. See Oiler v. Bank of Am., 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
474. See Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1974). For a more detailed study of
self-help repossession and due process, see 5 DzvoR-CREnrroR LAw, 23-01 (1983); Spak,
The Constitutionality of Repossession by Secured Creditors Under Article 9-503 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 10 Hous. L. Rsv. 855 (1973); Burke & Reber, supra note 429;
Neth, supra note 466; Note, supra note 463, at 629.
475. See supra notes 453-55 and accompanying text.
476. Parties engaged in commercial transactions use commercial arbitration in almost
any context in which they desire private resolution of their dispute. M. DomKE, THE LAW
AND PRACTiCE oF CoMMRCIAL ARitrrRATioN, § 1:01, at 3 (1984). Donke explains that.
[commercial arbitration] also comprises controversies arising out of building and engi-
neering contracts, agency and distribution arrangements, close corporation and part-
nership relations, separation agreements, individual employment contracts, license
agreements, leases, estate matters, contracts of government agencies and municipal
bodies with private firms for construction work, stock exchange transations and contro-
versies in the broad insurance field, reinsurance arrangements, inter-insurance com-
pany subrogation claims, and the new development of arbitration of uninsured motorist
accident claims.
Id.
477. M. DoMKn, supra note 476, § 1:01, at 1. See, e.g., UNIFORm ARnrr.TiON ACT § 2, 7
U.L.A. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.A.A.]; 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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ships. The arbitrating parties present their sides of the dispute in a
hearing before an impartial third party-an arbitrator-and agree
to abide by his decision."" Parties to commercial contracts fre-
quently incorporate in their contract an agreement to arbitrate all
future disputes that arise out of performance of the contract.479 In
other cases, parties simply agree to arbitration when a dispute
arises.6
Arbitration permits parties to bypass the judicial process 81
and benefits parties who prefer private resolution of their dis-
putes. 2 Arbitration agreements should define the scope of arbitra-
tion by setting forth the issues that the parties which to submit to
an arbitrator. An agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising out of
a transaction triggers an exclusive process for dispute resolution. 8
An arbitrator is the final judge of law and fact in a dispute unless
the disputing parties expressly agree to limit the arbitrator's au-
thority.4 8 ' Parties may structure an arbitration agreement to limit
478. See Chappell, Arbitrate ... and Avoid Stomach Ulcers, 2 ARE. MAG., Nos. 11-
12, 6, 7 (1944).
479. The American Arbitration Association, an organization dedicated to promoting
and facilitating dispute resolution through arbitration, recommends that parties wishing to
arbitrate future disputes arising out of a contract insert the following clause in their com-
mercial contracts:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered
by the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.
Am. ARErrRATION Ass'N., CoMMEcAL ARBnTRATION RuLEs (1982), reprinted in 263 PLI
Commercial Practice 211, 212 (1981), G. GOLDBERG, A LAwYza's GumE TO CoummRcu L AR-
BrrR , 114 App. A, (2d ed. 1977), and M. Domx, THE LAw AND PRACTCE OF CouMMR-
ciAL ARBrrATioN, at App. VII (1968) [hereinafter cited as CoMmaxcLIL ARBrrRATION RuLEs].
480. The American Arbitration Association suggests that parties wishing to submit an
existing dispute to arbitration execute the following agreement,
We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to submit to arbitration under the Commer-
cial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association the following contro-
versy: (cite briefly). We further agree that the above controversy be submitted to (one)
(three) Arbitrator(s) selected from the panels of Arbitrators of the American Arbitra-
tion Association. We further agree that we will faithfully observe this agreement and
the Rules and that we will abide by and perform any award rendered by the Arbitra-
tor(s) and that a judgment of the Court having jurisdiction may be entered upon the
award.
GOLDBERG, supra note 479, at 114 app.
481. U.A.A. § 1. See Rome v. Sinai Hoasp., 112 Mich. App. 387, 390, 316 N.W.2d 428,
429 (1982); DiPonio v. Henry Ford Hosp., 109 Mich. App. 243, 250, 311 N.W.2d 754, 757
(1981).
482. M. DOMKE, supra note 476, § 3.01, at 21.
483. Furnish, Commercial Arbitration Agreements and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 67 Cuan. L. Rzv. 317, 325 (1979).
484. See, e.g., Cournoyer v. American Television and Radio Co., 249 Minn. 577, 580,
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an arbitrator's powers and use various legal processes to help re-
solve their dispute. 85 Parties to commercial transactions, for ex-
ample, sometimes authorize arbitrators to make only advisory
rather than binding decisions concerning disputes.486
Although courts generally possess only limited authority to re-
view arbitration decisions,s courts have reviewed some of their as-
pects, such as whether an issue is arbitrable in light of the provi-
sions of an arbitration agreement' and whether an arbitrator's
award comports with the arbitration agreement.489 A party also
may challenge arbitration awards on the following three grounds:
(1) an undisclosed relationship existed between an arbitrator and a
party that affected the arbitrator's impartiality; (2) an arbitrator
was corrupt; and (3) an arbitrator failed to conduct a fair and judi-
cious hearing.'90
83 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1957); Meharry v. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 103 Ill. App. 3d
144, 146-47, 430 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (1981); Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515,
521, 424 A.2d 1309, 1312-13 (1981).
485. Note, The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause Under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 52 B.U.L. Rnv. 571, 598 (1972).
486. See Transpacific Transp. Corp. v. Sirena Shipping Co., 9 A.D.2d 316, 322, 193
N.Y.S.2d 277, 284 (1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 1048, 170 N.E.2d 391, 207 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1960).
Federal and state arbitration statutes have survived numerous constitutional attacks.
See, e.g., Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932) (arbitration does not violate
constitutional privileges vesting judicial power in the courts); Finsilver, Still & Moss v.
Goldberg, M. & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930) (arbitration does not deprive parties
of due process of law); Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288
(arbitration strengthens contractual obligations); see also Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d
692, 104 P.2d 770 (1940); Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 104-05, 309 N.W.2d 575, 581
(1981); Somner v. Mackay, 10 N.J. Misc. 644, 160 A.2d 95 (1932).
487. Recent Developments: Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. Rv. 137, 205 (1983);
see Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960) (illegality of part of contract does
not nullify agreement to arbitrate); Judd Constr. Co. v. Evans Joint Venture, 642 P.2d 922,
925 (Colo. 1982) (an arbitrator's decision is a final decision on the merits, tantamount to a
judgment); Jaffa v. Schacket, 114 Mich. App. 626, 319 N.W.2d 604 (1982) (errors of fact or
misrepresentations of law are not grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award).
488. See Stone v. Freezer, 304 N.Y. 649, 107 N.E.2d 509 (1952); Matsner v. Fried, 301
N.Y. 699, 95 N.E.2d 53 (1950).
489. See Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1982).
490. Goldberg, Arbitration of Claims of Contract Unconscionability, 56 N.D.L. Rv.
7, 20 (1980). See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 n.22 (1953) (construing 9 U.S.C. § 10
(Supp. V. 1952)). The scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is very narrow. "If the
award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a
full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in
law or fact." Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854). See also, I/S Stavberg v.
National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974); Federal Commerce & Naviga-
tion Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho Ltd., 457 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1972); Newark Stereotypers' Union
No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954
(1968).
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The most noteworthy aspect of private dispute resolution is its
inherent flexibility. From procedure to effect, the parties' agree-
ment molds the arbitration. 491 Arbitration, however, is not an
amorphous form of dispute resolution. Many industries, for exam-
ple, provide very specialized arbitration tribunals, 9 2 and the
American Arbitration Association offers a comprehensive set of
guidelines for conducting arbitration proceedings.493 Thus, the
form of commercial arbitration proceedings varies significantly de-
pending upon the nature of the underlying controversy and the
desires of the disputing parties.
494
(a) Advantages of Arbitration
Commercial arbitration facially appears to offer disputing par-
ties a less costly method than does the judicial system.495 Parties
should bear in mind, however, that despite widespread publicity
emphasizing the high cost of litigation,496 public funds help to sub-
sidize court costs. In arbitration proceedings, on the other hand,
the disputing parties must bear the full cost of paying arbitra-
tors.4 As disputing parties seek arbitrators who possess greater
expertise than those in the past, the cost of arbitration inevitably
will grow. Parties to arbitration also may seek the advice of legal
counsel during any or all stages of the arbitration process to decide
a variety of questions, such as whether to arbitrate, what form of
491. M. Domuz, supra note 476, at 1.
492. Am. ARBITRATION ASS'N., WinE WORLD OF ARBITRATION (C. Gold & S. Mackenzie
eds. 1978) (including articles on the textile and apparel industry, the construction industry,
and the health care industry).
493. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RuLEs, supra note 479. See also U.A.A., supra note
477; Rules for the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, reprinted in
M. DoMKB, supra note 476, at app. XHI; Rules for the FCC Court of Arbitration, Pub. L.
291, at 9-21 (1980).
494. The following tripartite classification of international arbitration exemplifies the
variation in forms and function of arbitration as a dispute resolution method: (1) nonbind-
ing procedures (in which the award is purely advisory); (2) semi-binding procedures (in
which parties may challenge the award but only with heavy fines to the challenger if a court
affirms the award); and (3) binding procedures (in which an arbitrator's decision is not re-
viewable). These three types of arbitration may vary widely in form and procedure. See
Perlman & Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of International Commercial Dis-
putes, 17 INT'L LAW. 215, 233-36 (1983).
495. See Kreindler, Choice of Forum-Litigation or Arbitration, 263 PLI COMmCLc
LAw AND PRACTICE 9, 11 (1981).
496. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1982, at 24, cols. 4-6 (speech by Lloyd N. Cutler
estimating that the amount of money spent on lawyers equalled 1.4% of the gross national
product of the United States).
497. See, e.g., CoM1.RcLAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 476, at rules 50-51.
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arbitration to use, what arbitrator to choose,498 and how to conduct
the arbitration proceedings. Disputing parties also use legal coun-
sel as advocates during arbitration proceedings. Thus, settling dis-
putes through arbitration sometimes, but not always, is less expen-
sive than litigating the same dispute in court. 99
Arbitration is a more expeditious method of dispute resolution
than are judicial trials because disputing parties privately can
schedule arbitration proceedings to commence soon after disputes
arise. Conversely, complex pretrial discovery procedures and con-
gested court dockets make prompt judicial dispute resolution vir-
tually impossible. When disputes arise during the performance of
construction contracts, for example, parties frequently use arbitra-
tion because it promotes prompt dispute resolution and avoidance
of very costly construction delays.500
The parties to arbitration proceedings are free to select the
arbitrators. This freedom allows the parties to choose arbitrators
with expertise in the controversial subject matter.50 1 The use of ar-
bitrators with expertise in the resolution of certain types of dis-
putes ensures expeditious, fair, and accurate dispute resolution.02°
The ability to select expert arbitrators also helps disputing parties
to bypass the time consuming process of educating fact finders
about technical matters that trial litigants often must employ.
5 03
The private nature of arbitration proceedings is another at-
tractive feature of arbitration.504 Many disputing parties choose ar-
bitration over judicial trials because public trials destroy parties'
498. See generally Roth, Choosing an Arbitration Panel, 6 LITGATION 13 (1980) (dis-
cussing factors to consider when selecting an arbitrator).
499. See R. COULSON, BusINEsS ArTRATIoN-WHAT You NEED TO KNow 7 (1980).
The effect on litigtion costs that litigants cause by flooding the judicial system with purely
private disputes is immeasurable. See address by F. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Process-
ing, delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 111, (1976).
500. See J. O'BRIEN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY, 3-4, 164-69 (1976); see also R. COULSON,
supra note 499, at 7; supra note 478.
501. See U.A.A. § 3; CoMMRCIAL ARBITRATION RuLzs, supra note 479, at rule 14.
502. Judge Learned Hand explained:
In trade disputes one of the chief advantages of arbitrations is that arbitrators can be
chosen who are familiar with the practices and customs of the calling, and with just
such matters as what are current prices, what is merchantable quality, what are the
terms of sale, and the like.
American Almond Prod. Co. v. Consolidated Peanut Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir.
1944).
503. See id.
504. See also notes 1152-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the advantages
of privacy in rent-a-judge proceedings.
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ability to preserve the privacy of their disputes 5 5 by making all
judicial dispute resolution procedures matters of public record.506
As in divorce cases, 507 the sensitive subject matter of many com-
mercial disputes gives parties a strong incentive to seek the pri-
vate, confidential remedies that arbitration offers. The ability to
obtain arbitrators who are expert in the subject matter of a dispute
and the confidential, expeditious, and sometimes inexpensive char-
acteristics of arbitration give parties to commercial disputes an ef-
fective alternative to litigation for solving their disputes without
marring business relationships.
(b) Disadvantages of Arbitration
Although the advantages of commercial arbitration are numer-
ous, several disadvantages also exist. First, the greatest disadvan-
tage is that the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is
very narrow.50 8 Parties to arbitration proceedings rarely persuade
reviewing courts to overturn an award for errors in fact finding or
law application. 09 Thus, parties assume the risk that arbitrators
may commit irreversible factual or legal errors in rendering an
award by submitting their dispute to arbitration.510 Second, arbi-
trators frequently do not write opinions. Thus, they may not al-
ways engage in thoughtful analysis of a dispute because they do
not have to reveal to the disputing parties the reasoning for their
decisions.5 11 Third, disputing parties sometimes are unable to ob-
tain discovery of their opponent's case512 or provisional remedies
505. Protective orders do provide some relief from the revelation of each party's
secrets. See Fm R. Civ. P. 26(c).
506. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
507. See infra notes 867-916 and accompanying text (discussing mediation in divorce
cases).
508. AnrrATiON 17 (A. Widis ed. 1979).
509. M. Dowca, TH LAw AN PRAcTicz op CoMME ciAL ARBrrRATiON 2 (1968), see
also Del Bianco & Assocs. v. Adam, 6 M11 App. 3d 286, 292-93, 285 N.E.2d 480, 484 (1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973). As a practical matter, parties have no right of appeal from
an arbitrator's decision, absent fraud or misconduct.
Kreindler, supra note 104, at 13.
510. ARnrrRATON, supra note 508, at 17. Even gross errors of judgment in law or mis-
takes of fact will not vitiate an award unless these mistakes or errors are apparent on the
face of the award. Garver v. Ferguson, 76 nM. 2d 1, 10-11, 389 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (1979).
511. S. LAZARUS, J. BRAY, JR., L. CaTER, K. CoLLms, B. Gmnm, R. HOLTON, JR., P.
MATrtws, & G. WmLARD, RESOLVING BusINmss DxspuTEs 85 (1965).
512. The Uniform Arbitration Act and Federal Arbitration Act do not have any ex-
press provisions for discovery beyond the power of the arbitrator to subpoena the produc-
tion of documents and witnesses. Brown, Some Practical Thoughts on Arbitration, 6 Lrri-
GAT7ON 8, 9 (1980).
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such as restraining orders and attachments.5 13 Fourth, although
the law requires arbitrators to give disputing parties a complete
opportunity to present all of their arguments and evidence at the
arbitration hearing, arbitration does not afford the parties the full
evidentiary and procedural safeguards of traditional trials.5 14 Last,
although litigation usually is more expensive than arbitration, arbi-
trating parties still must pay the travel expenses of arbitrators, le-
gal counsel, and court reporters, and the service fee for the agency
under whose auspices the arbitrators work.51 5
2. The Federal Arbitration Act
(a) History of the Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925 Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act
("Federal Arbitration Act" or "Act") 5 6 in order to encourage busi-
nesses to use arbitration and to promote nonjudicial commercial
dispute settlement.517 Congress, in adopting the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, recognized that widespread judicial hostility toward arbi-
tration agreements was a significant impediment to the further de-
velopment of arbitration as a viable method of resolving
disputes.5 18 This historical reluctance of courts to yield their juris-
diction to arbitration proceedings 5 9 denied contractual arbitration
clauses the legal and equitable dignity accorded to other contrac-
tual provisions. Through the Act, Congress sought to legitimize the
arbitration option in the eyes of the commercial world and the
courts.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that:
513. ARBITRATION, supra note 508, at 16.
514. Reisman v. Ranoel Realty Co., 224 Pa. Super. 220, 223-25, 303 A.2d 511, 513-14
(1973); Brown, supra note 512, at 9.
515. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 50 (1965).
516. 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1982). Congress first enacted the Federal Arbitration Act on Feb-
ruary 12, 1925. Congress adopted chapter 2 on July 31, 1970.
517. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924). See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND AwARDs § 23 (1930). See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S.
801 (1960).
518. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-4 (1924). At common law, courts in England and the United States felt animosity
toward arbitration. Thus, they held that arbitration agreements were revocable at will by
either party at any time before an arbitrator rendered an award. ARBITRATION, supra note
508, at 3. For a history of judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements, see gener-
ally, Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132
(1934).
519. See, e.g., Wolaver, supra note 518, at 138-40.
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving [interstate] commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal
to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to sub-
mit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.510
Section 4 of the Act permits a party to an arbitration agreement to
petition a federal district court to order the other party to engage
in arbitration.521 If the district court finds that the disputing par-
ties had entered an agreement to arbitrate and that one party had
failed to comply with the agreement, it must order the parties to
arbitrate the dispute. 2 In determining whether the dispute falls
within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the federal courts
typically resolve doubtful cases in favor of arbitration.523 Subse-
quent sections of the Act empower federal district courts to con-
firm arbitration awards52' and to modify 25 or vacate526 the award
520. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 1 of the Act explains that "'[c]ommerce,' as herein
defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations." Id. at § 1.
521. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
522. Section 4 recognizes that the party allegedly in default of the arbitration agree-
ment may receive, under some circumstances, a jury trial concerning the making of the arbi-
tration agreement and the failure, neglect, or refusal of the party to perform in accordance
with the agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). If the jury finds that "an agreement for arbitration
was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder," § 4 requires the
court to order the parties to proceed with the arbitration. Id.
523. See Brown, supra note 512, at 12. See, e.g., Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.,
376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967) (The court viewed its role in determining whether to order
arbitration as "'ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which
on its face is one governed by the agreement.' "). Id. at 714. In Seaboard Coastline R.R. v.
National Rail Passenger Corp., 554 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1977), for example, the court
readily acknowledged that under the terms of the pertinent arbitration agreement the arbi-
trator had the authority to interpret the scope of the arbitration agreement and its
container contract.
524. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982). Section 9 provides in pertinent part-
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court,
then at anytime within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration
may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon
the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected
525. See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982). Section 11 permits the court to: (a) correct evident
mistakes or miscalculations, (b) limit the award to matters submitted to the arbitrator, or
(c) cure imperfections in matters of form that do not affect the merits of the controversy. Id.
526. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). The court may vacate an arbitration award under the
following circumstances:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
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on limited grounds.
Despite the unmistakable congressional desire to facilitate
commercial arbitration,5 27 the Federal Arbitration Act did not im-
mediately cure the arbitration phobia of federal courts. The courts
initially interpreted the Act to require them to order arbitration
only when an arbitration agreement expressly applied to disputed
issues;528 otherwise, courts stubbornly refused to relinquish their
jurisdiction to arbitration . 29 The Second Circuit's opinion in
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.5 30 marked a
turning point in judicial treatment of arbitration clauses and the
Federal Arbitration Act.531 Since Kulukundis, the federal courts
consistently have endorsed arbitration agreements. The Second
Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.5 32
urged a presumption in favor of arbitration as a means of easing
court congestion and effecting the original intention of parties to
arbitration agreements."' In Robert Lawrence the court reaffirmed
the constitutionality of Congress' creation of "national substantive
law" governing arbitration agreements.53 4 Accordingly, the court
declared that all arbitration agreements of the type previously dis-
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
Id. Subsection (e) of § 10 empowers the court to direct an arbitrator to rehear a dispute
when it vacates an award if the time period that the arbitration agreement establishes for
the award has not expired. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (e) (1982).
527. See supra notes 516-19 and accompanying text.
528. Note, supra note 485, at 577.
529. See id.
530. 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
531. Note, supra note 485, at 578. Kulukundis developed the philosophy on arbitra-
tion agreements first articulated by the Second Circuit in In re Canadian Gulf Line, Ltd., 98
F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1938). See Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbi-
tration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CoNTsMP. PROSS. 580, 582-83
(1952).
532. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S.
801 (1960).
533. Id. at 410. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Su-
preme Court stated that if a contract fixing a particular forum for resolution of all disputes
"was made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen,
... absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties
and enforced by the courts." Id. at 12.
534. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d at 409.
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allowed in federal and state courts should be enforceable. "5 Sev-
eral other courts subsequently have adopted the position that they
should resolve in favor of arbitration any doubts or ambiguities
arising in arbitration statutes." '
The Supreme Court also espoused support for commercial ar-
bitration in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.5 37 by establishing the doctrine of separability of arbitration
clauses from their "container" contracts.538 The separability of the
arbitration clauses permits federal courts to apply the Federal Ar-
bitration Act in diversity cases. In Prima Paint the Court ex-
amined a contract in which Flood & Conklin sold its multistate
paint business to Prima Paint and transferred the business from
New Jersey to Maryland.539 The majority read the statutory phrase
"relating to interstate commerce" liberally and rejected the dis-
sent's contention that only contracts for the interstate shipment of
goods satisfied the interstate commerce requirement in section 2 of
the Act.5'0 The Court, therefore, ordered the parties to arbitrate
their dispute." 1
The Court's treatment of the interstate commerce requirement
in Prima Paint is characteristic of the liberal interpretation this
requirement has received in federal courts." 2 Courts consistently
have held that "involving [interstate] commerce" embraces, in ad-
dition to contracts for interstate shipment of goods, all contracts
with substantial interstate elements." 3 The Metro Industrial
Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co." 4 test for determin-
ing whether a contract "involves" substantial interstate activity re-
quires examination of a contract's terms to infer the contracting
535. Id. at 407.
536. See, e.g., Marcy Lee Mfg. Co. v. Cortley Fabrics Co., 354 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1965);
Younker Bros., Inc. v. Standard Constr. Co., 241 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Iowa 1965).
537. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
538. Id. at 402-04.
539. Id. at 401.
540. Id. at 401 & n.7.
541. Id. at 406-07.
542. See, e.g., Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 713-14 (7th Cir.
1967); Monte v. Southern Del. County Auth., 321 F.2d 870, 872 (3d Cir. 1963); Electronic &
Missile Facilities, Inc. v. United States, 306 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 374 U.S. 167 (1963).
543. M. DoMKE, supra note 476, at § 4:03, at 31-32. See Monte v. Southern DeL
County Auth., 321 F.2d 870, 872 (3d Cir. 1963); Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond, Fredericks-
burg & Potomac R.R., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1311-12 (D.D.C. 1981); see also Erving v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (contract need not contemplate
shipment of goods to evidence a transaction involving commerce).
544. 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961).
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parties' state of mind. The Metro Industrial test mandates appli-
cation of the Federal Arbitration Act if cogent evidence demon-
strates that the parties contemplated interstate activity at the time
of contracting, or in the course of performance of the contract." 5
(b) Application of the Federal Arbitration Act in
Federal and State Courts
The Federal Arbitration Act does not vest federal courts with
jurisdiction over cases concerning arbitration agreements. 4 e Par-
ties who bring suits in federal courts under the Act must have an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity
of citizenship or federal question.5 4 7 When an arbitration clause
is part of a contract that contemplates substantial interstate com-
merce or maritime activity, federal courts almost uniformly evalu-
ate the validity and effect of the arbitration agreement in accor-
dance with the guidelines set forth in the Act. 4 s Many state courts
have faced the question of whether to apply federal or state law
concerning the enforceability of clauses in contracts to arbitrate
future disputes that arise during performance of the contract. 9
Even when these disputes concerned a maritime or interstate
transaction, some state courts declined to apply the Federal Arbi-
tration Act and to enforce the arbitration clause.55° In 1984, how-
545. Id. at 387 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). The North Carolina Supreme Court ap-
plied the reasoning of Chief Judge Lumbard in Burke County Pub. Schools v. Shaver Part-
nership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981). The Burke court, in holding that an architec-
tural contract contemplated substantial activity in interstate commerce, reasoned that the
Indiana architectural firm would render services for the construction of two schools in North
Carolina, representatives of the architectural firm would periodically travel to North Caro-
lina to inspect the construction site, a Michigan firm performed structural engineering de-
sign work for the construction project, suppliers shipped construction materials to North
Carolina from all over the country, and the plaintiff made payments to the architects from
North Carolina. Id. at 419-20, 279 S.E.2d at 818.
546. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 395 (5th
Cir. 1981).
547. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1981); C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for
Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp. 446, 448 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
548. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 860 (1984). For further discussion
of the Federal Arbitration Act, see Note, Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in
Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 468 (1963); Note, Com-
mercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VmD. L. REv. 607 (1967).
549. See, e.g., Lesser Towers v. Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co., 258 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D. Cal.
1966); Deep South Oil Co of Tex. v. Texas Gas Corp. 328 S.W. 2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
see also M. DomKa, supra note 476, § 4:03, at 32-33.
550. M. DomKE, supra note 476, § 4:03, at 36. See, e.g., Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake
& Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951).
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ever, the Supreme Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating551
that the Federal Arbitration Act applies in both state and federal
courts.ss Thus, state courts must apply the Federal Arbitration
Act and enforce agreements to arbitrate future disputes that arise
out of the performance or breach of a contract which contemplates
substantial interstate commerce or maritime activity.
After capsulizing the history of the Act, the Court in Keating
articulated three reasons for its holding. First, the Court noted
that its holding in Prima Paint, which recognized that the Act was
a congressional exercise of commerce clause power,553 "clearly im-
plied" that the Act's substantive rules governed federal and state
courts alike. 54 Second, the Court observed that Congress intended
the Act to apply in state courts.555 Congress, the Court reasoned,
promulgated the Act to foreclose state legislatures' attempts to un-
dercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 5 Thus, the
Court felt compelled to hold the Act applicable in state courts to
avoid frustrating Congress' power to regulate interstate com-
merce.557 Last, the Court decided that the disparate treatment of
arbitration clauses in state and federal courts would encourage fo-
rum shopping,5 58 upon which the federal courts and Congress his-
torically have frowned. 559 Given these policy objectives, the Court
551. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
552. Id. at 859, 861.
553. Id. at 858. Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act pursuant to its com-
merce clause powers in article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution.
554. Id. at 859 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
420 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)). The Keating Court also stated that its recent holding in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 942 n.32 (1983),
reaffirmed the Prima Paint decision. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. at 859.
555. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. at 859. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Seass. 1-2 (1924); Hearings on S. 4212 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Seas. 6 (1923) (remarks of Sen Walsh).
The Court reasoned that because an overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation is in
state courts, Congress could not have intended to limit the applicability of the Act exclu-
sively to cases brought in federal courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. at 860-61.
556. Id. at 860.
557. Id. at 861.
558. Id. at 860. The Kentucky Supreme Court offered a similar rationale for applying
the Federal Arbitration Act in state courts. Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559
S.W. 2d 729 733 (Ky. 1977). In Fite & Warmath, the court confronted a choice between a
state common law rule, which permitted revocation of an arbitration agreement at any time
prior to a valid award, and the Federal Arbitration Act's rule, which makes arbitration
agreements irrevocable. The Kentucky Supreme Court, embracing the policy arguments
against forum shopping that the Supreme court articulated in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 73-77 (1938), held that the Act applied in Kentucky state courts. Fite &
Warmath, 599 S.W.2d at 734.
559. See Guaranty Trust Co. v York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Erie R.R. Co. v.
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concluded that the "involving commerce" language in section 2 of
the Act makes the Act applicable in both state and federal
courts.s8 0 The Keating decision, therefore, represents the Court's
largest step toward promoting the goals Congress envisioned when
it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925.
3. The Uniform Arbitration Act and State Law
The enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a contract
that does not involve interstate commerce or maritime transactions
depends on state arbitration law regardless of whether the litiga-
tion occurs in a state or federal court.561 In 1920 New York enacted
the first arbitration act in the United States.5 62 The effectiveness
of the New York Act and the Federal Arbitration Act prompted
the development of uniform laws for commercial arbitration. s
The American Bar Association approved a version of the Uniform
Arbitration Act ("Uniform Act") in 1955.s1" Several states immedi-
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
560. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. at 860. Prior to Keating numerous state
and federal courts had suggested that the Act applies to cases brought in both state and
federal courts. See, e.g., Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382,
386 (2d. Cir.) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); Pathman Con-
str. Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 164 Ind. App. 121, 132, 326 N.E.2d 844, 851 (1975); R.
J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan App. 2d 363, 365, 642 P.2d
127, 129 (1982); Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Ky. 1977)
(applying Act's irrevocability provision contrary to state law permitting revocation of agree-
ments); see also Annot., 95 A.L.R. 3d 1145, 1159 (1979) (listing state court decisions that
have applied the Act to arbitration disputes concerning a contract which involves
commerce).
Some of these courts based their holdings on the desirability of eliminating forum shop-
ping. See, e.g., supra note 558. The Florida court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Melamed, 405 So. 2d 790 (Fla. App. 1981), held that under the Supremacy Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, federal statutes are the supreme law of the land and preempt
inconsistent state laws. Id. at 792. See also American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959). Additionally, some state courts have applied
the Act to further the congressional intent of making the benefits of arbitration available to
business communities around the country while simultaneously unclogging congested court
dockets. See, e.g., Burke County Pub. Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Shaves Partnership, 303 N.C.
408, 422, 279 S.E.2d 816, 824 (1981).
561. Bernhardt v. Polygraph Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201-02 (1956); Shearson Hay-
den Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 106 (N.D. I1. 1980), af'd., 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.
1981); Cook v. Kuljian Corp., 201 F. Supp. 531, 535 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
562. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1980).
563. M. DouKE, supra note 476, § 4:02, at 29-30. The major difference between the
version of the Uniform Arbitration Statute that the ABA adopted and the preexisting stat-
utes was that the ABA's statute contained provisions for the enforcement of future arbitra-
tion clauses. Id. Today, forty states have arbitration statutes that provide for the enforce-
ment at such clauses. Id. at App. I.
564. Id. § 4:02, at 22.
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ately adopted versions of this act.565 Today every state except Ver-
mont has adopted some arbitration legislation.66 These statutes
usually resemble the Uniform Act.
567
The Uniform Act substantially parallels the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act. The two acts aply to essentially the same situations.568
Both acts contain virtually identical provisions 569 for compelling or
staying arbitration proceedings,5 70 vacating571 or modifying572 an
award, and entering an order respecting the award.5 73 The Acts dif-
fer in two main respects. First, the Uniform Act contains several
sections setting forth arbitration procedures and regulations.574
The Federal Arbitration Act, on the other hand, lets the disputing
parties agree upon arbitration procedures. 57 15 Second, the Uniform
Act gives state courts jurisdiction to enforce arbitration agree-
ments and to enter judgments concerning arbitration awards.57 6
The Federal Arbitration Act, however, does not confer jurisdiction
upon federal courts to hear disputes concerning arbitration agree-
565. Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wyoming
adopted the Uniform Act either completely or with minor changes. Id. § 4:02, at 22.
566. ARDrrRATION, supra note 508, at 3.
567. The following states have adopted statutes modeled after the Uniform Act:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Wyoming, and Texas. Recent Development, supra note 96, at 139 & n.2.
568. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) with U.A.A. § 1.
569. Although the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act concerning judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements are similar, most state
courts, when applying state arbitration law, define the scope of arbitration agreements less
liberally than do courts applying the Federal Arbitration Act. See supra note 512. Other
state courts have assumed greater responsibility for determining whether a dispute falls
within the scope of an arbitration agreement. Brown, supra note 512, at 12. See, e.g.,
Roosevelt Univ. v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 28 IMl. App. 3d 1045, 331 N.E.2d 835 (1975). Courts
applying state law and the Federal Arbitration Act both allow arbitrators to determine the
scope of arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of
Minn., 266 Minn. 284, 123 N.W.2d 371 (1963).
570. Compare 9 U.S.C. 8§ 3-4 (1982) with U.A.A. § 2.
571. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982) with U.A.A. § 12.
572. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982) with U.A.A. 8 13.
573. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982) with U.A.A. § 14.
574. See U.A.A. §§ 5-7.
575. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
576. U.A.A. § 17. State courts typically view commercial arbitration favorably. See,
e.g., Litchsinn v. American Inter-insurance Exch., 287 N.W.2d 156, 159-60 (Iowa 1980);
Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., 379 Mass. 762, 765-67, 400 N.E.2d 858, 861-62 (1980); Simpson
v. Simpson, 194 Neb. 453, 455-56, 232 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1975); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Rose, 92
N.M. 527, 530, 591 P.2d 281, 284 (1979); In re Town of Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wyo.
1977). For a further list of state court arbitration cases, see M. Domxn, supra note 476, 8
3:01, at 6 (Supp. 1983).
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ments in contracts that contemplate interstate commerce or mari-
time activity. Rather, the party bringing a claim in federal court
under the Act must demonstrate independent grounds for federal
court jurisdiction.2
D. Summary
The use of liquidated damages provisions in commercial con-
tracts and the right of creditors to repossess collateral in secured
transactions are two important commercial self-help techniques.
Contracting parties that use liquidated damages clauses agree that
a specific sum expressed in the clause is a just remedy for one
party's breach of the contract. If parties draft these provisions
carefully and avoid making them function as contractual penalty
provisions against the breaching parties, they can resolve the ques-
tion of appropriate damages for breach without going to court. The
right of repossession under the UCC allows creditors in secured
transactions to satisfy a debtor's defaulted obligation by taking
possession of the property that secured the transaction and dispos-
ing of it without bringing a judicial action. Although the common
law tolerated some uses of creditor force to repossess a debtor's
property, the UCC prohibits self-help repossession that "is fraught
with the likelihood of resulting violence. '578 Businessmen and con-
sumers also should realize that they may submit almost any com-
mercial dispute to arbitration 57 unless a statute or public policy
prohibits arbitration of the issue. Disputes frequently arise be-
tween parties to commercial transactions. These parties can avoid
the time consuming and expensive process of litigating their dis-
putes, by inserting an arbitration clause in the contract that gov-
577. See supra notes 446-48 and accompanying text.
578. Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 29, 254 N.E.2d 683,
686 (1970).
579. ARBrrRATION, supra note 508, at 2. Although arbitration is a common method of
resolving labor and construction contract disputes, parties also have used it in disputes con-
cerning wills and trusts. George Washington, for example, provided in his will for the arbi-
tration of disputes arising out of that instrument:
But having endeavored to be plain and explicit in all Denses-even at the expense of
prolixity, perhaps of tautology, I hope, and trust, that no disputes will arise concerning
them; but if contrary to expectation the case should be otherwise. . ., my will and
direction expressly is, that all disputes ... shall be decided by three impartial and
intelligent men, known for their probity and good understanding. ... which three
men thus chosen, shall unfettered by law, or legal constructions, declare their sense of
the testator's intention; and such decision, is to all intents and purposes to be as bind-
ing on the Parties as if it had been given in the Supreme Court of the United States.
American Arbitration Association, Arbitration News, No. 2 (1963).
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erns their transaction.8 In the past, many courts, out of animosity
toward arbitration, often refused to enforce arbitration agreements
at common law. Today, state and federal courts, pursuant to state
arbitration statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act in the wake of
Southerland Corp. v. Keating,581 enforce most arbitration agree-
ments. 2  In addition, the efforts of private organizations, such as
the American Arbitration Association,"' to improve the quality of
arbitration suggests that arbitration will play an important and ex-
panding role in the resolution of disputes that arise out of commer-
cial transactions in the United States." '
V. LANDLORD AND TENANT SELF-HELP
A. Introduction
The availability of self-help remedies for resolving disputes
between landlords and tenants heavily weighed in favor of land-
lords at common law. Landlords had the option, upon a tenant's
failure to pay rent on time, of utilizing the self-help right of dis-
traint to seize a tenant's personal property to satisfy the overdue
rent or simply using self-help eviction to expel tenants from the
leased premises. Tenants, on the other hand, enjoyed absolutely no
self-help remedies and had very few judicial remedies for the
wrongful actions of their landlords. Contemporary American courts
and legislatures, however, consistent with the modern trend in
America toward consumer protection, significantly have limited
landlord self-help remedies, but have expanded the number of ten-
ant self-help remedies. This trend, along with the emergence of
speedy judicial remedies for landlord-tenant disputes and state
and locally sponsored dispute mediation centers, has helped to re-
lieve society of the violence that frequently accompanied landlord
self-help at common law.
580. Recent Development, supra note 487, at 159. See, e.g., Macchiavelli v. Shearson,
Hamill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Bolingbrook Park Dist. v. National Ben
Franklin Ins. Co., 96 Ill. App. 3d 26, 30, 420 N.E.2d 741, 744 (1981).
581. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
582. See supra notes 516-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial en-
forcement of arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act and state law.
583. The American Arbitration Association is a private, nonprofit association that be-
gan operating in 1926, one year after the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act. The
Association is independent of industry and trade, and acts as an impartial administrator of
arbitrable disputes.
584. The American Arbitration Association reported 645 commercial arbitrations in
1957, 1,588 arbitrations in 1967 and 4,550 in 1977. Letter from Eastman Arbitration Library
(May 8, 1978) (reprinted in Furnish, supra note 92, at 317 n.1).
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This part of this Special Project traces the development of
landlord and tenant self-help remedies from their origins in com-
mon-law England to their modern status as permissible and imper-
missible methods of dispute resolution in contemporary America.
Part B of this section discusses landlord self-help remedies, includ-
ing the rights of distraint and self-help eviction. Part C traces the
emergence of tenant self-help in American jurisdictions, including
the right of tenants to make repairs and deduct reasonable costs
from rent, and the right to withhold completely payment of rent.
Part C also discusses the emergence of state and locally sponsored
dispute mediation centers that provide an effective means for
resolving landlord-tenant disputes. Part D concludes that the de-
velopment and treatment of self-help and speedy judicial methods
of landlord-tenant dispute resolution have helped to relieve society
from the neighborhood violence that often accompanied landlord
self-help at common law.
B. Landlord Self-Help
1. Distraint
(a) The English Rule
The common law right of distraint58 5 allowed landlords to util-
ize self-help and seize a tenant's personal property as security for
payment of overdue rent."" This right arose out of the landlord-
tenant relationship itself.5 87 The right of distraint differed from a
landlord lien because it remained unperfected until the landlord
physically seized the property, whereas a lien attached at the be-
ginning of the lease term." At common law, landlords had no
right to sell seized chattels, but rather had to place them in a pub-
lic pound until the tenant satisfied the overdue debt.58" A 1689
585. The terms "distress" and "distraint" are usable as synonyms. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 426 (5th ed. 1979).
586. 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARS ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1305,
at 493 (repl. 1981).
587. See 3 H. TFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 919 (3d ed. 1939). The common
law right of distraint originated in England in the feudal tenure relationship that existed
between lords and vassals. The lord, as owner of the reversion, could secure rent from the
vassal who held the leasehold estate. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.47, at 473 (A. Casner
ed. 1952).
588. 2 W. & M., ch. 5, § 1 (1689). Laying hold to a single chattel or any act or word
that indicated an intention to distrain symbolized a seizure of all goods on the demised
premises. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 894 (2d ed. 1920).
589. 3A G. THOMPSON, supra note 586, at 494.
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statute590 gave landlords the right to sell distrained property to
pay a rent arrearage5 91
At common law, several restrictions limited a landlord's right
to distrain. First, tenants either must have obtained a lease of the
premises or must have gained possession by a specifically enforcea-
ble agreement.592 Second, the amount of rent must have been a
sum certain.93 Third, landlords had to exercise this right during
the tenancy or within six months after the term ended if the ten-
ant remained in possession. 94 Last, landlords could not employ
this remedy to rent owed on an agricultural lease that had been
delinquent for one year or more,595 nor could they distrain twice
for the same rent.9 8
Generally, only landlords with reversionary interests in the
property could utilize this remedy5 97 since the right of distraint de-
pended upon the relation of tenure.9 ' The estates of deceased
landlords, however, could distrain for rent that came due during
the landlord's lifetime.59 9 Furthermore, tenants subletting to others
could distrain for rent that subtenants owed unless they had as-
signed away all their rights in the leased property. 00
Certain rules governed the distraint procedure. Landlords per-
sonally, or by appointed bailiffs, 01 had to distrain between sunrise
590. Id. Sale of Distress Act, 1689, 2 W. & M., ch. 5, § 2.
591. Id.; see 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra
note 588, at 894; see also Jones v. Biernstein, [1899] 1 Q.B. 470. The common law required
the landlord to comply with notice, advertising, and waiting period requirements, and pro-
hibited him from purchasing the goods. See 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at
895.
592. 2 W. ODGoRS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 889; 3A
G. THOMPSON, supra note 586, at 494.
593. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 889.
594. Id.
595. Id. at 890.
596. Id. "[A landlord] must not vex his tenant by the exercise upon two occasions of
this summary remedy." Bagge v. Mawby, 8 Ex. 641, 649, 155 Eng. Rep. 1509, 1512 (1853).
597. See supra note 587 and accompanying text.
598. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 889.
599. A landlord's estate did not enjoy the right of distraint at common law but re-
ceived it statutorily in 1540. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 37, § 1 (1540). See 3 H. TFpAY, supra note 587,
at § 919.
600. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 889.
601. A bailiff was an agent of the landlord authorized to exercise the landlord's right
of distraint. 3A G. THOMPSON, supra note 586, at 502. At common law, delegation of power
to a bailiff was an entirely personal matter, but courts eventually required landlords to ob-
tain court authorization before delegating this right. 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 21, § 7 (1888); see 2
W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 894.
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and sunset. 02 Distraining landlords properly could climb a wall or
fence and pass through an unlocked door or an open window but
could not break open an outer window or door.60 3 After a peaceful
entry but a subsequent forcible ejection, the distrainor could use
whatever force necessary to reenter and complete seizure of the
tenant's personal property.6 04 Common law distraint, therefore,
permitted landlords to breach neighborhood peace while exercising
this self-help remedy.
The personal property subject to a landlord's right of distraint
included any property found on the leased premises, whether or
not the tenant owned it.605 Since the common law only allowed
seizure of chattels as security for overdue rent,60 6 landlords only
could seize personalty that they could return in its original condi-
tion.0 The common law, however, prevented landlords from dis-
training certain types of property from their tenants. These excep-
tions fell into two categories: conditionally privileged
goods-property subject to seizure only if other property on the
leased premises was insufficient to satisfy the damage-and abso-
lutely privileged goods-property exempt from distraint under all
circumstances. 08 A privilege also protected items which third par-
ties brought onto the premises of a tenant who used them in a
public trade or business that affected trade and commerce.60 9
602. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 894.
603. Limiting the distrainor's use of force corresponded with the general public policy
of maintaining the King's peace. See id.
604. The law also permitted the use of force if a tenant, after a distrainor voluntarily
abandoned efforts to seize property after peacefully entering the tenant's leased premises,
denied the distrainor reentry to complete the seizure. See id.
605. 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 587, at § 920. The right to distrain for rent extended to
property that a tenant had removed fraudulently or clandestinely from the leased premises,
so that too little property remained on the premises to cover the overdue rent. 2 W. ODGERS
& W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 893; see 8 Anne, ch. 14 (1709).
606. See supra text accompanying notes 585-89.
607. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 891. Consequently, the common
law prohibited distrainors from seizing goods such as freshly butchered meat. Id. In addi-
tion, courts permitted distrainors to seize money if the distrainor returned the original coins
after the tenant made deliquent rental payments. Id.
608. Common law courts absolutely privileged fixtures from the landlord's right to dis-
traint because they viewed fixtures as part of the leased property. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODG-
ERS, supra note 588, at 891. These courts, however, granted only a conditional privilege from
distraint to other property such as beasts of the "plough," sheep, instruments of husbandry,
and property of the tenant not in actual use. Id. at 893; 3A G. THOMPSON,
supra note 586, at 493; see 52 Hen. 3, ch. 4 (1267) (distress must be reasonable).
609. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 891; 3 H. TFFANY, supra note 587,
at § 920. This class of exempt goods included grain a third party left on a delinquent ten-
ant's leased premises for milling or goods left on the premises for resale or safekeeping. 2 W.
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Statutory restrictions further limited a landlord's right to dis-
train. English statutes expressly regulated use of distraint on farm-
ing stock,110 a sublettor's property,""' and a tenant's clothing, bed-
ding, and tools of trade.612 Statutes also protected textile
manufacturing equipment6 13 and gas meters and fittings from
seizure . 1 ' These restrictions on distraint reflected a public policy
designed to enhance trade and commerce 61 5 and the beginning of a
growing dissatisfaction with the harshness of this self-help
remedy. 16
ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 891.
610. 56 Geo. 3, ch. 50, § 6 (1816).
611. Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, ch. 53, ]§1-2]. Undertenants
included persons who had leased property from the original leaseholder and lodgers at an
inn or hotel. See 3 H. TaFiANY, supra note 587; 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS,
supra note 588, at 892.
612. English statutes privileged from the right of distraint as much as five pounds in
value of this property for up to seven days after the landlord demanded possession of the
property. Legislators reasoned that taking away a tenant's bed clothes was too harsh a pen-
alty for delinquent rental payments. This statute was an early example of consumer protec-
tion. Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 21, § 4.
613. 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 40, § 18 (1843).
614. This statute also exempted electric meters and fittings. Gasworks Clauses Act,
1847, 10 & 11 Vict., ch. 15, § 14. This law was an exception to the general rule that a
landlord's right to distress extended to property that a tenant did not own. See supra note
605.
615. According to one commentator, "[tihe most important class of exemptions from
distress [were] those in favor of trade or commerce ... " 3 H. TFFANY, supra note 587, at
§ 920.
616. Courts and commentators eventually viewed the right of distraint as a self-help
remedy that gave landlords an "opportunity for injustice and oppression." Consequently,
state courts and legislators in the United States have not viewed the right of distraint favor-
ably. Id. at § 918; 2 AimRicAN LAW OF PRoPERTY, supra note 587, at 475. Because of the
remedy's harshness, many states excluded distraint from their common law. See, e.g.,
Folmar & Sons v. Copeland & Brantley, 57 Ala. 588 (1877); Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393,
18 P. 342 (1888); Crocker v.Mann, 3 Mo. 472 (1834); Bohm v. Dunphy, 1 Mont. 333 (1871);
Howland v. Forlaw, 108 N.C. 567, 13 S.E. 173 (1891); Smith v. Wheeler, 4 Okla. 138, 44 P.
103 (1896); see also 2 AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 587, at 475. Other states have
abolished the remedy altogether by statute. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.250 (1975); ARiz.
Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1372 (1974) (distress abolished for residential leases); DEL. CODE ANN.
Tit. 25, § 6301 (1974) (distress abolished except for commercial leases); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
713.691 (West Supp. 1983) (distress abolished for residential leases); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
383.680 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (distress abolished for residential leases); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 504.01 (West 1947); OR. Rav. STAT. § 91.835 (1975) (distress abolished for residential
leases); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 59.18.230 (Supp. 1983) (distress abolished for residential
leases); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.11 (West 1981). The UNIFORM REsmENTUL LANDLORD AND
TENANT Acr § 4.205(b) (1972) also has abolished the right of distraint. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note 5(c) (1976).
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(b) The Right of Distraint in Contemporary America
The common law distraint remedy has not gained widespread
acceptance in American jurisdictions because it allowed landlords
to treat tenants harshly.117 Some states, however, have enacted
statutes that resemble common law distraint,6 18 while other juris-
dictions give landlords a lien on their tenants' property.6 119 The two
approaches differ because a landlord's right to distrain remains un-
perfected until the rent becomes overdue, whereas a landlord's lien
becomes effective at the beginning of the lease term.62 0 Almost all
states have taken one of the following three approaches when deal-
ing with a landlord's right of distraint. One group of state statutes
has abolished the right of distraint.2 1 A second group of states
have passed laws governing a landlord's remedies for overdue rent
that courts have held to be nonexclusive remedies.62 2 Some of these
statutes, therefore, permit landlords to exercise their right of dis-
traint.62 8 A third group of states either have no statutes pertaining
to distraint6 24 and landlord liens or expressly prohibit landlords
from seizing a tenant's property to recover overdue rent.62 5
The amount of force courts will permit landlords to use in
seizing their tenants' personal property varies among the states
that presently allow self-help distraint. A few jurisdictions allow
landlords to use whatever force is reasonably necessary to accom-
plish the seizure.62 6 Most jurisdictions that allow distraint, how-
617. See infra note 641 and accompanying text.
618. See, e.g., MD. REAL PaoP. CODE ANN. §§ 8-301 to -332 (1974 & Supp. 1981); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note 5(a) (1976).
619. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-7-51 (1972 & Supp. 1982); see RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note 5(b) (1976).
620. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note 5 (1976); 2 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 230[2] (1982).
621. See supra note 616, for a list of statutes that abolish the right of distraint.
622. The Oregon courts, however, have ruled that Oregon's statute concerning land-
lord remedies provides a nonexclusive remedy that leaves common law distraint intact.
Smith v. Chipman, 220 Or. 188, 348 P.2d 441 (1960). See generally 3A G. THOMPSON, supra
note 586, at § 1305.
623. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-20-102 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:33-1 to -23
(1952 & Supp. 1983). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory
note 5 (1976). One commentator described the continued existence of self-hlep in this area
as "the sole surviving relic in modem statutory law of the absolutism incident to the ancient
feudal doctrine governing land tenures." 3A G. THOMPSON, supra note 586, at 496.
624. States that make no statutory provision for distraint include Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note 5(c) (1976).
625. See supra note 616 for statutes that expressly abolish the practice of distraint.
626. See infra notes 681-86 and accompanying text.
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ever, require landlords to distrain peacefully.2 7 Colorado, for ex-
ample, gives residential apartment landlords a lien on certain
nonexempted personal property and a right to distrain peaceably
to recover overdue rent.
628
After a landlord has distrained a tenant's personal property,
most states specify a method of selling these goods to ensure that a
landlord obtains the best available price."2 9 Landlords must reim-
burse their tenants with any money received from the sale that
exceeds the amount of unpaid overdue rent.630 Landlords must fol-
low carefully the statutory procedural requirements for distraint
because excessive distraint often will render a landlord liable to
the tenant for damages.63 ' For example, violation of these proce-
dures may give d tenant an action against the landlord for trespass
to the distrained goods.32
Many states give landlords of land leased for agricultural pur-
poses a lien or distraint right on crops when a tenant fails to pay
rent on time.6s5 These landlord rights in a tenant's crops some-
times are superior to the liens of all other creditors 34 and may
cause tenants difficulty in securing credit from other sources. 3 5 In
these jurisdictions, therefore, landlords enjoy "uniquely monopolis-
tic" bargaining power over their agricultural tenants.636
Today, most jurisdictions do not allow true self-help because
they require a public official, such as a sheriff or constable, to con-
duct all seizure of a tenant's personalty.637 Under a Texas distraint
statute, for example, landlords or their agents must apply to a jus-
tice of the peace for a distraint warrant.' Upon issuance of the
627. See supra text accompanying notes 601-04.
628. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-20-102 (1973).
629. See, e.g., Cahill v. Lee, 55 Md. 319 (1881); Richards v. McGrath, 100 Pa. 389
(1882); see 3A. G. THOMPSON, supra note 586, at 500.
630. 2 W. ODGERS & W. ODGERS, supra note 588, at 895.
631. 3A G. THOMPSON, supra note 586, at 501-02.
632. Id. at 501.
633. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6715 (1974 & Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
83.08-.19 (West 1964 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-401 to -412 (1979); see RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note 5 (1976).
634. See 2 R. POWELL, supra note 620, at 307.
635. Id. at 309; see, e.g., Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5227 (Vernon 1962 & Supp.
1975); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 587, at 475.
636. Id.
637. See, e.g., Tax. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5227 (Vernon 1962 & Supp. 1975).
638. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5227 (Vernon 1962 & Supp. 1975). For a general
discussion of Texas distress procedures, see Potter & Soules, Distress Warrant and Trial of
Right of Property Under the 1981 Texas Rules, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 693 (1981).
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warrant, a public officer conducts the seizure. s9
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
("URLTA"), which twenty-five jurisdictions partially have
adopted, expressly abolishes distraint for rent.64 0 A growing minor-
ity of states also have taken this position." 1 Several factors are re-
sponsible for current disenchantment with the right of distraint.
First, distraint allows landlords to treat tenants harshly.6 42 Second,
harsh treatment of tenants, especially in residential contexts, runs
counter to the recent trend in law toward consumer protection.
43
Last, distraint contradicts public policy since it favors a unique
class of creditors." 4
(c) Constitutionality of Distraint
The constitutional restrictions in the due process clause re-
strict landlord self-help remedies in the United States. Two Su-
preme Court decisions questioned the constitutionality of a land-
lord's use of self-help on procedural due process grounds.' In
Fuentes v. Shevin646 the Court examined Florida's statutory re-
plevin procedures and held that creditors could seize goods to pro-
tect security interests prior to a final court adjudication of the dis-
639. See Potter & Soules, supra note 638; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note
587, at 475.
640. UNIFORM RESIDENTiAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 4.205 (1972). The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act in 1972. The group's objective is to "promote uniformity in state
laws" where desirable and practical. Although the Commissioners recommended general
adoption of the URLTA throughout the United States, as they do all uniform acts, 14
U.L.A. iv (1980), only thirteen juristictions have enacted a version of it as state law. 7A
U.L.A. 319 (Supp. 1984).
641. See supra note 616.
642. 2 AmERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 587, at 475.
643. See infra text accompanying notes 737-40.
644. See supra text accompanying notes 633-36.
645. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay
View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In Sniadach respondent finance corporation alleged petitioner
owed it a debt of $420.00. Respondent had $63.18 of petitioner's wages under its control,
and in accordance with Wisconsin statutory procedures, stated that it would hold half that
amount as payment for the debt. The finance company said that it would pay the other half
to the petitioner as subsistence allowance. Petitioner challenged the garnishment proceed-
ings under the fourteenth amendment due process clause, alleging that the garnishment
proceedings did not give her adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing before seizure of
her wages. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 338.
646. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Appellants, purchasers of household goods under conditional
sales contracts, challenged the constitutionality of Florida's replevin laws. The statute per-
mitted creditors to obtain a writ of replevin by ex parte application to a court clerk without
hearing or prior notice to the debtors. Id. at 69-70.
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pute if the creditors had tested their claims at a fair prior
hearing.6 47 This holding precipitated a number of cases that held
state distraint statutes unconstitutional.65 Courts, applying Fuen-
tes, held these laws invalid because they permitted landlords to
take tenants' property without due process.6 49 For example, in
Shaffer v. Holbrook650 a federal district court held that West Vir-
ginia's summary distraint procedure violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 51 The state law in Shaffer
allowed a justice of the peace to issue a distraint warrant to the
sheriff of the county where the tenant leased property652 based
solely on a landlord's sworn affidavit alleging overdue rent. s The
tenant in Shaffer received no notice or hearing prior to the seizure,
and the landlord* could have auctioned the goods to satisfy the rent
arrearage unless the tenant contested the validity of the default
and furnished a security bond." The court stated that the absence
of a hearing prior to distraint deprived the tenant of property
without due process. 55 Furthermore, the court stated that any
available postseizure remedies were insufficient to protect an ag-
grieved tenant's rights.6 56
Two years after Fuentes, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 57 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Louisiana seques-
647. The Court noted, "We do not question the power of a State to seize goods before
a final judgment in order to protect the security interests of creditors so long as those credi-
tors have tested their claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing." Id. at
96.
648. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Riverside Hotel,
Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla.1975); Adams v. Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co., 376 F. Supp. 61
(D. Nev. 1974); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert,
348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va.
1972); Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338
F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Brooks v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 11 IMI. App. 3d 791, 298 N.E.2d
262 (1973); Van Ness Indus., Inc. v. Claremont Painting & Decorating Co., 129 N.J. Super.
507, 324 A.2d 102 (1974); State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972).
649. See REsTATEmEr (SzcoND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 reporter's note 12 (1976).
650. 346 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
651. Id. at 766.
652. W. VA. CODE § 37-6-12 (1966).
653. Id.
654. Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. at 766.
655. Id. at 766.
656. Id.
657. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Respondent seller sued petitioner for the overdue balance a
buyer owed on personal property purchased under an installment contract. As in Fuentes,
state law allowed the creditor to obtain a writ to repossess the goods without notice to
debtor. The Court distinguished Fuentes, however, on the ground that the Louisiana se-
questration statute, unlike the Florida replevin law, required the creditor to submit an affi-
davit and the courts to participate in the issuance of the writ. Id. at 616.
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tration law. 55 The Mitchell decision severely undercut the force of
Fuentes because the Court held that postponement of judicial in-
quiry is not a violation of due process when dealing with property
rights if the statute provides an adequate opportunity for an ulti-
mate judicial determination of liability."s 9 This decision, in con-
trast with Shaffer, seems to permit landlords to use self-help dis-
traint as long as their tenants can later challenge the seizure. Most
decisions striking down state distraint and landlord lien statutes
came shortly after Fuentes but before Mitchell.6 0 After Mitchell
few courts followed the Fuentes precedent, especially when the ap-
plicable statute allowed completely private self-help.66 1
2. Self-Help Eviction
(a) The English Rule
Early English common law gave landlords662 almost unbridled
authority to utilize self-help and to repossess leased premises from
a holdover tenant .66  Landlords could enter the premises and use
force short of death or bodily harms" to repossess their property.
Only persons with claims or rights in the property could exercise
this remedy legally.665 Loose enforcement of this rule, however, en-
couraged persons, as a matter of common practice, to dispossess
tenants "by the strong arm" even when they possessed no rights in
the property.6 6 6 The breaches of peace that resulted from this
practice induced the Crown to protect tenants' possession of real
658. Id. at 619.
659. Id. at 611.
660. But see, e.g., Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
Merlin v. Sabrina, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
661. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 14.1 statutory note 7 (1976). At least
one court has indicated that statutes which allow a private landlord to take a tenant's prop-
erty without resort to the judicial process, a sheriff, or other public official, are not likely to
violate the fourteenth amendment because completely private self-help does not constitute
state action. See Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1974).
662. The right to use self-help was available to anyone entitled to possession of the
land, not just those with landlord status. 1 F. HARER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.15
(1956); see 1 L. PIKE, HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND 247 (1973).
663. 2 J. Taylor, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD & TENANT § 786
(8th ed. 1887); see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 280 (3d ed. 1927).
664. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 662; see Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177, 181 (1966).
665. See supra note 586, 2 J. TAYLOR, supra note 663; see also Note, Landlord-Tenant
Law-Abolition of Self-Help Repossession-Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978), 5
Wm. MrrcHuL L. R-v. 535, 535 (1979).
666. 1 L. Pike, supra note 662, at 249. Early English courts realized that the law "al-
lowed disseised owners too large a licence for the due maintenance of the peace." 3 W.
HOLDSWORTm, supra note 663, at 280.
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property667 by giving tenants the assize of novel dissessin.6 68 This
summary remedy gave unjustly dispossessed plaintiffs an opportu-
nity to regain possession as quickly as possible." 9 This judicial
remedy stopped the proliferation of forcible entry and disposses-
sion in England for some time.7 °
As the procedure for bringing a cause of action in England be-
came increasingly complex,17 1 however, the advantages assize of
novel disseisin created diminished, and violent dispossessions
again became commonplace. 7 2 In 1381 Parliament enacted the
Forcible Entry Act6 7 3 to alleviate this lawlessness. The Act sought
to protect a tenant's possession of leased property by making forci-
ble entry a criminal offense.67 4 Dispossessed holdover tenants, how-
ever, received no civil remedy for damages under the Act because
holdover tenants technically had no legal right to possession of the
premises and suffered no legally cognizable injury when a person
deprived them of possession.7 5 Later decisions, however, held that
667. The history of legal protection of possession is discussed in Comment, Defects in
the Current Forcible Entry and Detainer Laws of the United States and England, 25
UCLA L. Rsv. 1067, 1068-71 (1978).
668. Neither personal service nor formal pleadings were required for the dispossessed
party to avail himself of this remedy. The only question put to the jury was whether a
landlord dispossessed a tenant unjustly. Maitland, The Beatitude of Seisin (pts. 1-2), 4 L.Q.
Rav. 24, 28, 35-36 (1888); see 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 48 (2d ed. 1923); Comment supra
note 667, at 1068-69 n.10.
669. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 668,
at 47-48.
670. Comment, supra note 667, at 1069.
671. See Maitland, supra note 668, at 291; see also Comment, supra note 667, at 1069
n.12.
672. Plummer, Introduction to FoRTscuE ON THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND at 21.
"Not a little of the blame for this state of things should rest upon the judges who, by al-
lowing the utmost license to mendacious pleadings, had made the assize of novel disseisin
anything but the festinum remedium which it still was in the days of Edward I." Maitland,
supra note 668, at 291.
673. Although the assize of novel disseisin was the first statutory attempt to regulate
self-help repossession, many commentators feel that the Forcible Entry Act of 1381 signaled
the demise of this repossession remedy. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 663, at 280;
Comment, supra note 667, at 1070 n.13; Annot., supra note 664, at 181.
674. Forcible Entry Act, 1381, 5 Rich. 2, ch. 8. Courts have credited this Act with
giving rise to the expression that "possession is nine points of the law." See Goffin v. Mc-
Call, 91 Fla. 514, 519, 108 So. 556, 558 (1926).
675. Annot., supra note 664, at 181; see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs
§ 23, at 123 (4th ed. 1971). In Taunton v. Costar, 101 Eng. Rep. 1060 (K.B. 1797), the court
felt the disallowance of a civil remedy was "too plain for argument. Here is a tenant...
whose term expired upon a proper notice to quit, and because he holds over in defiance of
law and justice, he now attempts to convert the lawful entry of his landlord into a trespass
.... There is not the slightest pretence for considering [the landlord] as a trespasser in
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while forcibly entering landlords were not liable to tenants for tres-
pass, tenants and their families did have an action for assault and
battery for forcible eviction.67 6 Few English courts recognized this
distinction between forcible entry and forcible eviction,677 and
Hemmings v. Poke Stoges Golf Club, Ltd.67 8 expressly abrogated
it.
6 7 9
The Forcible Entry Act also limited landlords' use of force
during repossession.6 80 The statute allowed only persons with a
claim of right in the property to enter onto it.68' Moreover, the
statute prohibited entry "with strong hand" or with a "multitude
of people," and allowed entry only in a "peaceable and easy man-
ner. 6 82 The courts interpreted this language to permit a landlord
to use "no more than necessary force" during self-help reposses-
sion.683 More than necessary force included breaking open house
doors, threatening physical injury to persons in possession, going
onto the premises armed with weapons or accompanied by a large
number of people, and entering a tenant's premises in other violent
ways.18' Because the statute required holdover tenants to show
that landlords used force calculated to prevent tenant resistance
when they entered their tenants' premises to support a forcible en-
try claim, trespass alone would not support an indictment for this
claim.68 5 Thus, landlords entered peacefully when they entered
through an open window, used a key, lured a tenant out of posses-
this case. . . ." Id. at 1060-61.
676. See, e.g., Newton v. Harland, 133 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1840) (landlord liable for
assault); Hillary v. Gay, 172 Eng. Rep. 1243 (Ex. 1833) (landlord liable for forcible eviction);
see also Comment, Landlord-Tenant Law: Abolition of Self-Help in Minnesota, 63 MINN.
L. Rav. 723, 725 n.9 (1979); Annot., supra note 664, at
181.
677. See, e.g., Lows v. Telford, 1 App. Cas. 414 (1876); Harvey v. Brydges, 153 Eng.
Rep. 546 (Ex. 1845); see Comment, supra note 676, at 725 n.9.
678. [1920] 1 K.B. 720 (1919). Before Hemmings overruled Newton, some American
jurisdictions accepted the Newton rule. Annot., supra note 664, at 181.
679. Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, Ltd., [1920] 1 K.B. at 734.
680. Forcible Entry Act, 1381, 5 Rich. 2, ch. 7.
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Harvey v. Brydges, 153 Eng. Rep. 546, 548 (Ex. 1845); see Taunton v. Coster, 101
Eng. Rep. 1060, 1060 (K.B. 1797); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAms, supra note 662, at 255; Annot.,
supra note 664, at 181. This rule protected tenants from physical harm but not from a
landlord's entry onto the premises. Comment, Landlord Eviction Remedies
Act-Legislative Overreaction to Landlord Self-Help, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25, 28
(1982); see supra note 674 and accompanying text.
684. HALSBURy'S LAws OF ENGLAND 863, at 508 (4th ed. Lord Haisham 1976).
685. Id.; see supra note 674 and accompanying text.
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sion, or merely threatened to damage chattels.""6 Eventually,
courts held that any force which caused damage was forcible and
improper.
8 7
A series of other statutes regulating a landlord's right to use
self-help in repossessing leased property followed the Forcible En-
try Act of 1381.88 Parliament enacted these statutes further to
squelch forcible entries that continued despite the Forcible Entry
Act.6 9 These acts gave certain persons the right to damages as
compensation for injuries sustained during a landlord's forcible en-
try.' 0 Today, however, English law still allows landlord reentry
with reasonably necessary force.91
(b) American Approaches to Self-Help Eviction
American courts have not resolved uniformly whether a land-
lord can employ self-help to repossess leased premises from a hold-
over tenant. '92 All American jurisdictions 93 have enacted legisla-
tion concerning recovery of leased premises from holdover tenants.
686. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 684, at 508.05.
687. See, e.g., Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, Ltd., [1920] 1 K.B. 720, 734 (1919)
(held for landlord who used no more force than necessary and caused no damage).
688. See 21, Jac. 1, ch. 15 (1623); 8 Hen. 6, ch. 9 (1429); 4 Hen. 4, ch. 8 (1402).
689. As stated in the preamble of 4 Hen. 4, ch. 8 (1402), "[D]aily the great Persons of
the Realm do make forcible Entries into other Mens Lands, and put out the Possessors of
the same ... and so by such forcible Entries and Maintenance, the Land-Tenants and
Possessors be utterly disinherited and undone.. .;" This act further provided that courts
could sentence offenders to one year in jail and award damages to dispossessed tenants. To
establish a forcible entry claim, plaintiffs had to prove that a person forcibly entered their
premises and seized the tenants' goods. Id.
690. Subsequent statutes expanded the class of tenants that have standing to sue for
forcible entry and the remedies available under this cause of action. In 1429 Parliament
enacted a statute that imposed criminal sanctions for both forcible detainer and forcible
entry. 8 Hen. 6, ch. 9 (1429). The difference between the two offenses is temporal, depending
on whether a person uses force to gain entry or to retain possession once that person has
entered the premises. Newsom v. Damron, 302 Ky. 79, 82, 193 S.W.2d 643, 644 (1946). This
statute also increased civil remedies to include restituion and damages. See Comment,
supra note 676, at 725 n.10. Finally, in 1623 Parliament passed a statute that added tenants
for a term of years to the class of tenants entitled to the civil remedies created in the 1402
and 1429 acts. 21 Jac. 1, ch. 15 (1623). Previously, damages were available only to dispos-
sessed freeholders.
691. Comment, supra note 667, at 1070-71.
692. See Comment, supra note 683, at 29; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 14.1
statutory note 7 (1976); Annot., supra note 664, at 177.
693. For a list of statutes addressing landlord eviction remedies (including laws of the
Canal Zone, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and positions of the
Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code (1969) and the Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act (1972)), see RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 14.1 statutory notes
(1976).
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"Forcible Entry and Detainer" and "Summary Proceedings" are
the titles legislatures typically have given to these statutes. 94 Al-
though many of these statutes give landlords summary judicial
remedies without expressly prohibiting self-help, 95 a state court
construction of the term "forcible entry" often determines the
availability of extrajudicial dispute resolution.696 For example,
Michigan's forcible entry and detainer statute does not prohibit
expressly self-help repossession even though it gives landlords a
summary judicial remedy.19 7 A Michigan Supreme Court case, how-
ever, held that a landlord's use of deception to gain entry was not
peaceable within the meaning of the statute. 98 This decision im-
plied that the Michigan statute permits only peaceful self-help.6 9
Landlords in Michigan, therefore, have little practical access to a
self-help eviction remedy even though the state statute does not
exclude this remedy expressly. This indirect exclusion of self-help
eviction and wide disagreement over the definitions of "peaceable
self-help, 70 0 "forcible entry, 7 0 1 and other commonly used terms
make imprecise any general categorization of states' treatment of
self-help repossession. These statutes, however, are separable into
the following three categories: (1) a small minority that follow the
694. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 14.1 statutory note 2 (1976). Compare
R.L GEN. LAWS §§ 34-19-1 to 34-10-11 (1969) (Forcible Entry and Detainer) with MICH.
Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5701-.5759 (West Supp. 1983) (Summary Proceedings to Recover
Possession of Realty). "Summary Proceedings" statutes unsually provide landlords with a
remedy to recover possession of leased premises that functionally is more efficient than the
common law ejectment remedy. Forcible entry and detainer statutes, on the other hand,
evolved from early English statutes and common law. See supra notes 661-91 and accompa-
nying text. Because these two types of statutes have different historical backgrounds, the
procedures a tenant must follow for bringing an action vary depending upon the type of
statute in force in the tenant's jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 14.1
statutory note 2 (1976).
695. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.501-.511 (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1983);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-36-1 to 78-36-11 (1953). But see R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-17 (Supp.
1980) (expressly prohibits a landlord's use of self-help eviction).
696. See REsTATE Tr (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 14.1 statutory note 7, at 5 (1976).
697. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5701-.5759 (West Supp. 1983).
698. Pelavin v. Misner, 241 Mich. 209, 217 N.W. 36 (1928). In Pelavin the landlord
went to his apartment building with another man whom the landlord represented as a pro-
spective real estate buyer to the wife of one of his tenants. The landlord asked the tenant's
wife, the only occupant of the premises at the time, to show the "purchaser" a defective
walkway on the outside of the building. After she innocently complied, the landlord closed
and locked the door, and refused to let her reenter. Id. at 210-11, 217 N.W. at 36.
699. Id. at 209, 217 N.W. at 36.
700. See Comment, supra note 683, at 30; Comment, supra note 676, at 727; Annot.,
supra note 664, at 189-94; see also infra notes 714-22 and accompanying text.
701. See Comment, supra note 676, at 727-28; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY §
14.1 statutory note 7 (1976).
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English rule and permit landlords to use reasonably necessary
force",2 during self-help repossession; 03 (2) a majority that only al-
low peaceful self-help;70  and (3) a growing minority that com-
pletely prohibit self-help repossession.705
States following the English rule70° permit landlords to use
force that reasonably is necessary to repossess the leased premises
from a holdover tenant.707 The number of jurisdictions retaining
this rule has declined rapidly during the past two decades, and to-
day these states constitute a very small minority.70 The forcible
entry and detainer statutes70 9 in these English rule states subject
landlords to criminal, but not civil, liability, when their conduct is
beyond the scope of reasonably necessary force.7 10 Courts in these
jurisdictions, however, still may hold a landlord liable in tort for
injury to the tenant's person or property.1
The majority of American jurisdictions allow landlords to util-
ize peaceful self-help.12 State courts and legislatures have abol-
ished forcible entry to prevent violent confrontations between
landlords and tenants.1 3 Courts applying this general rule define
"peaceable self-help" in a variety of ways. 4 Some jurisdictions de-
fine it as nonviolent entry.7 15 In these states, a landlord's use of a
702. See supra notes 682-91 and accompanying text.
703. See infra notes 706-11 and accompanying text.
704. See infra notes 712-22 and accompanying text.
705. See infra notes 723-29 and accompanying text.
706. See supra text accompanying notes 702-05
707. See supra note 691 and accompany text.
708. Compare Annot., supra note 664, at 182-85 with
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 14.1 statutory note 7 (1976). In 1966 fifteen states
followed the English Rule, including a few states, such as Rhode Island, that have since
abolished self-help eviction altogether. See R.L GEN. LAws § 34-18-17 (Supp. 1980); Annot.,
supra note 664, at 183. Pennsylvania and Wyoming are two states that still retain the tradi-
tional "no more than necessary force rule." Overdeer v. Lewis, 1 Watts & Serg. 90 (Pa.
1841); Welch v. Rice, 61 Wyo. 511, 159 P.2d 502 (1945).
709. Although most states lable their statutes "Forcible Entry and Detainer," forcible
entry techically is distinct from forcible detainer. Forcible entry concerns the manner in
which a landlord enters a tenant's premises, while forcible detainer concerns what landlords
do after they enter their tenants' premises. Newsom v. Damron. 302 Ky. 79, 82, 193 S.W.2d
643, 644 (1946).
710. Welch v. Rice, 61 Wyo. 511, 159 P.2d 502 (1945).
711. Adams v. Adams, 7 Pa. 160 (1869).
712. See, e.g., Krasner v. Gurley, 252 Ala. 235, 40 So. 2d 328 (1949); Winn v. State, 55
Ark. 360, 18 S.W. 375 (1892); Levy v. McLintock, 141 Mo. App. 593, 125 S.W. 546 (1910);
Paddock v. Clay, 138 Mont. 541, 357 P.2d 1 (1960); Heironimus v. Duncan, 11 Tex. Civ.
App. 610, 33 S.W. 287 (1895); see W. PROSSER, supra note 675, at 124.
713. See W. PROSSR, supra note 675, at 123.
714. Id. at 124.
715. See, e.g., Fort Dearborn Lodge No. 214, LO.O.F. v. Klein, 115 Ill. 177, 3 N.E. 272
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key to enter his rental property and remove the tenant's posses-
sions716 does not constitute forcible entry. Most states originally
adopted statutory language similar to that in England's Forcible
Entry Statute of 1381.717 Courts interpreted the limitation on en-
try "with strong hand" and "multitude of people 71 8 to prohibit
only the use of actual force.719 Today's statutes often contain lan-
guage easily construed to include more than violent action within
their definition of "forcible entry. 72 0 Courts purporting to permit
peaceable self-help repossession have held that very minimal uses
of force may equal forcible entry within the meaning of their stat-
utes. 7.1 Some courts have interpreted these peaceful self-help stat-
utes to allow landlords to enter the premises of holdover tenants
only when these tenants consent.7 2  This narrow definition of
"peaceable" denies landlords any realistic opportunity to avoid us-
ing the judicial system to regain possession of their premises.
The third view American jurisdictions have taken expressly
forbids all self-help and requires landlords to use the judicial rem-
edies that statutes provided to regain possession of leased prop-
erty.7 23 Proponents of this so called "modern rule"724 perceive that
even peaceable self-help eviction creates too great a potential for
violence between landlords and tenants. 25 In these jurisdictions, a
(1885); Liberty Indus. Park Corp. v. Protective Pkg. Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 116, 335 N.Y.S.2d
333 (1972); see Comment, supra note 683, at 30.
716. Liberty Indus. Park Corp. v. Protective Pkg. Corp. 71 Misc. 2d 116, 335 N.Y.S.2d
333 (1972).
717. See Comment, supra note 676, at 727 n.26.
718. Forcible Entry Act, 1381, 5 Rich. 2, ch. 7; see supra notes 680-82 and accompany-
ing text.
719. See comment, supra note 676, at 727 n.26.
720. See RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 14.1 statutory note 7 (1976).
721. See, e.g., Adelhelm v. Dougherty, 129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937) (entrance with
aid of locksmith); Buchanan v. Crittes, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100 (1944) (use of a passkey);
McNeil v. Higgins, 86 Cal. App. 2d 723, 195 P.2d 470 (1948) (entrance through an open
window).
722. See, e.g., Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961);
Adelhelin v. Doughtry, 129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937); Reeder v. Purdy, 41 IMI. 279 (1866):
Casey v. Kitchens, 66 Okla. 169, 168 P.812 (1917); see W. PRossER, supra note 675, at 124.
723. Annot., supra note 664, at 186-89.
724. See Note, supra note 665, at 536; Annot., supra note 664, at 186.
725. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF PROPERTY § 14.2 (1976) provides: "(1) If the control-
ling law gives the landlord,... a speedy judicial remedy for the recovery of posssession
.[he] may [not] resort to self-help to recover possession ... unless the controlling law
preserves the right of self-help." In the official comment to this section the Restatement
drafters reasoned that since the original purpose of self-help repossession was to give land-
lords the ability to recover leased premises promptly, the existence of speedy judicial reme-
dies eliminated the need for self-help. Moreover, eliminating self-help decreased the danger
of landlord-tenant confrontation. Id. § 14.2 comment a.
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tenant can recover damages from a landlord for using self-help to
enter and regain possession of leased premises regardless of
whether the landlord's entry was forcible or peaceable.7 26 A grow-
ing number of states727 have adopted this position, and it has the
endorsement of the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Prop-
erty ' 8 and other notable commentators. 2 9
(c) Constitutionality of Self-Help Eviction
The constitutional arguments weighing against the validity of
statutes that give landlords a right of self-help repossession seem
more compelling than those made against the constitutionality of
the right of distraint because housing generally is more important
for human welfare than is personal property.730 In Lindsey v.
Normet,5 1 however, the Supreme Court refused to hold that pos-
session of one's home was a fundamental interest warranting strict
scrutiny of an Oregon forcible entry and detainer statute.732 Justice
White, writing for the Court, refuted the tenants' argument that a
state could not interfere with an individual's need for decent shel-
ter without showing a superior state interest:
7 3 3
The Restatement also provides that if the law of the jurisdiction does not preserve the
right of self-help repossession, any agreement between landlords and tenants to the contrary
is void as against public policy. Id. § 14.2(2). Although California has adopted this approach,
see Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961), the majority of
states have not. See RRSTATEbMNT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 14.2 reporter's note 5 (1976).
726. One great advantage of the modern rule is that it eliminates the problem of draw-
ing lines between forcible and peaceable entry. The lack of uniformity in law among states
allowing self-help inevitably leads to inconsistent resolutions to the problems that arise in
identifical fact situations. Compare Liberty Indus. Park Corp. v. Protective Pkg. Corp., 71
Misc. 2d 116, 335 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1972) with Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100
(1944) (in both cases the landlords used keys to enter the leased premises but the courts
inconsistently assessed liability).
727. See, e.g., Kassan v. Stout, 9 Cal. 3d 39, 507 P.2d 87, 106 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1973);
Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn. 12 (1884); Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711 (Del. 1972); Adelhelm
v. Dougherty, 129 Fal. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937); Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978);
Bass v. Boetel & Co., 191 Neb. 733, 217 N.W.2d 804 (1974); Edwards v. C.N. Investment
Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 272 N.E.2d 652 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971); Price v. Osborne, 24
Tenn. App. 525, 147 S.W.2d 412 (1940); Nelson v. Swanson, 177 Wash. 187, 31 P.2d 521
(1934).
728. RsTATzmzNr (S~coND) OF PROPERTY § 14.2 (1976).
729. See UNIFORM REsIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT
§1 4.207, 4.301(c) (1972).
730. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Weitzman, The Impact of Repair and
Deduct Legislation: An Economic Analysis, 11 CLEARMGHOUSz REv. 985, 989 (1978).
731. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
732. Id.; OR. RaV. STAT. §§ 105.105-.160 (1975) (Oregon forcible entry and detainer
statute).
733. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 73-74.
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We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.
But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition of
the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the
term of his lease without the payment of rent.. . . [T]he assurance of ade-
quate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legisla-
tive, not judicial, functions.
73 4
The Court further held that the unique characteristics of the land-
lord-tenant relationship differentiated eviction litigation from
other cases and justified limiting the issues at trial to a tenant's
default.7 5 The Court's treatment of the Oregon forcible entry and
detainer statute, while dealing with a summary judicial eviction
remedy rather than a self-help remedy, implies that courts need
not scrutinize self-help eviction any closer than they do landlords'
use of self-help distraint.75
C. Tenant Self-Help
The trends and future of self-help in the landlord-tenant area
seem closely tied to the general trend in American jurisprudence
toward consumer protection. Historically, landlords were the bene-
ficiaries of all major self-help remedies in landlord-tenant law. 87
At common law tenants had a right to replevin 75  but no true self-
help remedies for grievances against their landlords. This historical
imbalance is traceable to the extensive protection traditionally
given landowners and to laissez-faire economics. 7 9 Common law
courts applied caveat emptor as strongly to leases in land as they
did to other contracts.7 ,0 The bargaining position of tenants in the
United States increased, although not to the point of equality,
734. Id. at 74.
735. Id. at 72-73. The Court invalidated a requirement in the Oregon statute that
compelled an appealing tenant to post a bond double the amount of rent allegedly due. The
statute also stipulated that a tenant would forfeit this bond if he lost the appeal. Id. at 74-
75.
736. See supra note 661 and accompanying text for a discussion which suggests that
pure landlord self-help might not satisfy the state action requirement that is a prerequisite
to a fourteenth amendment due process violation.
737. See supra text accompanying notes 584-616 & 662-91 for a discussion of the his-
tory of distraint and self-help eviction.
738. Replevin was a common law action available to tenants that authorized them to
apply to a sheriff to retake distrained property from landlords until judicial dispostion of
the landlord-tenant dispute. Tenants had to post a bond as security for this property. 3 W.
HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 283-87 (3d ed. 1927).
739. See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
740. See Backman, The Tenant as a Consumer? A Comparison of Developments in
Consumer Law and in Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 OKLA. L. Rxv. 1, 4-5 (1980).
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when the doctrine of caveat emptor and other economic policies
favoring landlords741 lost judicial and public support in most juris-
dictions.7 42 This shift in bargaining power and the general trend
toward consumer protection resulted in a decrease of landlord self-
help remedies and an increase of tenant self-help remedies.743
Although tenants have not received as much protection as gen-
eral consumers in the past,744 some commentators argue that the
social purposes and policies behind consumer protection apply
strongly to tenants.7 45 First, both tenants and general consumers
usually enter commercial transactions for personal, family, or
household purposes.7 46 Second, both tenants and general consum-
ers have relatively weak bargaining positions when compared to
landlords or business enterprises that often are able to offer their
products on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.7 47 Third, landlords and bus-
iness enterprises significantly over-match both tenants and general
consumers in commercial expertise concerning most leases and
business transactions.7 4' Last, tenants and consumers typically
enter into transactions to satisfy consumption needs, whereas land-
lords and business enterprises usually enter business transactions
to make a profit.7 49 The similarities between the commercial posi-
tion of tenants and general consumers suggest that both deserve
similar protective measures.
7 50
Changes in the availability of landlord and tenant self-help
remedies are evidence of the influence of consumer protection on
landlord-tenant law. The traditional landlord remedies of distraint
and self-help eviction have undergone substantial erosion since the
741. Id. at 5.
742. See generally Backman, supra note 740, at 1-11 (comparing the historical devel-
opment of tenants' rights with the development of consumers' rights generally). Government
regulation of the rental housing industry and the advent of the implied warranty of habita-
bility are evidence of this shift.
743. See infra notes 751-76 and accompanying text.
744. Backman, supra note 740, at 5-9.
745. Id. at 3-4.
746. See Consumer Credit Protection Act § 103(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (Supp. 1976);
UNIFORM RsIDmNTAL LANDLORD AND TmNANT Acr § 1.301(14) (1972).
747. See Backman, supra note 740, at 3.
748. Id. The overwhelming imbalance in expertise between landlords and tenants usu-
ally does not exist when a landlord is not an institutionalized business. Many landlords, on
the other hand, own only one rental unit and deal with leases, repairs, and other rental
issues as often as their average tenants.
749. Backman, supra note 740, at 4.
750. Id. Broad consumer protection enactments, however, exempt leases of real prop-
erty from coverage. Id. at 4 n.20.
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common law days of "all necessary force. '7 1 Conversely, a tenant's
ability to utilize self-help has increased. 52 The URLTA, for exam-
ple, allows tenants to engage in rent application, in which they per-
sonally repair minor defects in the leased premises and deduct the
cost from their rent.7 83 The Act limits the amount deductible to
the lesser of one half of one month's rent or $100.754 Similarly, the
Act allows tenants to deduct the cost of utility service from their
rent payments if their landlords have promised to supply utilities,
but have failed to do so.75 The Restatement (Second) of Property
also allows rent application.5
At common law, landlords had no obligation to make any re-
pairs on the leased premises during the lease term.5 The implied
warranty of habitability7"' and the passage of statutes that address
this issue 7 ' in a majority of American jurisdictions, however, has
placed a duty on landlords to make certain repairs. In these juris-
dictions, tenants, after giving their landlords proper notice of a de-
fect in the leased premises, may deduct from their rent reasonable
costs incurred in repairing the defect.760 Three factors generally af-
fect a tenant's ability to use this self-help method. First, the land-
lord must have a duty to repair defects in the leased premises.7 1
Second, the tenant must give the landlord notice and reasonable
time to repair the defect.762 Last, the tenant's expenditures and
subsequent deductions must be reasonable..76 Determining reason-
751. See supra notes 683-87 and accompanying text.
752. See Backman, supra note 740, at 11-44.
753. U~nioRm REsmENTmL LANDLORD AND TENANr ACT § 4.103 (1972); see, e.g., Ficker
v. Diefenbach, 34 Or. App. 241, 578 P.2d 467 (1978).
754. UmNFoRm RSmENT AL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.103(a) (1972).
755. UNwRm RsmzNr.AL LANDLORD Am TENANT ACT § 4.104 (1972).
756. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF PROPERTY § 11.2 (1976) (section entitled "Application
of Rent to the Elimination of Default").
757. 2 R. PowmEL, supra note 620 230[3], at 326.
758. For a full discussion of the shift from the doctrine of caveat emptor to the crea-
tion of the implied warranty of habitability, see Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitabil-
ity in Lease of Furnished Premises for Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RICH.
L. REv. 322 (1969).
759. See Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in
Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 Urns. L. ANN. 3, 6 (1979); infra notes 760-
62 and accompanying text.
760. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 11.2 (1976).
761. 2 R. POwELL, supra note 620 230[3], at 326; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY § 11.1 (1976).
762. 2 R. PowELL, supra note 620 1 230[3], at 326; RSSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY § 11.1 (1976).
763. 2 R. PowELL, supra note 620 230[3], at 326; RESTATEmEN (SECOND) OF PROP-
mzrY § 11.1 (1976).
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ableness in these cases requires consideration of a variety of fac-
tors, including age and condition of the building and the condi-
tions of other buildings in the vicinity.
7 "
Some of these rent application statutes are short and simply
written,6 5 while others contain detailed procedures that tenants
must follow closely to receive a rent reduction.7 6 Other state stat-
utes deny tenants the right to deduct costs of repairs from rent
and instead provide summary judicial procedures to accomplish
the desired result.
7 7
Some American jurisdictions recently have given tenants the
right to withhold rent completely to induce landlords to make re-
pairs.78 An advantage of this remedy over rent application is that
tenants avoid the time, trouble, and expense of making repairs. A
disadvantage of this remedy is that landlords are free to decide
how to repair defects. When a landlord fails to make requested re-
pairs within a reasonable amount of time,7 6 ' the Restatement pro-
poses that tenants, after proper notice to their landlords, should
place rent that subsequently becomes due in escrow until the land-
lord makes the requested repairs or until the lease terminates,
whichever comes first.77 0 The Restatement also requires tenants to
notify their landlords that they have made rental payments into an
escrow account when they become due.77 1
764. 2 R. PowmEL, supra note 620 1 230[3], at 327; REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
iRTY § 11.1 (1976).
765. Seee.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 1942 (West 1954 & Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §
70-24-406 (1983); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983); NJ). CENT.
CODE § 47-16-13 (1978). Powell cites the New York statute as a typical simple rent applica-
tion law. 2 R. Poww.L, supra note 620 1 230[3], at 327. The statute states that "[i]n any
case in which a tenant shall lawfully make a payment to a utility company pursuant to the
provisions of... [the] public service law, such payment shall be deductible from any future
payment of rent." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
766. See, e.g., HAWAI REv. STAT. § 521-64 (1976) & Supp. 1982; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 111, § 127B (West 1983); UNwoRM REsmEN L LANDLORD AND T!ENANT ACT § 4.103
(1972); see 2 R. PoWzLL, supra note 620, at 1 23013], at 328-29 n.74 (setting forth the text of
a detailed rent application statute).
767. See, e.g., WASH. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 59.18.110 (Supp. 1983); see 2 &. POWELL, supra
note 620 1 230[3], at 328-30.
768. See 2 R. PowELL, supra note 620 1 230[3], at 330.1;
RzSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.3 (1976).
769. See 2 R. PoWELL, supra note 620, at 1 225 for a discussion of the circumstances
that put a landlord in default.
770. RESTATzmrr (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.3 (1976).
771. Id. The following statutes codify the Restatement's requirements for rent with-
holding: ALAsKA STAT. § 34.03.190(a)(3)(1975); Amiz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1365 (1974);
CONN. GRN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47a-14a to 47a-14g (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§
5901-5907 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §83.60 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2561
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A majority of American jurisdictions have adopted a variation
of the Restatement position that only requires tenants to notify
the landlord of the reasons for withholding rent while allowing
them to retain possession of the unpaid rent subject to an order
requiring them to deposit the money with a court.7 2 Some jurisdic-
tions require tenants to place unpaid rent in a court-administered
escrow account as soon as the tenant withholds payment.7 Under
the Restatement, a tenant also has the option of changing from
rent withholding to rent application.7 Under the rent application
option, however, the Restatement would prohibit tenants from us-
ing previously escrowed rental payments to make repairs ." These
self-help alternatives, together with tenants' judicial remedies, di-
verge significantly from traditional common law rules that obli-
gated landlords only to provide tenants with possession of the
leased premises.7
In addition to rent application and withholding, other rela-
tively recent self-help remedies have emerged as alternatives to ju-
dicial proceedings to resolve landlord-tenant disputes. An in-
creased use of mediation is the most prominent of these alternative
methods. 7  Mediation has taken a variety of forms ranging from
"neighborhood justice centers 7 7 8 to projects designed solely for
(1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 383.645 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 8-211 (1981); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, §§127A - 127K (West 1983); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 566.20 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.500-.640 (Vernon Supp.
1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1428 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A42-74 to 2A:42--84 (West
Supp. 1983); N.Y. MuLT. DwELL. LAW §§ 302-a, 309 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1983); N.Y.
REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW §§ 769-782 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1983); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
5321.07 (Page 1981); OR. Rzv. STAT. § 91.810 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Pur-
don 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24.3-19 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-28-501 to 66-28-502
(1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4859 (1973); VA CODE § 55-248.25 (1981 & Supp. 1983); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 280.22 (West Supp. 1975). See also MODEL REsmENTiAL LANDLORD-TENANT
CODE §§ 3-301 to 3-307 (1969); UNmFol RESDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 4.105
(1972).
772. 2 R. PowELL, supra note 620 1 230[3], at 330.2; see, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Tenants poten-
tially could abuse this approach unless courts required them to deposit unpaid rent in an
escrow account with the court. Otherwise, tenants could use and earn money from the with-
held rental payments during the time required to adjudicate the dispute.
773. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 620 23013], at 330.1.
774. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.3 comments b-c (1976).
775. Id.
776. See Chase, The Property-Contract Theme in Landlord and Tenant Law: A Crit-
ical Commentary on Schoshinski's American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 13 RurroERS
L.J. 189, 199 (1982) (quoting R. SCHosinsK, AMmICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 116
(1980)).
777. See Backman, supra note 740, at 42.
778. See McGillis Neighborhood Justice Centers and the Mediation of Housing-Re-
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the purpose of resolving landlord-tenant disputes."9 Commenta-
tors have cited numerous reasons for the recent expansion in the
number and type of alternative landlord-tenant dispute resolution
devices. First, judicial resolution of these disputes is often intolera-
bly time consuming because housing disputes typically require im-
mediate attention and swift action.8 Second, litigation is very ex-
pensive compared to the often small amounts of money at stake in
a dispute78 1 and the relatively low cost of many nonjudicial reme-
dies.7 82 High litigation costs often persuade landlords and tenants
to abandon their claims rather than pay the disproportionate cost
of obtaining a judicial remedy.788 Last, even when landlord-tenant
lated Disputes, 17 URB. L. ANN. 245 (1979). This article surveyed six mediation dispute
processing projects concerning their handling of housing disputes. These so-called neighbor-
hood justice centers dealt with a wide range of legal issues, including landlord-tenant dis-
agreements. Of the six projects discussed, the landlord-tenant caseload ranged from 11.5%
to 22% of all disputes addressed. An important issue raised was whether issues that affect
people other than the disputants, such as conditions of the common areas or rent changes,
are better left to individuals rather than tenant associations. Of course, when no tenant
association exists, individual tenants should be able to handle these matters themselves. At
least one community, however, has decided to exclude disputes that affect a significant
number of people from neighborhood mediation. Id. at 268.
The Atlanta Neighborhood Justice Center Project employs a fairly typical dispute reso-
lution procedure. The subject matter of disputes that the Justice Center handles includes
both civil and criminal matters. Id. at 258. After the Justice Center receives notice of a
dispute, whether by referral of neutral parties or by initiative of the disputing parties, it
then holds a mediation hearing in an informal, relaxed atmosphere, occasionally in the dis-
putants' local neighborhoods. Id. Mediators are volunteers who come from diverse socio-
economic backgrounds. The American Arbitration Association instructs these mediators
about the process of dispute resolution. Id. at 259.
Mediators usually begin mediation hearings by explaining the mediation process to the
disputing parties. The disputing parties then present their sides of the dispute. The media-
tor attempts to help the parties perceive clearly the issues that underly their dispute and
reach a mutual resolution to the dispute. Id. After reaching a settlement, the mediator
records the settlement's terms on a project form and has the parties sign it. Id.
779. See Ebel, Landlord-Tenant Mediation Project in Colorado, 17 URB. L. ANN. 279
(1979). The Colorado Landlord-Tenant Mediation Project uses procedures for referral of
disputes, selection and training of mediators, and conduct of hearings that are similar to
those used in other mediation projects. Compare id. at 281-86 (the Colorado Landlord-Ten-
ant Mediation Project) with McGillis, supra note 778, at 158-60 (the Atlanta Neighborhood
Justice Center). The Colorado Project emphasizes flexible and creative solutions to housing
disputes unavailable to typical court litigants. For example, if a dispute concerns eviction of
a tenant, mediators attempt to convince the landlord to allow their tenant a reasonable
amount of time to find alternative housing. If the disputants are unable to reach an agree-
ment, the mediator advises them of other available remedies. Id. at 281-84.
780. Ebel, supra note 779, at 280.
781. The importance of many housing disputes is neither the expense of minor repairs
nor the cost of one month's rent, but rather the speed with which disputing parties can
settle their disagreements.
782. See Ebel, supra note 779, at 280-81.
783. Id.
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disputes reach court dockets, judges usually lack "the time, incli-
nation, and authority" to fashion creative solutions to the prob-
lem.78 These and other reasons785 have led to an increased rejec-
tion of judicial dispute resolution in favor of more efficient and
effective nonjudicial remedies.
D. Analysis
The question necessarily arises whether the trend in contem-
porary America toward increasing tenant self-help remedies and
decreasing landlord self-help remedies benefits society. The Re-
statement (Second) of Property and the URLTA both take the
position that society benefits from the decline of landlord self-help
remedies such as the right of distraint and self-help eviction. s
Dean Prosser also argues that the current majority view denying
landlords the right of forcible entry clearly is desirable and notes
that few things are more likely to lead to violence than allowing
landlords to throw their tenants out by force.87 He also recognizes
the danger of violence in jurisdictions purporting to allow peaceful
landlord self-help.8 Other commentators have argued that the
seemingly innocuous act of padlocking the door of a leased dwell-
ing in the tenant's absence creates an imminent threat of violent
confrontation between landlord and tenant.78 9 Although many ju-
risdictions responded to these concerns by abolishing some land-
784. Id.at 281.
When confronted with the massive volume of cases typically found in the landlord-
tenant area, courts are often required to act upon the basis of incomplete and filtered evi-
dence. It is no wonder, then, that courts are seldom able to do more than simply enter a
monetary judgment for the plaintiff or defendant.
Id.
785. Many landlords and tenants also feel confused and intimidated by the judicial
system and therefore decide not to resolve their disputes through formal legal action. Id. at
279-81.
786. See UNIFORM REsDENTI A LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 4.103, .104, .205, .301
(1972); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF PROPERTY §§ 12.1, 14.1-.3, statutory notes and comments
(1976).
787. W. PRossER, supra note 675, at 123.
788. Id.
789. Earnhardt, Peaceful Padlocking in a Perfect World: Commentary and Rebuttal,
13 N.C. CENT. L. J. 195, 203-06 (1982). This commentator presents a number of hypothetical
situations in which he attempts to demonstrate problems with allowing "peaceful" self-help
eviction. In defending a recently enacted ban on self-help eviction in North Carolina, the
author demonstrates that a "lockout attempt, whether done face to face or like a thief in the
night when the occupant is away, can be a provocative act." Id. at 206. His central thesis is




lord self-help remedies, the advent of speedy judicial remedies that
are readily available to landlords and incoming tenants arguably
have eliminated the need for most harsh landlord action such as
self-help eviction.790 Thus, although courts and legislators signifi-
cantly have limited the legality of landlord self-help, speedy judi-
cial remedies have filled the void left by this trend and have en-
sured that landlords can protect the property they lease.
Although most commentators support the modern trend in
America toward expansion of tenant self-help, 91 one commentator
has criticized this trend as possessing the potential to reduce the
availability of low income housing.79 2 According to this argument,
repair and deduct statutes, which allow tenants to repair defects in
leased premises and deduct the costs of repair from rent under cer-
tain circumstances, will reduce the net income of landlords.793
Under this theory, rental property in the worst condition would be
least profitable because the cost of repair would be very highY"
Thus, repair and deduct statutes will cause landlords of low in-
come property to lose profits and either abandon these invest-
ments altogether or increase rent. " Consequently, this commenta-
tor concludes that these self-help statutes will lead to a reduction
in the quantity of low cost rental housing.79
This criticism of repair and deduct statutes contains several
analytical flaws. First, several questionable pure market assump-
tions that comprise the foundation of this criticism may not be
valid in today's housing market.7 9 7 Second, available statistical evi-
dence shows that the current repair and deduct legislation has not
led to detectable increases in average rates of rent and that these
statutes have had no adverse effect whatsoever on the quality of
housing available. 7 8 Last, this argument refuses to consider
790. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 14.2 comment a (1976).
791. See supra notes 740-50 and accompanying text.





797. Id. at 986. This argument rests on several assumptions about the housing market,
including the following- that consumers have full knowledge of conditions and rental levels
in all available apartments, that consumers have a wide variety of rental housing alterna-
tives from which to choose, that equal bargaining power exists between landlords and te-
nants, that both landlords and tenants act in what they perceive to be their own best inter-





whether giving tenants these self-help remedies may be advanta-
geous to landlords and society in general. 99 In the absence of a
tenant's entitlement to deduct repair costs or withhold rent for a
landlord's default, landlords in run-down areas sometimes are re-
luctant to repair defects in or improve their property.800 The uni-
versal application of a deduct and repair law, however, could give
landlords the incentive needed to maintain their leased property
and, as a result, help raise property values of rental property and
surrounding neighborhoods.
The right to repair and deduct and other tenant self-help rem-
edies especially should benefit unsophisticated residential tenants
who earn low levels of income. These tenants, who often are igno-
rant of and intimidated by the judicial system, and who usually
cannot afford to pursue formal judicial remedies8 0 1 should enjoy a
greater ability to maintain and repair inexpensively through self-
help the property they lease. More sophisticated and affluent te-
nants, on the other hand, should enjoy access to both inexpensive
self-help and speedy but costly judicial methods of maintaining the
quality of their leased property. State and locally sponsored dis-
pute mediation centers,8 0 2 however, because they provide expedi-
ent, reasonably priced, and creative methods of settling landlord-
tenant disputes,803 offer probably the best method of dispute
resolution.
Thus, the emergence of speedy judicial remedies for landlords
and incoming tenants, the increase in self-help remedies for te-
nants, and the advent of state and locally sponsored dispute medi-
ation centers, overall have benefited society significantly by help-
ing it to avoid the neighborhood violence that frequently
accompanied landlord self-help at common law.804
E. Summary
The time and expense parties incur in resolving disputes in
our judicial system have motivated society to search for more effi-
cient methods of dispute resolution. Thus, society has accepted
799. See R. PowzLL, supra note 620 230[3], at 330-330.1; supra notes 751-67 and
accompanying text.
800. Weitzman, supra note 730, at 989. Landlords fear that if they make these im-
provements they will be unable to retrieve their investment. Id.
801. See supra notes 782-85 and accompanying text.
802. See supra notes 778-85 and accompanying text.
803. See id.
804. See supra notes 604 & 663-90 and accompanying text.
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self-help as one alternative to resolving landlord-tenant disputes
through formal judicial procedures. American courts and legisla-
tures, however, have looked disfavorably upon forms of self-help
that create potentially violent confrontations between landlords
and tenants. Consequently, a majority of jurisdictions have limited
or abolished most forms of landlord self-help. Tenant self-help
remedies, on the other hand, have expanded significantly in most
jurisdictions primarily because most state courts and legislatures
have perceived that these remedies address more compelling
problems than did traditional forms of landlord self-help, and be-
cause these remedies seem less likely to cause neighborhood vio-
lence. Moreover, the overwhelming bargaining power many resi-
dential landlords traditionally have enjoyed over their tenants has
weighed strongly in favor of expanding tenant self-help remedies.
This trend in landlord and tenant self-help, along with the devel-
opment of speedy judicial landlord and incoming tenant remedies
and the emergence of state and locally sponsored dispute media-
tion centers, has helped to relieve society of the neighborhood vio-





Self-help in the area of family law deals primarily with resolv-
ing the unfortunate consequences of marriage dissolution. The
traditional adversarial divorce process is deficient because it dis-
courages cooperation between the parties in drafting the marriage
dissolution agreement. Moreover, court proceedings usually exacer-
bate the emotional conflict between husband and wife. The judi-
cially imposed divorce settlement, therefore, often is incongruous
with the parties' needs, desires, and expectations. Recently, how-
ever, courts and legislatures increasingly have begun to recognize
and enforce nonjudicial alternatives to the traditional adversarial
divorce.
This part of the Special Project concentrates on two self-help
methods that can provide divorcing couples with greater control
over their marriage dissolution, thereby decreasing the trauma and
minimizing the hostility and divisiveness which accompany the
traditional divorce process. Subsection one discusses antenuptial
agreements, which are contractual agreements that couples enter
1984]
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prior to marriage. The agreements provide solutions to the ques-
tions of support and distribution of property upon termination of
the marriage. Subsection two discusses divorce mediation, which is
a self-help alternative that enables couples to avoid the judicial
process entirely. Generally, mediation is a cooperative process
whereby the divorcing parties, with the help of a neutral mediator,
negotiate the terms of their divorce agreement. Couples are using
each of these self-help methods with greater frequency to make the
divorce process easier. This part of the Special Project will attempt
to describe these methods and will evaluate their impact in the
area of family law.
2. Antenuptial Agreements Contingent Upon
Divorce-Traditional Reasoning Versus Current Realizations
An antenuptial agreement contingent upon divorce is a
predrafted contract that regulates the disposition of property and
resolves the questions of support payments upon the divorce of the
parties.80 5 Parties develop antenuptial agreements to plan realisti-
cally for the possibility of a divorce, to limit alimony or property
rights, and to minimize or foreclose litigation."' Antenuptial agree-
ments are similar to the general self-help contractual provisions
that this Special Project previously has discussed80 7 in that they,
too, provide for possible future occurrences.80 8 Courts, however,
traditionally have viewed these contracts as void per se on public
policy grounds.80 9 Several justifications support this conclusion.
805. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. Rav. 141, 159 (1979). Couples make
antenuptial contracts both in contemplation of death and divorce. Typically, an older man
and younger woman who are about to marry enter an antenuptial agreement. Usually each
has been married previously. The agreement limits the rights each will have upon the death
of the other. Id. at 141. See also Comment, Antenuptial Contracts Determining Property
Rights Upon Death or Divorce, 47 UMKC L. Rxv. 31, 44-45 (1978). This section of the
Special Project, however, focuses on antenuptial agreements contingent upon divorce.
806. Casenote, Antenuptial Contracts Governing Alimony or Property Rights Upon
Divorce: Osborne v. Osborne, 24 B.C.L. REv. 469, 478 (1983).
807. See supra notes 396-98 and accompanying text.
808. Parties may modify or revoke antenuptial agreements with their full and free
consent if they do not infringe upon the rights of third persons by such actions. The parties
must express clearly their intent to modify or revoke the antenuptial agreement, and courts
will not accept readily a party's claim of oral rescission. 2 A. INDEY, SEPARATION AORZx-
mrs AND ANTE- NuPTIL CoNTRAcTs, 90-104 to 90-105 (rev. ed. 1983). For a number of
illustrative model antenuptial agreements, including agreements regarding the amendment
or cancellation of antenuptial agreements, see id. at 90-3 to 90-23.
809. See, e.g., Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App. 157, 216 P. 92 (1923); Norris v. Norris,
174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 5 Wis. 2d 146, 92 N.W.2d 356 (1958). See
also 2 A. LINDEY, supra note 808, at 90-33 to 90-34; Clark, supra note 805, at 148; Swisher,
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Typically, courts determined that the agreements promoted and
facilitated separation or divorce.8 10 Some courts emphasized the
state's interest in preventing a spouse from becoming a ward of the
state,81' while others concluded that the contracts commercialized
the marriage relationship.812 Since 1970, courts in an increasing
number of jurisdictions have abandoned this traditional view and
have recognized the validity of antenuptial contracts. 81 Moreover,
some states statutorily have recognized these agreements.8 14 The
primary reason for this trend is that in a society in which divorce
is prevalent,1 5 prospective spouses have a legitimate interest in
planning for such an occurrence.81 6
Divorce Planning in Antenuptial Agreements: Toward a New Objectivity, U. RICH. L.Rv.
175, 177 (1979); Casenotes, supra note 806, at 469; Comments, Antenuptial Contracts Con-
tingent Upon Divorce Are Not Invalid Per Se, 46 Mo. L. Ray. 228, 229 (1981); Note, Ante-
nuptial Contracts to Circumvent Equitable Distribution in New Jersey Under the Revised
Divorce Act, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 283, 292 (1981).
810. See infra notes 817-31 and accompanying text.
811. See infra notes 832-56 and accompanying text.
812. See infra notes 857-63 and accompanying text.
813. Swisher, supra note 809, at 183; Casenote, supra note 806, at 469. E.g., Barnhill v.
Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728
(Colo. 1982); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 47-48, 359 A.2d 719, 720-22
(1976); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Posner v.Posner, 233 So.2d 381,
385 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Scherer v. Scherer, 249
Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982); Volid v. Volid, 6 I11. App. 3d 386, 391-92, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47
(1972); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 683, 576 P.2d 629, 633 (1978); Ferry v. Ferry, 586
S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 45, 505 P.2d 600,
604 (1973); Freeman v. Freeman, 565 P.2d 365, 367 (Okla. 1977); Unander v. Unander, 265
Or. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973); see also Moore, The Enforceability of Premarital
Agreements Contingent Upon Divorce, 10 OuIo N.U.L. Ray. 11, 11-12 (1983).
814. See, e.g., MN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11(1) (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §
236(b)(3) (Consol. 1981-1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255(11) (West 1981). Unfortunately,
most divorce laws only generally provide for distribution upon divorce and rarely specifically
consider antenuptial agreements contingent upon divorce. Note, For Better or For Worse
* . .But Just in Case, Are Antenuptial Agreements Enforceable?, 1982 U. ILL. L.F. 531,
543-44.
815. In 1981 there were 109 divorced persons for every 1000 married people in the
United States. BUREAU or THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. Or CommRcE, P-2 PUB. No. 374, POPULA-
TON PROFME OF THE UNrD STATES 1981 28 (1982). Courts currently grant divorces at the
rate of 1,200,000 per year. Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 1. In 1960, in comparison, 35
divorced people existed for every 1000 married people, and American courts granted ap-
proximately 393,000 divorces that year. BURKAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERcE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TiE UNITED STATES 39 (102d ed. 1981).
816. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 732 n.4 (Colo. 1982) (Noting the
frequency of divorce, the court explained that although divorce property division laws are
flexible, it is not imprudent for parties to remove uncertainty about property disposition in
the event of divorce.); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (Recognizing that
divorce is "a commonplace fact of life," the court noted that it was fair to assume that
prospective spouses might want to agree upon the disposition of their property in the event
of divorce.), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972).
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(a) The Agreements Tend to Encourage Divorce
The primary argument supporting the traditional rule voiding
antenuptial agreements contingent upon divorce is that antenup-
tial contracts induce divorce, thereby contravening the state's in-
terest in preserving marriage. 17 Courts have noted, however, that
little evidence exists to support this conclusion.818 To the contrary,
some courts and legal commentators have rejected the traditional
public policy concern and argue that antenuptial agreements defin-
ing parties' expectations and responsibilities in the event of di-
vorce may promote marital harmony, not divorce. 19 The Arizona
Court of Appeals820 has suggested that allowing a couple to con-
tract between themselves recognizes an equality between husband
and wife that stabilizes the marriage. 21 Further, one justice of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in Fricke v. Fricke822 that even if
an antenuptial agreement encourages one party to seek divorce be-
cause it favors that party, it necessarily would deter the other
spouse from desiring a divorce.823 One commentator, in response to
the argument that these agreements induce divorce, has suggested
that refusing to enforce an antenuptial contract may have the un-
817. See, e.g., Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 475, 477, 121 A.2d 704, 706, 707 (1956)
(court refused to enforce what it termed a "buy out" provision providing that the wife
would receive $5000 rather than alimony by reasoning that the agreement induced separa-
tion); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 604, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964) (court reasoned
that if a contract limiting the husband's liability were enforceable, he could "through abuse
and ill treatment of his wife force her to bring an action for divorce and thereby buy a
divorce for a sum far less than he would otherwise have to pay"); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis.
124, 127-28, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1950) (An antenuptial contract "invites dispute, encour-
ages separation, and incites divorce proceedings."); see also Casenotesupra note 806, at 479;
Comment, supra note 805, at 229-30.
818. See Volid v. Volid, 6 IM. App. 3d 386, 391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1972); Unander v.
Unander, 265 Or. 102, 106, 506 P.2d 719, 720 (1973); Clark, supra note 805, at 149; Moore,
supra note 813, at 13; Comment, supra note 809, at 230. See also Comment, supra note 805,
at 48.
819. Volid v. Volid, 6 IM. App. 3d at 391, 286 N.E.2d at 46 (1972); Clark, supra note
805, at 149; Moore, supra note 813 at 19-20; Zolla & Strick, Prenuptial Agreements and
Freedom of Contract in California, CAL. ST. B.J., Jan. 1981, 27; Comment, Antenuptial
Agreements and Divorce in Georgia: Scherer v. Scherer, 17 GA L. Rv. 231, 239 (1982); Note
supra note 809, at 297; Comment, supra note 809, at 230-31.
820. Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (1975).
821. In Spector, the court noted that men and women have a relatively equal status
under the law, which lessens the need for a protective shield around women. Id. at 137, 531
P.2d at 182. The court explained that because marriage today closely resembles a partner-
ship, the court should not deprive spouses of their right to contractually divide their prop-
erty in the event of divorce. Id.
822. 257 Wis. 124, 129, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1950) (Brown, J., dissenting).
823. Id. at 130, 42 N.W.2d at 503. See also Comment, supra note 819, at 234 n.19.
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desired consequence of actually deterring some people from mar-
rying.2' This commentator, citing a recent census which states
that 1,589,000 unmarried couples live together in the United
States,s 5 suggested that a significant percentage of these couples
avoid marriage because of the potential financial consequences of
divorce. e2
Proponents of antenuptial contracts also note that society has
altered its views toward marriage and that courts should recognize
this change when construing antenuptial agreements. 827 Most state
legislatures also have recognized that society does not benefit from
preserving a broken marriage.828 Therefore, these states have
adopted no-fault divorce provisions.8 29 The trend toward facilitat-
ing divorce leaves little reason to oppose antenuptial agree-
ments,8 0 because such agreements hardly can be more conclusive
to this activity than the rather minimal grounds for divorce that
824. Moore, supra note 813, at 13. Justice Brown in his dissent in Fricke noted that
"[p]ublic policy does not require that an elderly woman desiring marriage must remain sin-
gle if she cannot find a man who is willing to leave everything to chance and put his prop-
erty at the disposal of the court, if someday a court thinks it proper to grant a divorce." 257
Wis. at 132, 42 N.W.2d at 504; Moore, supra note 813, at 13 n.16.
825. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
MARITAL STATUS ANDa LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 5 (1982).
826. Moore, supra note 813, at 13. See also Casenote,
supra note 806, at 478 ("[I]n at least some instances, but for the antenuptial contract there
would be no marriage.").
827. Marriage is not the inviolate, enduring relationship it once was, because an in-
creasing number of marriages now end in divorce. See supra note 815. See also Zolla &
Strick, supra note 819, at 26.
828. See Clark, supra note 805, at 149; Moore supra note 813, at 13-14; Swisher, supra
note 809, at 184; Zolla & Strick, supra note 819, at 26-27; Comment, supra note 809, at 230.
See also Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (recognizing that the sanctity of
marriage concept has eroded greatly in the last several decades), rev'd on other grounds, 257
So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 105, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973)
(recognizing the state's policy that a marriage between spouses who cannot reconcile their
differences is not worth preserving).
829. All but two states have enacted some form of no-fault divorce legislation. See
Moore, supra note 813, at 13 n.19. When an Illinois no-fault measure becomes effective on
July 1, 1984, South Dakota will be the only state without a no-fault provision. Gest, Divorce:
How the Game is Played Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1983, at 39. Under the
no-fault statutory ground for divorce, fault on the part of either spouse is not necessary.
Rather, the court can grant the divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences or upon
a showing by either party that the marriage is irretrievably broken. See Moore, supra note
813, at 13.
830. Moore, supra note 813, at 14. Clark, supra note 805, at 149; Comment, supra
note 809, at 230. See also Zolla & Strick, supra note 819, at 26 (noting that the Posner
decision recognized that modem notions of divorce had changed, leaving the traditional rule
without a purpose).
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states with no-fault provisions require.1sl
(b) The Agreements Interfere with the Spousal Duty of Support
A second policy argument supporting the traditional approach
that disfavors antenuptial agreements is that they interfere with
the husband's duty to support his wife.83 2 Critics maintain that en-
forcing antenuptial agreements increases the number of divorced
women who depend upon the state for support, thereby increasing
the state's financial burden.833 Critics contend that this marital ob-
ligation is so important to the public weal that the state should not
place it within the parties' private contractual control.83
Admittedly, the state may have an interest in reducing the
number of "wards of the state." Courts, however, should not void
all antenuptial agreements on this ground, because the "ward of
the state" rationale is open to criticism on several grounds. First,
most wives do not depend upon their husbands for support,3 a
majority of married women now work outside the home 83  and
women now comprise more than half of all college students.837
Courts, therefore, should not presume that divorced women will be
dependent financially upon the state. 8  The Illinois Court of Ap-
peals noted in Volid v. Volid ss9 that many married women cur-
831. Clark, supra note 805, at 149.
832. Traditionally, courts have recognized the duty of a husband to support his wife.
See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 29, Ariz. 538, 544, 243 P. 402, 404 (1926) (husband has an
unmodifiable duty to support his wife); Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1970)
(antenuptial contract relieving husband of duty to pay alimony is contrary to the public
interest). See also Notes, supra note 814, at 537; Comment, supra note 809, at 231-32.
833. See Moore, supra note 813, at 15; Comment, supra note 809, at 232; Comment,
supra note 805, at 47.
834. See Swisher, supra note 809, at 189. Courts also have emphasized the public in-
terest in supporting this marital obligation. In In re Marriage of Newman, 44 Colo. App. 37,
-, 616 P.2d 982, 984 (1980), the court specifically stated that the public interest in en-
forcing the husband's legal obligation to support his wife outweighs the desires of the par-
ties to agree contractually to their obligations in the event of divorce. Id. The Oregon Su-
preme Court noted in Reiling v. Reiling, 256 Or. 448, 450, 474 P.2d 327, 328 (1970),
overruled, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973), that the "state has a paramount interest in the
adequate support of its citizens, and, therefore, the husband's duty of support, either before
or after divorce, should not be left to private controL" Id.
835. See Note, supra note 814, at 539-40.
836. See H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 726 (3d ed. 1980);
Moore, supra note 813, at 16.
837. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CommERcE, STATISTICAL ABsTEACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 159 (101st ed. 1980).
838. See Moore, supra note 813, at 16. See also Note, supra note 814, at 540; Com-
ment, supra note 805, at 49; Comment, supra note 819, at 240.
839. 6 IM. App. 3d 386, 28 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
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rently develop career skills and successfully enter the business
world. In addition, the court stated that if a woman has the requi-
site training, is healthy, and can match her skills with the needs of
the market, then alimony is not necessary.so Furthermore, in Hol-
liday v. Holliday"1 a Louisiana Supreme Court justice noted that
antenuptial agreements usually provide for the wife to maintain
the same control over her property as she had before the marriage.
The court reasoned that women today are capable of financial in-
dependence and need not be wholly dependent on either their hus-
bands or the state. 42
Second, the state's interest in preventing a spouse from be-
coming a ward of the state is no greater in a divorce action than in
a situation in which one spouse predeceases the other,84 3 and many
jurisdictions enforce antenuptial agreements contingent upon
death.8 44 The Nevada Supreme Court specifically noted in Buett-
ner v. Buettner,"5 that a different rationale should not apply if the
parties agree on the amount of support due the wife in the event of
divorce e.84  Allowance of only judicial determinations of the
financial rights of a divorced spouse does not comport with al-
lowing parties to provide contractually for a widowed spouse.
Moreover, commentators urge that legislatures and courts should
be consistent when enacting and construing laws that deal with
similar matters.4 8
Third, antenuptial contracts which do not provide adequate
support to an economically dependent spouse probably achieve
840. Id. at 391, 286 N.E.2d at 46-47; see also Moore, supra note 813, at 16; Note,
supra note 814, at 540-41; Comment, supra note 805, at 49.
841. 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978) (Calogero, J., dissenting).
842. Id. at 621-22 (Calogero, J., dissenting). In Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506
P.2d 719 (1973), the Oregon Supreme Court held that courts should enforce antenuptial
contracts unless this enforcement deprives a spouse of support that he or she cannot secure
alone. The court, therefore, formulated an approach that recognizes the rights of parties to
contract freely, while preserving the state's right to invalidate the contract when necessary
to ensure adequate financial support for its citizens. Id. at 107-08, 506 P.2d at 721-22. See
also Comment, supra note 805, at 49.
843. See Moore, supra note 813, at 15. See also Comment, supra note 805, at 50.
844. See Moore, supra note 813, at 12, 15; Comment, supra note 805, at 50; see also
Note, supra note 809, at 297.
845. 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973).
846. Id. at 44, 505 P.2d at 603; Moore, supra note 813, at 19.
847. See Note, supra note 809, at 297-98.
848. Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 397, 411 (1977). One commentator has noted that since contracts promote stability in
other areas, no reason exists to presume that they promote discord in marriage. See Com-
ment, supra note 805, at 47.
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that end because of material nondisclosure, fraud, or duress and,
therefore, courts should not enforce them.s 9 Courts generally re-
quire that antenuptial agreements make fair and reasonable provi-
sion for the spouse. 50 Absent such a provision, courts demand that
one spouse provide full and frank disclosure of his financial worth
to the other spouse, or that the other spouse possess adequate
knowledge independent of disclosure.851 In Buettner,852 for exam-
ple, the court enforced an antenuptial agreement but warned that
it would not enforce any such contract that was unconscionable, or
which one of the parties obtained through fraud, duress, or
misrepresentation.8 58
Last, one commentator has stated that recent legislative ac-
tions have eviscerated the argument that courts should invalidate
these agreements because they infringe upon the spousal duty of
support.8" The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("Uniform
Act") expressly seeks to minimize the requirement of spousal sup-
port.855 Several legislatures have adopted the Uniform Act or a
substantially similar law.8 56
849. Moore, supra note 813, at 15. If an antenuptial agreement does not provide ade-
quate support to an economically dependent spouse, those courts that recognize these agree-
ments probably would deem it unconscionable or violative of the reasonable support stan-
dard and refuse to enforce the contract. See Comment, supra note 809, at 232.
850. See, e.g., Eule v. Eule, 24 M. App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974) (noting that the
trend is to uphold antenuptial agreements if they are fair and reasonable); see also Parniaw-
ski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Belcher v. Belcher, 307 So. 2d
918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
851. 2 A. LiND.Y, supra note 808, at 90-52.
852. 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973).
853. Id. at 45, 505 P.2d at 604; Moore, supra note 813, at 16.
See also Clark, supra note 805, at 145. To allow for changes in the parties' circumstances
subsequent to the execution of an antenuptial contract, some courts impose the additional
requirement that the agreement be "just and fair" at the time of the divorce. These courts
refuse to enforce antenuptial agreements if the circumstances of the parties at the time of
the dissolution differ so significantly from their circumstances at the time of the marriage
that enforcement of the contract would be unjust. See e.g., McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn.
482, 489, 436 A.2d 8, 12 (1980); Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, , 292 S.E. 2d 662, 666
(1982).
854. Note, supra note 814, at 539.
855. The draftsmen of the proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act urged that
legislatures abolish alimony except in certain circumstances. Note, supra note 814, at 539
n.49. According to the draftsmen, a court should have discretion to award alimony only
when the spouses have no unemancipated children, when the wife's age or health forecloses
the likelihood that she will be able to remarry or support herself, or when the property
available for distribution to the wife does not reflect her contributions to the marriage. Id.
Under any other circumstances, the draftsmen felt that the property settlement should pro-
vide sufficiently for the wife's economic welfare. Id. See R. Lzvy, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIvoRcE LEGISLATION: A PRELnMnARY ANALysis (1969).
856. Note, supra note 814, at 539. In practice, courts award alimony payments to only
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(c) The Agreements Commercialize Marriage Relationships
A third argument against enforcing antenuptial agreements
contingent upon divorce is that the contracts commercialize mar-
riage relationships and denigrate the status of marriage in our soci-
ety.5 7 For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated
that antenuptial agreements reduce the marital relationship to a
"'barter and sale'."858 Moreover, proponents of antenuptial agree-
ments argue that courts already have recognized the utility of con-
tracts in the marriage relationships" by generally enforcing ante-
nuptial agreements that settle property rights upon death. ' 0
Similarly, courts have recognized separation agreements that par-
ties construct in contemplation of divorce which settle the parties'
property rights.861 Proponents of antenuptial agreements also have
noted that a major aim of no-fault divorce statutes is to make the
termination of marriages more amicable.16 Therefore, any legal de-
vice, albeit contractual, that contributes to a peaceful, nonlitigious




An increasing number of courts and legislatures have reevalu-
ated the traditional arguments against antenuptial agreements
contingent upon divorce and have concluded that the contracts are
not void per se.8" The decisions of these courts recognize that in a
14% of all divorced women. BUREAU OF Tm CENSUS, U.S. Dm"T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS SpEciAL STUDY SEwms, PUB. No. 112, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY:
1978, at 1 (1980), cited in Moore, supra note 813, at 16 n.38.
857. Casenote, supra note 806, at 479; Comment, supra note 809, at 231; Comment,
supra note 805, at 45. See, e.g., Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App. 157, 167, 216 P. 92, 96
(1923) (antenuptial agreements are a menance to the marriage relation); Fricke v. Fricke,
257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1950) (The contracts treat marriage relationships
with as little dignity as courts accord commercial relationships.). See also Swisher, supra
note 809, at 189-90.
858. Sprinkle v. Ponder, 233 N.C. 312, 317, 64 S.E.2d 171, 175 (1951).
859. Comment, supra note 805, at 47-48.
860. Id. See supra notes 844-48 and accompanying text.
861. 2 A. LNDEY, supra note 808, at 31-18; Comment, supra note 805, at 48. Propo-
nents of antenuptial contracts also have noted that injecting contractual principles into the
marriage does not destroy its dignity and sacredness. Marriage itself if a contract, and
surely such terminology does not erode the dignity of the institution. Id. at 47.
862. Moore, supra note 816, at 14-15.
863. Id. at 15. See Clark, supra note 805, at 149 (Antenuptial contracts "will reduce
the hostility and destructiveness of a divorce if one should occur.").
864. Zolla & Strick, supra note 819, at 26. See also Note, supra note 814, at 562;
Casenote, supra note 806, at 503.
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society that readily accepts divorce, couples have a significant in-
terest in planning for the financial consequences of such an occur-
rence.86 5 Jurisdictions that continue to void antenuptial agree-
ments governing property or alimony rights in the event of divorce
should recognize that, in view of the social changes in the past two
decades, these agreements have a legitimate and logical role in the
marriage relationship. These jurisdictions instead insist on disre-
garding the needs and desires of prospective spouses and rely on
traditional ideals that no longer apply to today's society.8 '6
B. Divorce Mediation
Divorce mediation is a relatively new practice by which mar-
ried couples resolve their disputes and negotiate the terms of their
marriage dissolution while working with a mediator.6 Although
some states have enacted statutes that govern mediation,868 the
majority of divorce mediation is voluntary for both parties. Concil-
iation courts, mediation organizations, or individuals working sin-
gly or in teams most often provide this service,86 9 and many
mediators have behavioral science training or specialized training
in mediation.
70
The goals of mediation are threefold: (1) to create an equita-
ble, legally sound, and mutually acceptable divorce agreement; (2)
to avoid the expense and trauma that accompany litigation; and
(3) to minimize hostility and postdissolution controversy.87 1 Al-
865. Casenote, supra note 806, at 503.
866. Moore, supra note 813, at 20.
867. See Bahr, Mediation is the Answer, FAm. Anvoc., Spring 1981, at 32, 32-33; Sil-
berman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107, 107
(1982); Note, Family Law-Attorney Mediation of Marital Disputes and Conflict of Inter-
est Considerations, 60 N.C.L. REv. 171, 171 (1981).
868. See Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29, 32 (1982). For example,
California law provides for mandatory mediation of child custody issues before adversary
proceedings. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1984). Other states have established judi-
cially administered mediation services without making mediation mandatory. See, e.g.,
MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 552.513 (West Supp. 1983).
869. Id. at 32-33.
870. Note, supra note 867, at 174. American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
mediators undergo approximately 35 hours of training with the AAA. Mediators for the Dis-
pute Settlement Center in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, originally received 40 hours of train-
ing from the Community Relations Service of the United States Department of Justice.
Currently, the Dispute Settlement Center conducts its own weekend training sessions. Id. at
174 n.26.
871. See Bahr, supra note 867, at 32. See also Gold, Mediation in the Dissolution of
Marriage, ARB. J., Sept. 1981, at 9, 11; Pearson, Child Custody: Why Not Let the Parents
Decide?, 20 JUnoDs J., Winter 1980, at 4, 5 ("Mediation is a cooperative dispute resolution
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though similar to arbitration,7 mediation is simply an aid to ne-
gotiation whereby the mediator, while remaining neutral, actively
discusses the issues and makes suggestions for the divorce agree-
ment873 The third-party mediator, however, unlike the arbitrator,
has no authority to impose a settlement on the parties. 74
Although a lawyer may involve himself directly in the process
as a mediator or as a part of a mediating team,87 5 a layman media-
tor usually monitors the negotiations. 7 6 Nevertheless, the lawyer
may play an important role in this self-help process, even if he
does not participate directly on the mediating team, by serving as
an impartial advisor to both parties, as a legal advisor to one party,
or as a member of an interdisciplinary team. 77 The attorney also
may become involved in the mediation process by suggesting medi-
ation to a couple seeking a divorce or by helping the parties select
a third-party mediator. The lawyer, however, must guard against
potential ethical problems that may arise during mediation. Sec-
tion VII of this Special Project will discuss more fully the attor-
ney's role in the mediation process and its attendant conflicts. 878
1. Criticisms of the Traditional Adversarial Divorce
The traditional adversarial legal system is an inappropriate
means of terminating many marriages. Critics maintain that the
adversarial process exacerbates conflicts, increases trauma, and en-
process in which a neutral third party tries to keep contesting parties talking until they
reach a settlement of their differences."); Silberman, supra note 867, at 107 ("[Mlediation
contemplates a neutral third party who will guide the parties towards a resolution of their
marital disputes, outside of, or preliminary to litigation.").
872. See discussion of mandatory arbitration clauses supra at note 479 and accompa-
nying text.
873. See Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and Divorce Agree-
ments, 15 WAKE FOREST L. Rzv. 467, 470 (1979).
874. McEwen & Mainan, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assess-
ment, 33 ME. L. Rzy. 237, 238 (1981); Riskin, supra note 868, at 29 (1982); Silberman, supra
note 867, at 107-08.
875. Riskin, supra note 868, at 36-37; see also Note,
supra note 867, at 174-75.
876. Riskin, supra note 868, at 36-37; Note, supra note 867,
at 173.
877. Riskin, supra note 868, at 38-39. The most obvious ethical problem arises in cases
in which the lawyer attempts to act as an impartial advisor to both parties. A lawyer must
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of his client; failure to do so is a viola-
tion of the Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmInL-
rry Canon 5 (1981); see also Riskin, supra note 868, at 38. If one lawyer advises both
couples, therefore, he risks sanction by the appropriate bar association.
878. See infra notes 922-1122 and accompanying text.
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courages divisiveness.879 Litigation also may create previously non-
existent conflicts between the parties.88 0 Further, critics contend
that most attorneys who work in the family dispute context func-
tion as advocates whose sole purpose is to protect their clients' in-
terests." l Attorneys often direct their client to seek specific legal
goals rather than to assess the total family situation or individual
responsibilities. 82 This approach by the attorney minimizes the
possibility of a continuing, cooperative, postdissolution relation-
ship between the parties.888
The traditional adversarial procedure often leaves the parties
dissatisfied with the final settlement. During divorce negotiations
the attorney may replace his client's views with his own rather
than merely advising his client." As a result, the parties may feel
little duty to adhere to the divorce decree. 885 The parties, there-
fore, may ignore the agreement or return to court to contest it,
thereby contributing to court congestion.8 6 Further, many di-
vorced parents refuse to comply with child visitation and support
agreements. A 1971 study of 105 divorced families found that
within two years after the divorces occurred, the courts had inter-
vened in eighty-three percent of the cases.
887
879. See Bahr, supra note 867, at 32. The adversarial system often fails to meet the
needs of a family who desires a continuing relationship after the divorce. Gold, supra note
871, at 9. This process "usually increases trauma and escalates conflict." Herrman, McKenry
& Weber, Mediation and Arbitration Applied to Family Conflict Resolution: The Divorce
Settlement, ARB. J., Mar. 1979, at 17, 18. Even parties who seek a reasonable and fair settle-
ment find that the adversarial process alters their noble intentions. Meroney, supra note
873, at 469; see also Pearson, supra note 871, at 6; Pickrell & Bendheim, Family Disputes
Mediation-A New Service for Lawyers and Their Clients, 15 Amz B.J. 33 (Oct. 1979);
Steinberg, The Therapeutic Potential of the Divorce Process, 62 A.B.A. J. 617 (1976).
880. Note, supra note 867, at 171.
881. Herrman, McKenry & Weber, supra note 879, at 18. By the time a couple seeks
legal aid, they are often bitter and vindictive. An attorney under these circumstances, there-
fore, easily may resort to pure advocacy and pursue the same goals that he would pursue in
a commercial breach of contract case-to obtain the largest settlement possible for the wife,
or to reduce the award as much as possible if he represents the husband. This limited view
of the lawyer's role in these matters will not benefit even his own client. Meroney, supra
note 873, at 469-70 n.16 (citing Pilpel & Zavin, Separation Agreements: Their Function and
Future, 18 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 33, 36 (1953)). Some critics also claim that attorneys
lack the necessary training to deal with the psychological and interpersonal aspects of a
divorce. Herrman, supra note 879, at 18; Pearson, supra note 871, at 6.
882. Herrman, McKenry & Weber, supra note 879, at 18.
883. Id.
884. Steinberg, supra note 879, at 619.
885. Jenkins, Divorce California Style, STUDENT LAw., Jan. 1981, at 31, 31; Pearson,
supra note 871, at 6.
886. Jenkins, supra note 885, at 31.
887. Pearson, supra note 871, at 6 (citing Cline & Westman, The Impact of Divorce in
974
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Divorce litigation also often has a devastating effect on chil-
dren of the marriage, as s especially when friction between the par-
ents prolongs the conflict or when the children become the focus of
the divorce dispute.889 Moreover, courts are in-equipped to deter-
mine the best interest of the child.890 Judges complain that they
must make difficult character evaluations when deciding which
parent will receive custody of the child.89 1 One commentator has
noted that even experienced judges often sacrifice important fam-
fly values in the interests of the "structural imperatives of the judi-
cial system. 8 92 These writers argue that judges are less capable of
determining the best interests of the child than are the parents,
because in most cases the parents will have more knowledge of the
child's needs and desires.s93 These scholars also assert that private
dissolution of marriages is an attractive alternative because it
would minimize the parents' feelings of embarrassment and inade-
quacy and would reduce the adverse effects of the conflict on the
child.94 Finally, they maintain that quick resolution of domestic
disputes is the optimal result.8 95 Without timely and efficient con-
clusions, uncertainty and delay in the proceedings can deny chil-
dren the stability that they need as soon as practicable. 9s
the Family, 2 CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & HumAN DEV. 78-83 (1971)).
888. Gold, supra note 871, at 11. Continued parental conflict is the most damaging
aspect of divorce for children. This conflict divides their loyalties and can make the neces-
sary transition to life with just one parent even more difficult. Id.; see also Pearson, supra
note 871, at 6; Zumeta, Mediation as an Alternative to Litigation in Divorce, 62 MICH. B.J.
434, 434 (1983).
889. Pearson, supra note 871, at 6.
890. Spencer & Zammit, Mediation-Arbitratin: A Proposal for Private Resolution of
Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DuKE L.J. 911, 918.
891. Pearson, supra note 871, at 6. Courts have difficulty determining relevant ele-
ments to weigh when making custody decisions and have relied on a variety of presump-
tions. See Spencer & Zammit, supra note 890, at 916-17. The judicial standards in this area
are vague and judges often arbitrarily impose their own values. See Winks, Divorce Media-
tion: A Nonadversary Procedure For the No-Fault Divorce, 19 J. FAM. L. 615, 652 (1980-
1981). For a critical discussion of the discretionary powers of the judge in child custody
cases, see Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, 39 LAw & CowN--p. PRons. 226, 268-70 (1975). See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 175 Neb.
108, 111-12, 120 N.W.2d 585, 589 (1963) (court found wife guilty of adultery and, therefore,
declared her an unfit custodian as a matter of law); Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 254
Iowa 1391, 1399, 121 N.W.2d 216, 220 (1963) (except in exceptional circumstances, the
mother is the best person to care for children of tender years).
892. Spencer & Zanmit, supra note 890, at 939.
893. Id. at 918.
894. Id. at 919.
895. Id.
896. Id. The child's-sense-of-time guideline would require decisionmakers to act with
"all deliberate speed" to maximize each child's opportunity either to restore stability to an
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Commentators have expressed additional criticisms of the
traditional adversary divorce. First, judges may review the cases
only cursorily because of crowded court dockets and the resulting
pressure to consider cases quickly. 97 Second, judges have the
power to affect substantially the course of couples' lives by their
subjective evaluation of those couples during their brief encounter
with the court.8 98 Last, judges' decisions may become biased if the
judges are unable to understand and appreciate parties who have
life styles different from their own."9'
2. Advantages of Divorce Mediation
Divorce mediation, in addition to reducing the flood of divorce
litigation,900 offers distinct advantages to the participating parties.
These advantages include a reduction in the hostilities that de-
velop in the divorce context, decreased likelihood that parties will
breach their agreements, an improvement in the adverse effects
which children endure, and a lessening of time and economic com-
mitments to achieve the desired result.
Mediation reduces the hostility that traditional adversarial di-
vorce often creates.90 1 Because of its procedural flexibility, media-
tion enables the parties to consider a broader range of issues relat-
ing to their divorce, including concerns that may prove to be more
important to the parties than the problems which they raised in
their complaint. 90 2 The mediation process more effectively edu-
existing relationship or to facilitate to "replace" old ones. Procedural and substantive deci-
sions should never exceed the time that the child-to-be-placed can endure loss and uncer-
tainty. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND TrE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 42
(1973).
897. Meroney, supra note 873, at 469.
898. Id.
899. Id. One commentator has noted the presence of "patronizing paternalism toward
the marrying and divorcing population which often leads to punitive authoritarianism
against those who do not share middle class values." Levy, Introduction, A Symposium on
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L. REv. 531, 532 (1973).
900. See supra note 815.
901. Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FA,. L.Q. 219, 219 (1982); Mer-
oney, supra note 873, at 486; Silberman, supra note 867, at 108; Note, supra note 867, at
172.
902. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 874, at 239. Professor Riskin has determined
that mediation is "potentially more hospitable to unique solutions that take more fully into
account nonmaterial interests of the disputants." He also has noted that the source of these
advantages is that "mediation is less hemmed-in by rules of procedure or substantive law




cates each party about the other's needs903 and allows them to set-
tle their differences amicably and to continue their relationship on
terms more favorable than the adversary process offers.04 Media-
tion also avoids conflict because the process requires each party to
state his or her demands in the presence of the other party and the
neutral mediator rather than through his or her attorney. This pro-
cedure avoids the problems that can arise when a party deals only
with his attorney and, therefore, is more likely to take an extreme
or unreasonable position.905 Finally, if the parties do not reach a
settlement through mediation, they may initiate arbitration or liti-
gation with a greater understanding of the other party's position,
which should minimize their hostility.
Parties who voluntarily and responsibly negotiate their own
divorce settlement are more likely to remain satisfied with and
comply with its terms than parties who choose to litigate their dis-
pute. Therefore, these parties are less likely to initiate costly
postdissolution litigation concerning the agreement.906 Mediated
agreements better serve the parties' interests, because the parties
are more aware of their particular needs than the courts.07 A
study of the first 200 cases which the Los Angeles County concilia-
tion court mediated found that only fourteen percent of these
cases returned to court.908 Mediated agreements, therefore, appear
to provide stability in postdissolution relationships.
Mediated custody agreements also offer substantial advan-
tages over court-imposed arrangements. Parents generally have
more knowledge than judges about their own capabilities and the
needs and interests of their particular family.909 Moreover, media-
tion shields children from the psychologically damaging strain of
903. Riskin, supra note 868, at 34.
904. McEwin & Maiman, supra note 874, at 239. One commentator has noted that
mediation "clears the air so people can cooperate more afterward." Jenkins, supra note 885,
at 32. Another commentator has determined that individuals taking part in mediation gen-
erally report a better relationship with their former spouse. See Zumeta, supra note 888, at
435.
905. Crouch, supra note 901, at 220.
906. Note, supra note 867, at 172. Parties are more likely to comply with the agree-
ment because they developed it by exploring fully all options and alternatives. Therefore,
they have answered all their questions and feel a sense of completion. See Gold, supra note
871, at 13. See also Riskin, supra note 868, at 33; Zumeta, supra note 888, at 435.
907. See Jenkins, supra note 885, at 32; Zumeta, supra note 888, at 435.
908. Jenkins, supra note 885, at 32.
909. Winks, supra note 891, at 650; Note, supra note 867, at 172; Spencer & Zammit,
supra note 890, at 918.
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the adversarial procedure.91 Mediation also provides a more suita-
ble framework for informal alteration of the custody arrangement
as the child grows older, or the parents remarry, move, or change
careers.9 1  Finally, one commentator has noted that "[tlo the ex-
tent that mediation leads to greater parental adjustment, reduces
levels of interparental conflict, and increases time that parents can
devote to their children, children become better adjusted."
9 12
Mediation also provides the parties with a more expeditious1 s
and less expensive914 method of divorce. Generally, parties who
mediate their disputes pay less than parties who choose to litigate
their settlement, even though those mediating must pay the costs
of mediation and legal representation. 915 Divorce mediation also
can provide a savings of time and money to the courts, thereby
prompting the important public interest in relieving crowded court
dockets.916
910. Note, supra note 867, at 172. See supra notes 888-89 and accompanying text. The
number of children in divorce-affected households is increasing. In 1956 361,000 children's
parents divorced. Approximately one million children annually experience their parent's di-
vorce. Simons, The Invisible Scars of Children of Divorce, 7 BArRIsTE 14, 15 (1980), cited
in Note, supra note 867, at 172 n.14.
911. Winks, supra note 891, at 651.
912. Pearson, supra note 871, at 6. Mediation agreements result in more joint custody
agreements as opposed to the more conventional mother-only awards. Also, mediation
agreements lead to a higher rate of visitation by the noncustodial parent. Id. at 7; Zumeta,
supra note 888, at 435, 440.
913. Mediation usually proceeds more rapidly than litigation. Gaughan, Taking a
Fresh Look at Divorce Mediation, TRAL, Apr. 1981, at 39, 41; see also Riskin, supra note
868, at 33, 34; Silberman, supra note 867, at 108. Divorce dissolution is more expeditious
because parties avoid backlogged court calendars. Also, in Colorado, judges require an aver-
age of 9.8 hours to resolve a contested custody case. In contrast, mediators devote an aver-
age of 5.4 hours to each case Pearson, supra note 871, at 10.
914. Bahr, supra note 867, at 34-35; Crouch, supra note 901, at 220; Jenkins, supra
note 885, at 32; Pearson, supra note 871, at 10;
Riskin, supra note 868, at 33-34; Silberman, supra note 867, at 108; Winks, supra note 891,
-at 648; Zumeta, supra note 888, at 436; Note, supra note 867, at 172.
915. Brigham Young University Professor Stephen Bahr conducted a study and deter-
mined that parties who mediate spend approximately $150 less than parties who litigate.
Bahr, supra note 867, at 34. See also Zumeta, supra note 888, at 436.
916. Pearson, supra note 871, at 10. A 1978 study of the Los Angeles Family Concilia-
tion Court found that it had resolved 747 cases at a projected net savings to the county of
$175,044. Id. See also Note, supra note 867, at 173. Courts should welcome the mediation
alternative because it will relieve their dockets of cases that arguably belong elsewhere. Mer-
oney, supra note 873, at 485; see also Note, supra note 867, at 173. In California the prob-
lem of court delay is particularly apparent. The state legislature recently enacted a law
requiring "mandatory mediation" of child custody issues in divorce cases prior to an adver-
sary hearing. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1984); see also Riskin, supra note 868, at
32; Zumeta, supra note 888, at 434.
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3. Summary
Divorce mediation offers substantial benefits to divorce-seek-
ing couples and avoids the traditional adversarial process. Media-
tion, however, will not always be an appropriate method of dissolv-
ing a marriage, 1 "7 because the process requires the mutual trust of
the parties.918 Moreover, couples must have the motivation and the
emotional and intellectual abilities to be capable of ignoring their
differences long enough to cooperate and develop equitable divorce
settlements.919 Nevertheless, for parties willing to ignore fault and
emphasize fairness and mutual trust, divorce mediation is a self-
help alternative that can benefit the entire family and minimize
the hostility often present in the traditional divorce process.92 0 To
maximize the benefits of mediation, however, attorneys must be-
come more involved in the process.92
VII. THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. Alternatives to Litigation: The Attorney's Role and the Legal
Profession's Reaction
1. Introduction
The concept of legal self-help encompasses all methods of
resolving legal disputes that do not entail the costly retention of a
lawyer or the lengthy litigation process. To conclude that all alter-
natives to litigation require an absolute separation from the legal
profession, however, is mistaken. Individuals may choose one of
several different methods of resolving legal conflicts which do not
involve courtroom procedures but that actively involve lawyers in
the process. One such method is mediation.92  Because of its
917. Gold, supra note 871, at 13; Meroney, supra note 873, at 486; Pearsonrsupra note
871, at 10; Riskin, supra note 868, at 33; Winks, supra note 891, at 643.
918. The most important element for successful mediation is trust, because without
trust the agreement cannot stand. Meroney, supra note 873, at 486; Winks, supra note 891,
at 644.
919. Meroney, supra note 873, at 486. See Gold,
supra note 871, at 13.
920. Meroney, supra note 873, at 486.
921. Riskin, supra note 868, at 35, 41.
922. This section of the Special Project concentrates on the mediation process because
courts and bar associations have addressed problems that pertain to the individual lawyer's
role and the legal community's reaction to mediation more than they have explored the
benefits and shortcomings of other litigation alternatives in which lawyers participate. See,
e.g., Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 436 N.E.2d 476, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1982); N.Y.C.B.A.
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 (1982); Colo. B.A. Ethics Comm., Formal
Op. 47 (1972), reprinted in 1 COLo. LAW. 59 (1972).
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unique combination of involving lawyers in the process yet resolv-
ing legal disputes outside of the judicial arena, mediation offers
lawyers the opportunity to promote and upgrade the vital, neces-
sary alternatives to the slow, expensive, and frustrating litigation
process.
In the past, mediation was a relatively unpopular form of dis-
pute resolution. Because of escalating legal fees, overcrowded dock-
ets, and emotionally draining courtroom encounters, however, the
public increasingly perceives mediation as a viable alternative to
formal litigation.2 3 The number of dispute resolution centers in
the United States consequently has grown from approximately
three in 1971 to over one hundred and eighty in 1982.24 The legal
community has had a mixed response to the increase in this type
of dispute resolution alternative. While local bar associations do
not oppose the mediation programs openly,925 attorneys utilize the
process infrequently. 2 '
Leaders in the legal community, however, strongly advocate
lawyer support of and participation in the mediation process.2 7 At
a 1982 American Bar Association ("ABA") meeting, Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger recognized the delays, expense, and trauma that
accompany the traditional system of courtroom litigation and
stated that an increase in mediation and arbitration would en-
hance the American justice system.9 28 Justice Burger attributed
the legal community's apprehension of informal dispute resolution
mechanisms both to attorneys' legal education, which emphasizes
litigation rather than mediation, and to their fear of losing busi-
ness.92 9 While the Justice did not suggest that informal dispute
resolution should replace the existing legal system, he did warn
that something must occur to deal with the "'avalanche' of [un-
tried] lawsuits ... .*"9o Noting the advantages of mediation as an
alternative to the traditional courtroom, Burger argued that medi-
923. See Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 29, 31 (1982). Note, Family
Law-Attorney Mediation of Marital Disputes and Conflict of Interest Considerations, 60
N.C.L. Rzv. 171, 171 (1981).
924. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Bane or Boon to Attorneys?, 8 A.B.A. DIsPUTE
RESOLUTION 1, 14 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Bane or Boon].
925. Id.
926. Note, supra note 923, at 173.
927. See Bane or Boon, supra note 924, at 14; Chief Justice Burger Urges Mediation,
8 A.B.A. DispuTE RESOLUTION 1, 16 (1982).
928. Chief Justice Burger Urges Mediation, supra note 927, at 1, 16.
929. Id. at 16.
930. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Burger).
[Vol. 37:845980
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ation soon wauld win the support of the legal profession and the
general public because the alternative resolution system offers
qualified experts in specialized legal areas, less stress to the parties
in conflict, and reduced cost to the clients. 31
The ABA also has supported alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms.932 Former ABA President David R. Brink envisions
the American justice system eventually achieving a stage in its de-
velopment in which unrepresented citizens can take their legal
problems "to the most appropriate dispute resolution process rang-
ing from conciliation, mediation, arbitration, factfinding, ombud-
sperson to small claims court, a private lawyer, a traditional court
or whichever of a number of bar-sponsored private or public agen-
cies can resolve that person's problem."933 Mr. Brink characterized
attorneys' roles in the legal process as "counselors, problem solv-
ers, and deliverers of prompt, appropriate, and affordable justice"
and encouraged attorneys to contribute to the development of al-
ternative dispute resolution forums.3 An ABA panel recom-
mended that attorneys should participate in alternative forms of
dispute resolution and characterized the new development of such
programs as a "boon to attorneys. '9 3 5 Recognizing that such alter-
native mechanisms could "provide attorneys with a new vision of
their role .in problem solving," the panel noted that the "movement
toward alternatives will continue."936 One panel member observed
that lawyers must support this change in the legal system by pro-
moting its development, or the government will react to a "justly
frustrated citizenry" by shaping this imminent legal revolution
with or without the legal profession's support.937 These calls for a
reevaluation of the lawyers' role in dispute resolution are conso-
nant with the ethical duties of the legal profession.93 8 By promot-
ing mediation and other nonjudicial processes, lawyers encourage
the simplification and improvement of the currently overburdened
system. 39 Plainly, the time has come for attorneys to invite alter-
931. Id.
932. The ABA publishes the Dispute Resolution booklet on a quarterly basis. See 8
A.B.A. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1, 1 (1982).




937. Id. (quoting Canadian Bar Ass'n President A. William Cox).
938. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSONAL REsPoNsmErry Canon 8 (1981) ("A Lawyer
Should Assist in Improving the Legal System.").
939. See supra notes 927-28 and accompanying text. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
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native dispute resolution processes and self-help counseling into
their practices.
2. Reasons for Lawyer Participation in Mediation
Regardless of whether lawyers feel compelled ethically to en-
gage in mediation or the legal profession or the government partic-
ipates in it, lawyers still should use mediation in their practices for
several reasons. First, it can improve the legal system. 40 Second,
the public's increasing demand for mediators exceeds the current
supply of nonattorney mediation services.941 Some lawyers view
this increasing need for mediators as a "threat" to potential busi-
ness and thus feel obligated to become involved in the mediation
process to protect their "turf. 9 42 Other attorneys, however, see the
current popularity of mediation as an opportunity to refine and
expand their roles as mediators-a role this group views as a natu-
ral extension of a lawyer's duties. 4s
Third, if attorneys currently would support and practice medi-
ation, then the legal community could formulate its role within the
mediation process at the early stages of alternative dispute resolu-
tion development. Fourth, because of the significant legal conse-
quences that often accompany mediation decisions,9 44 and the
complex legal documents frequently necessary in the mediation
process,945 the mediator should have some type of law background.
Thus an attorney may be an ideal mediator, particularly if he
serves as both mediator and legal advisor. Last, the goal of alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms is to complement and enhance
the current lawyer-operated legal system. 46 If lawyers participate
in mediation, therefore, they will understand better how society
could combine mediation and the court system to achieve optimal
results.
In addition to these specific reasons why lawyers should en-
SiONAL RESPONSIBmITY EC 8-2 (1981) (Lawyers should help improve "legal procedures...
whenever experience indicates a change is needed."). Current problems of litigation should
signal to attorneys that the legal system needs supplementary programs to help resolve pri-
vate disputes.
940. See supra notes 938-39 and accompanying text.
941. Note, supra note 923, at 175.
942. See Riskin, supra note 923, at 52.
943. See Rich, The Role of Lawyers: Beyond Advocacy, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 767, 775.
944. Id.
945. See id.
946. See Chief Justice Burger Urges Mediation, supra note 927, at 1. Callner, Bound-
aries of the Divorce Lawyer's Role, 10 FAM. L.Q. 389, 396 (1977).
[Vol. 37:845982
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gage in and encourage the development of self-help through media-
tion, reasons of fairness to the disputing parties also should coax
attorneys into the mediation process, if not for themselves, then
for the sake of their clients. One of the most unfair aspects of
traditional courtroom litigation is the cost. The tremendous legal
fees that litigants incur often exceed the benefits of having individ-
ual representation.4 Mediation fees can be more reasonable be-
cause the parties split the associated costs. The issue still arises,
however, as to whether individual representation and its concomi-
tant advocacy for one side of a legal controversy is superior to hav-
ing a lawyer mediate between two adverse positions and, therefore,
is worth the additional expense. Ethical Consideration 5-15 of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility9 8 states that "a lawyer
may properly serve multiple clients having potentially differing in-
terests in matters not involving litigation. 9 4 9 Some situations in
which the parties' interests potentially differ could terminate in a
court of law, but this possibility often does not justify the higher
legal fees that such parties must pay for individual representation.
Attorney mediation offers a cheaper and more flexible alternative,
and after mediation begins, if conflicts occur that temporarily halt
the process, then the parties still have reserved the right to employ
additional attorneys if necessary. If no conflicts emerge, then the
parties avoid duplicating legal expenses and incur only the less ex-
pensive mediation fee.9 50 Another unfair by-product of the tradi-
tional litigation process is the animosity that the adversarial na-
ture of the courtroom causes. Mediation alleviates much of this
animosity by bringing the parties together through a mediator
rather than driving them further apart with two unyielding advo-
cates.95 1 Finally, the public often perceives legal representation as
a high-priced, self-perpetuating sham. Mediation offers the legal
community an opportunity to serve the public more effectively at
lower costs, thus fostering a more stable and trusting relationship
between the legal community and the public.952 Mediation does not
solve every problem of the traditional adversarial approach; how-
ever, it does provide a viable alternative to proliferating litigation
947. Note, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
94 HARV. L. R.v. 1244, 1303-04 (1981).
948. See infra note 1003.
949. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmI.ITY EC 5-15 (1981).
950. See note, supra note 947, at 1309-10.





3. Arguments Against Lawyer Participation in Mediation
Even though the leaders of the legal community support medi-
ation and inducements exist to encourage lawyer participation in
the process, in 1981 attorneys accounted for only fifteen percent of
the mediators in this nation.9 ' The legal community is skeptical of
this type of alternative dispute resolution process for several rea-
sons: 1) mediation and traditional legal processes that attorneys
use to solve conflicts are incompatible; 2) mediation impairs attor-
neys' economic position; 3) lawyers cannot address adequately the
emotional aspects inherent in some types of mediation; 4) non-at-
torney mediators in fact are practicing law illegally; and 5) attor-
ney mediators potentially violate legal ethics.
(a) Incompatibility of Mediation and Traditional Dispute
Resolution Practices of Attorneys
Because attorneys often view their clients as disputants in an
adversarial battle that can be resolved only by applying general
principles of law to the facts behind the dispute, 5 their approach
to problem solving suggests incompatability with mediation.5 ' At-
torneys often characterize any disagreement between individuals as
an "all or nothing" situation, not as an opportunity for disputants
to compromise.9 57 Several explanations exist for this adversarial at-
titude. First, the practice of law attracts this "all or nothing" per-
953. " '[N] either the federal nor the state court systems are capable of handling all the
burden placed upon them.'... [T]he appellate case load per judgeship since 1950 has in-
creased 16 times as much as the population increased." Chief Justice Burger Urges Media-
tion, supra note 927, at 1, 1, 16 (quoting Chief Justice Burger); see supra text accompanying
notes 928-31.
954. Note, supra note 923, at 173 n.22.
955. Riskin, supra note 923, at 44.
956. Id. at 43; see infra note 1051 and accompanying text.
957. Riskin, supra note 923, at 44. As some commentators have noted:
When negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock themselves into those posi-
tions. The more you clarify your position and defend it against attack, the more com-
mitted you become to it. The more you try to convince the other side of the impossibil-
ity of changing your opening position, the more difficult it becomes to do so. Your ego
becomes identified with your position .... As more attention is paid to positions, less
attention is devoted to meeting the underlying concerns of the parties.
R. FISHER & W. URY, GmTrING TO YES 5 (1981). Traditional legal education instills in attor-
neys the "hard position" as opposed to the more amicable "soft position." The "hard posi-
tion" embraces the following doctrines: (1) Participants are adversaries, (2) the goal is vic-
tory, (3) entrench yourself in your position, (4) search for the single answer, and (5) insist on
your position. See id at 9; see also infra note 961 and accompanying text.
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sonality because application of the law to the facts often presents
clear-cut, yes-or-no answers to client disputes.5 Second, a client's
preconceived notion that an attorney is a zealous advocate who
pursues only his client's best interests at the expense of any con-
flicting cause frequently reinforces this attitude.95 9 Third, this hard
line attitude yields profitable results in courtroom litigation for
both attorneys and clients.8 0 Because an attorney who behaves ag-
gressively generally dominates one that represents his client in a
more subdued manner,e clients with staunch advocates represent-
ing them often win their suits and, therefore, willingly pay these
attorneys handsomely for the victories. This inherent reward sys-
tem perpetuates attorneys' adversarial roles. Fourth, because law-
yers can rely upon the general principles of law to give either a yes
or no answer to a conflict, they enjoy some degree of proficiency in
predicting outcomes of disputes. 2  Fifth, the adversarial system
also simplifies the role of attorneys by limiting their choices and
decisions. Traditionally, educators have taught advocates that they
"may assert any claim on behalf of a client except one based on
fabricated evidence or one empty of any substance at all. Short of
this extremity, . . . advocate[s] . . .ha[ve] no choices to make."9'8 3
Last, the highly competitive, adversarial law school environment
encourages and cultivates this attitude.98
Unfortunately, in following this one-sided approach attorneys
often fail to recognize the meritorious points of the opposition, be-
come less attuned to maximizing social good, and become skeptical
of mediation.98 5 Attorneys, therefore, doubt the ability of lay
mediators to comprehend and resolve the technical legal problems
which arise in mediation,986 and fear that clients will doubt the ad-
958. See Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and
Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 221, 248 (1974); Riskin, supra note 923, at 47. This adversarial
personality conflicts with mediation, in which the parties pursue a mutually beneficial solu-
tion to a unique situation that usually is not solvable by the application of general principles
of law. Id. at 44.
959. See Caner, supra note 946, at 396; Riskin, supra note 923, at 44, 47; Note, supra
note 923, at 173; infra text accompanying note 1051.
960. Riskin, supra note 923, at 47.
961. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 957, at 8-10. ("[P]ursuing a soft friendly
form of positional bargaining makes you vulnerable to someone who plays a hard game of
positional bargaining. In positional bargaining, a hard game dominates a soft one.").
962. Riskin, supra note 923, at 47.
963. G. HAZARD, ETHics IN TH PRACTICE OF LAW 67 (1978).
964. Riskin, supra note 923, at 48; see Boyer & Cramton, supra note 958, at 261-62;
supra text accompanying note 929.
965. Riskin, supra note 923, at 44.
966. See Rich, supra note 943, at 775 (1980).
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vocacy ability of a lawyer who also acts as a mediator.9 17 Attorneys
also may be uncomfortable with a role that so blatantly conflicts
with the traditional views and training of attorneys. 68 The chang-
ing views of legal education and the subsequent reverberations in
the legal community as law students graduate and become practic-
ing attorneys, however, provide hope that society will develop a
more multi-dimensional approach to legal problems,9 9 and that
self-help modes such as mediation will become compatible with
traditional legal methods of resolving disputes.
(b) Mediation Impairs Attorneys' Present and Future Economic
Status
A second justification for attorneys' aversion to mediation is
that the competition between lawyer and non-lawyer mediators
and the propensity not to litigate mediated cases combine to re-
duce lawyers' total income by lessening their number of clients and
billable hours.97 Many attorneys feel threatened by mediation be-
cause it not only has reduced their present practices immediately,
but it also will continue to diminish their future client base for
several reasons. First, attorneys fear that if mediation is successful,
parties will avoid conflicts subsequent to the mediation process,
thereby reducing the future need for traditional legal services.97 1
Second, if an attorney agrees to serve as a mediator, he can lose
those parties as future clients because ethical considerations may
preclude him from representing either party in subsequent ac-
tions.9 72  Last, attorneys are afraid their support of mediation
might damage their images as aggressive client representatives and
thereby encourage potential clients to employ more dedicated
advocates. 78
Although these economic concerns seem justifiable, the detri-
mental economic effects that mediation actually has on attorneys
are minimal. Although persons who use mediation rather than liti-
gation pay a smaller fee per case,974 incorporating mediation into
law practices does not necessarily yield less overall attorney reve-
967. Riskin, supra note 923, at 42; see supra text accompanying note 959.
968. Note, supra note 923, at 173; see supra text accompanying note 929.
969. See infra note 1122.
970. Riskin, supra note 923, at 48-49; see supra text accompanying note 929.
971. Riskin, supra note 923, at 49.
972. Id. see infra note 1026.
973. See supra text accompanying notes 959-67.
974. See supra text accompanying note 931.
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nue. 5 Because of their excessive workloads, many attorneys must
refuse to represent clients. If mediation requires less attorney time,
therefore, attorneys could allocate the extra hours to other fee-gen-
erating activities . 7 Furthermore, being versed in mediation skills
could expand and diversify a lawyer's clientele by making him ac-
cessible and affordable to those people who can afford the smaller
mediation fee but otherwise would be unable to pay the regular
legal fees and expenses. 9 With minimal economic detriment to at-
torneys, therefore, mediation could further the societal goal of
helping those people whom the American legal system previously
ignored if attorneys or the government incorporated this type of
self-help through alternative resolutions systems into the tradi-
tional legal systems. 78
(c) Attorneys Receive Inadequate Training for Mediation
Practice
A third problem that limits attorney support of mediation is
the common belief that attorneys lack adequate knowledge to
practice mediation. 79 Few of today's practicing lawyers received
mediation training during their legal education.98 0 Although the
opportunity to learn about the mediation process heretofore has
been almost nonexistent, law schools recently have provided their
students with limited exposure to the mediation process.9 81 Train-
ing in mediation, however, remains a much-neglected subject in
this nation's law schools. 2  The problem of lawyers being inade-
quately prepared to engage in mediation, therefore, is self-perpetu-
ating and will hamper the development of mediation as an alterna-
tive means of resolving disputes until legal educators realize the
important function it could fulfill in the legal system of this
country.
Additionally, continuing legal education programs for lawyers
interested in mediation are rare. Although mediation seminars are
more prevalent than in the past, individual attorneys still bear the
burden to initiate and foster interest in programs to help develop
975. Riskin, supra note 923, at 53.
976. Id.
977. Id. at 53-54.
978. See id. at 58.
979. Id. at 43, 49; Note, supra note 923, at 175.
980. Riskin, supra note 923, at 49. see infra note 1122.
981. Riskin, supra note 923, at 49 n.124.
982. Id. at 49.
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mediation skills.9s3 Such development is particularly difficult be-
cause most "lawyers neither understand nor perform mediation
nor have a strong interest in doing either."98 ' Even within the
group of interested lawyers, therefore, attendance at mediation
seminars is low, especially because of the normally busy schedules
of most attorneys.
Lawyers' mediation skills are also inadequate because attor-
neys lack "sufficient counseling skills to adequately control discus-
sions with such potential for emotional volatility."985 If anything,
legal training teaches attorneys to be aggressive agitators, not
level-headed, neutral mediators. As one commentator has indicated
in a marriage counseling context, danger exists in allowing a lawyer
to mediate:
Unless the attorney has extensive psychological training and clinical ex-
perience, he should not attempt to engage in intensive marriage counseling.
He is a counselor at law and not a marriage counselor. There is a substantial
difference. The counseling skills required of a lawyer and of a psychologist
are not identical.9 86
An attorney, however, may gain understanding of and sensitivity
towards the emotional and psychological needs of mediation par-
ticipants by attending training sessions or through comediation
with a trained counselor.9 87 The former, however, takes valuable
time from the attorney, and the latter may increase the clients'
costs of mediation.9 88
(d) Non-Attorney Mediators Are Practicing Law Illegally
Another reason for attorneys' hesitancy to support the devel-
opment of mediation is that Canon Three of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility dictates an affirmative duty for lawyers
to assist the prevention of the unauthorized practice of law.989
Non-lawyer mediators, in giving advice and counsel to mediation
participants, often closely approach the practice of law without a
license,990 and several state bar associations have addressed this
983. Id. at 50.
984. Id. at 43.
985. Note, supra note 923, at 175.
986. Calner, supra note 946, at 393.
987. Note, supra note 923, at 175.
988. Id.
989. MODEL CODE OF PROFEISSoNAL RsoNsminrrY Canon 3 (1981).
990. State statutes prohibit such activity. "[T]he nonattorney mediatior is not allowed
to give any type of legal advice because of state statutes prohibiting the unauthorized prac-
tice of law." Note, supra note 923, at 174.
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controversial issue. The North Carolina Bar ruled that contract
drafting by a non-attorney is equivalent to engaging in the unau-
thorized practice of law. 91 The North Carolina Bar further noted
that advice concerning the "advisability of and legal effect of en-
tering into such an agreement also constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law."99 2 Additionally, both the Minnesota9 ' and Ne-
vada9 4 Bars have found that a lay mediator had practiced law
without a license when he represented himself to divorcing couples
as a competent advisor on how to use pleadings, forms, and other
necessary court documents and also counseled the couples on their
legal rights.' 5 These three opinions illustrate that lay mediators
sometimes engage in the unauthorized practice of law, at least in
the eyes of the legal profession; non-lawyer mediators, however,
normally are neutral observers from whom mediating parties do
not expect legal counseling.9 6 Courts, therefore, should not label
the conduct of all lay mediators as the unauthorized practice of
law simply because some lay mediators dispense legal advice.9 An
attorney's concern in these situations is the risk that a disciplinary
committee might find he had violated Canon Three's prohibition
against assisting another in the unauthorized practice of law if the
attorney associates with non-lawyer mediators who convey that at-
torney's legal advice to mediating parties. This fear was realized in
one situation that the Los Angeles County Bar addressed, when it
precluded an attorney from working as a legal advisor because he
probably aided non-attorney mediators in giving their clients un-
authorized legal advice. 98
991. Council Action/Committee Reports, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27
N.C.S.B.Q. 4, 5 (1980), quoted in Note, supra note 923, at 174 n.27.
992. Id. at 7.
993. Minnesota State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Reform, Inc., (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1975), re-
printed in Minnesota Bar Wins Sweeping Victory Against a Lay Practitioner of Divorce
Law, 39 UNAuTH. PRAc. NEWS 187, 188 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Minnesota].
994. State Bar of Nev. v. Brandon (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1972),
reprinted in Nevada Divorce, 37 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEws 32, 32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Nevada].
995. Id. at 37; Minnesota, supra note 993, at 190-91. Whether the drafting of legal
documents goes beyond the clerical function must be considered. Nevada supra note 994, at
33.
996. Note, supra note 923, at 174.
997. See, e.g., N.Y.C.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 (1982)
("[I]t is possible for laymen to perform certain divorce mediation activities without exercis-
ing professional legal judgments and without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law").
998. L.A. County B.A. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 270 (1982) (concerning a
marriage counselor who communicated to the parties the legal aspects of a particular con-
flict) discussed in Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation,
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These rulings indicate the legal community's need for explicit
standards against which courts can judge the conduct of lay
mediators to ascertain whether their conduct constitutes the unau-
thorized practice of law. In the absence of these needed guidelines,
legal community opposition to mediation and other alternative
forms of dispute resolution easily can argue against such alterna-
tives. The fear of violating Canon Three by assisting someone in
practicing law without a license is legitimate, and detractors of me-
diation can cite capricious bar association rulings such as those in
Minnesota, Nevada, and California to support their arguments.
One critic also has observed that the legal community's desire to
maintain monopoly-like control over cases which are suitable for
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms frequently motivates al-
legations that lay mediators illegally practice law.999 Arguably, law-
yers censure these non-attorney mediators, not for the public's
protection and best interests but, rather, to perpetuate unneces-
sary litigation that mediation could handle more efficiently and ef-
fectively. If practical alternatives to traditional legal practices are a
desirable goal, then the bar must take innovative steps rather than
continue to make reflexive and unreasoned charges of unautho-
rized law practice. 1000
(e) Attorneys as Mediators May Violate Professional Ethics
A final argument that legal community opposition to media-
tion presents is that attorneys who participate in mediation may
violate professional ethics.1001 The guidelines that the ABA and
state bar associations set forth inadequately define the attorneys'
role in mediation.10 02 The growing prevalence of mediation in our
society will force these organizations to address the difficult ethical
considerations that continuously confront attorneys who partici-
pate in mediation and to provide guidelines indicating acceptable
conduct for mediating attorneys.
16 FAm. L.Q. 107, 125 (1982).
999. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 998, at 124.
1000. See, e.g., id. at 128.
1001. Id. at 108.
1002. See infra notes 1003-04 and accompanying text.
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B. The Attorney's Role in the Mediation Process: Ethical
Concerns00 3
Attorney participation in mediation and other dispute resolu-
tion alternatives will benefit the American legal system only if the
developers of these alternatives carefully plan the evolution of the
lawyers' role in these processes to conform attorney actions to im-
portant rules of legal ethics. The mediation process best illustrates
the ethical problems that attorneys encounter when using non-liti-
gation dispute resolution mechanisms. Attorneys assume several
roles in the mediation process: (1) sole mediators, (2) joint
mediators, or (3) non-mediators. Each of these roles requires its
own set of ethical guidelines. Participation in the mediation pro-
cess, therefore, requires an attorney to identify her level of partici-
pation and to examine the applicable ethical issues. Although me-
diation is growing in popularity and attorney mediators are more
prevalent, however, the ethical boundaries of attorneys' roles un-
fortunately remain vague and undefined. 0 4 The problem of inade-
quate ethical guidelines to direct the behavior of attorney
mediators has discouraged the legal community from participating
in the mediation process. The following discussion will isolate the
ethical problems that accompany each attorney role in the media-
tion process, cite existing rules of legal ethics that pertain to these
concerns, and explore possible guidelines for proper ethical behav-
ior in each situation.
1. Attorneys as Sole Mediators
A sole mediator serves as a neutral third party who attempts
to facilitate an agreement between conflicting parties." 5 Sole
mediators may not enforce a ruling that is against the will of the
1003. This section of the Special Project will first discuss Ethical Considerations
("EC") and Disciplinary Rules ("DR") under the ABA's Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility ("Code"), the general form of which presently is in effect in many states. The
ABA strictly enforces DR's but not EC's. Next this Section will analyze the same concerns
under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules") which the ABA House of Dele-
gates adopted on August 2, 1983. The ethical analysis in this Section focuses principally on
divorce mediation and marriage counseling because attorneys participate in mediation most
frequently in these areas.
1004. The Code "gives no guidelines on the permissible dimensions of extra-legal
counseling services." Calner, supra note 946, at 392. "[N]owhere in the rules or comments
[of the ABA's Model Rules] does the ABA recognize or endorse the variety of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms embraced in the concept of mediation." Silberman, supra
note 998, at 119.
1005. See Silberman, supra note 998, at 107.
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parties but may participate actively in the mediation process.1006 A
mediator's strong influence in the outcome of a mediation necessi-
tates that he adhere to the strictest ethical standards. Two specific
practices of mediators present particularly controversial ethical
problems. First, attorneys who are sole mediators arguably concur-
rently practice two occupations-mediation and law. Second, as a
sole mediator, an attorney is in a position to represent two clients
with conflicting interests-a situation that could impair the attor-
ney's independent professional judgment and violate the attorney-
client privilege.
(a) The Practice of Two Professions
Generally an attorney may practice law-and another profession
simultaneously. 1007 No provision in the Code explicitly prohibits
such action. 100 8 Ethics committees displeased with the absence of
such a restriction have imposed a committee-created rule that pro-
hibits attorneys from simultaneously practicing law and a second
occupation which relates to the practice of law.1009 Courts initially
applied the rule strictly and prohibited attorneys from practicing
law and related occupations simultaneously. 010 Recent courts,
however, have not interpreted it so narrowly and have allowed law-
yers to engage concurrently in law and related occupations. 01' An
attorney who performs this dual career function, however, must
adhere to the following qualification:
1006. Hazard, supra note 963, at 63; Riskin, supra note 923, at 29.
1007. Callner, supra note 946, at 395.
1008. H. DRiNKzR, LEGAL ETmcs 221 (1953); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972).
1009. See, e.g., N.Y.S.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 206 (1971) (dis-
tinguishing between unrelated occupations such as operating shopping centers, retail stores,
and manufacturing plants and related occupations such as marriage counseling, accounting,
and operating real estate brokerage firms). The ethical obstacles that arise if a lawyer prac-
tices law and engages in a related occupation can be significant. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972). "It may be impossible to know whether
the lawyer's work for another person is performed as part of the practice of law or as a part
of his other [related] occupation... ." Id. See also H. DRmKRM, supra note 1008, at 221-22.
The ABA committee had several reasons for enacting the rule. First, lawyers dividing their
efforts between two occupations cannot remain knowledgeable of current developments in
both areas. Second, if an attorney practices in a law-related Area, he is presenting himself as
a specialist in that area. Third, the demands of a law practice require an attorney's full time
attention. Last, dual occupations mislead the public. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972).
1010. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 41 (1961).
1011. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972);
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1248 (1972).
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If the second occupation is so law-related that the work of the lawyer in
such occupation will involve, inseparably, the practice of law, the lawyer is
considered to be engaged in the practice of law while conducting that occupa-
tion. Accordingly, he is held to the standards of the bar while conducting that
second occupation from his law offices.' 0 1'
Thus, if an attorney is the sole mediator in a marriage dispute, for
example, he essentially assumes the role of a marriage counselor,
which the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics considers a
law-related occupation.10"1 The Code's ethical standards, therefore,
arguably apply to attorneys who practice marriage mediation.
Under this analysis, a "second occupation" of marriage mediator
may subject an attorney to close review from the bar for any signs
of suspicious or unethical conduct.
101 4
(b) Canon Five Considerations
One ethical standard that the typical attorney marriage medi-
ator may violate while representing two conflicting sides in the
marriage mediation process is Canon Five of the Code, which pro-
vides: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judg-
ment on Behalf of a Client."1 015 Various bar associations, however,
disagree about whether this canon permits or prohibits a lawyer
from being a divorce mediator.
(1) Canon Five Prohibits an Attorney From Being a Marriage
Mediator
The Colorado Bar Association ruled that lawyers should not
represent both parties in a divorce case if any possibility of conflict
exists.1 016 It based its ruling upon DR 5-105, which prevents an at-
1012. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972);
see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1248 (1972).
1013. Callner, supra note 946, at 395; see, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972).
1014. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 775 (1965).
1015. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrrY Canon 5 (1981).
1016. Colo. B.A. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 47 (1972), reprinted in 1 COLO. LAW. 59,
60 (1972). The Code also adopts this position:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a clentwill be or is likely to be adversely affected by
the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple
clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such repre-
sentation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
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torney from accepting a case if the interest of another client might
impair the attorney's independent judgment. Cases in which a di-
vorce does not contain the seeds of conflict are rare, and the Colo-
rado Bar Committee, therefore, concluded that few instances exist
in which an attorney ethically could serve as a marriage media-
tor.10 117 The Committee, however, did not explain how it arrived at
its decision.
Similar to the Colorado Bar's ruling, the Washington State
Bar'011 and the New Hampshire Bar'01 9 recently held that an attor-
ney divorce mediator violated DR 5-105.1020 Likewise, the Wiscon-
sin Bar found that an attorney ethically could not serve as a di-
vorce mediator because the process placed the attorney in an
"unresolved conflict position."10 21 The attorney in this instance of-
fered to mediate between various divorcing couples and proposed
to "(1) educate the parties as to their legal rights and responsibili-
ties, (2) mediate any disputes which may arise in the course of the
settlement negotiations and (3) draft a separation agreement and
related documents and appear in court to process the divorce.
1 02 2
Additionally, the mediator suggested that each party obtain sepa-
rate counsel to review the final agreement. The Wisconsin Bar
Committee held that the attorney, by promising to "educate" his
clients, falsely represented that he was protecting each party's best
interest, a role that legal advisors traditionally assume. 10 23 The
Committee noted the conflicts inherent in a divorce proceeding
and reasoned that the attorney mediator's proposal probably
would culminate in litigation.10 24 Since this result was not in the
best interests of the parties, the attorney had failed to fulfill a
promise he made in his position of attorney mediator.10 12 The
Committee recognized that EC 5-20 of the Code 1028 allows attor-
MODEL CODE Op PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) & (C) (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
1017. Colo. B.A. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 47 (1972), reprinted in 1 CoLo. LAW 59, at
60 (1972).
1018. Wash. S.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility Comm., Informal Op. 385
(1980).
1019. N.H.S.B.A. Ethics Comm. (1982), reprinted in 8 N.H.L. WEEKLY 385 (1982).
1020. See supra note 1016 for text of DR 5-105.
1021. Wis. S. B. Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. E-79-2 (1979),





1026. A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in mat-
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neys to act as mediators if they do not represent either party sub-
sequently. 10 2 7 Even though the attorney agreed not to represent ei-
ther party in subsequent litigation, however, the Committee ruled
that the proposed agreement extended the attorney's authority be-
yond the scope that EC 5-20 contemplated and beyond the activi-
ties that attorneys normally perform.1°28
The opinions of the Colorado, Washington, New Hampshire,
and Wisconsin bar association ethics committees typify state bar
associations committee decisions prohibiting attorneys from serv-
ing as divorce mediators. Advocates of this view maintain that the
interests of the partners to a troubled marriage differ, regardless of the
protestations to the contrary by the parties themselves. Situations in which
their interests are identical are so rare as to be considered exceptional. The
Code states that a lawyer should avoid representing not only currently con-
flicting but even potentially conflicting interests.... Partners of a deteriorat-
ing marriage fall within the broad prohibition of conflict.'1"
The Code, however, does not indicate the degree of conflict
that must exist among the parties before an attorney can no longer
adequately represent each individual side of a controversy. The
Code also fails to specify how a decision-making body, whether it
be a bar association committee or a court, should analyze the pres-
ence of conflict.1030 Because of the Code's silence concerning the
requisite degree of conflicts, ethics committees have reached differ-
ent decisions about whether an attorney ethically can be a mar-
riage mediator. Ultimately, the legal field totally lacks any clear
standards of conduct for attorneys to follow.
ters which involve present or former clients. He may serve in either capacity if he first
discloses such present or former relationships. After a lawyer has undertaken to act as an
impartial arbitrator or mediator, he should not thereafter represent in the dispute any of
the parties involved. MODEL CODE o, PRoFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrrY EC 5-20 (1981).
1027. Wis. S. B. Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. E-79-2 (1980),
reprinted in 53 Wis. B. BuLL. No. 1, at 61 (1980).
1028. Id.
1029. Callner, supra note 946, at 394 (footnotes omitted). "Several courts and ethics
committees contend that the interests in ... [divorce] cases will always be in actual conflict
despite any superficial harmony." Note, supra note 947, at 1311(emphasis in original) (cit-
ing authorities that support this view).
1030. With the absence of these Code provisions, courts can choose from many alter-
native methods to analyze whether an attorney represents two clients with particularly con-
flicting interests. A court could examine whether such a conflict exists from the perspective
of the attorney, the parties, or a third party. The court could base its observations on the




(2) Canon Five Permits an Attorney to Become a Marriage
Mediator
Other state bar associations have ruled that attorneys ethically
can serve as divorce mediators. The Oregon Bar, for example, rea-
soned that attorney mediators do not violate the Code because
they do not "represent" either party in the mediation process. 1031
Although the difference between representing both parties and
representing neither party probably is illusory,10 32 if attorneys re-
present both parties in mediation, they arguably assume the tradi-
tional attorney functions of protecting the parties' interests, dis-
pensing legal advice, drafting agreements, and processing
agreements through court.103 3 If attorneys represent neither party,
however, they are less likely to violate ethical rules because they
engage in a more restricted group of functions.03 The Oregon
Committee noted several limitations on the role of attorney
mediators. First, attorneys can give impartial legal advice only in
the presence of both parties. Second, attorneys can draft agree-
ments but must suggest that the parties allow outside counsel to
review the documents. Third, attorneys must not represent either
party in subsequent litigation. Last, attorneys must inform each
party that they represent neither party, and the parties must con-
sent to the arrangement.1035 Proper consent requires complete dis-
closure by the attorney and the ability on the part of the parties to
understand the involved risks:
1036
If the lawyer can satisfy the court that the client knowingly and intelligently
consented after full disclosure, the court will not readily overturn the consent
in he absence of substantial harm to the client.
When confronted by individual layclients, however, courts will probe in
depth to determine whether the consent was freely and intelligently given.
Such consents are typically construed against the attorney.
01 7
The New York State Bar, recognizing that the functions of
mediators differ from those of advocates, has ruled that although
attorneys may not represent both parties in a divorce, they can act
1031. Or. B.A. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Proposed Op. 79-46 (1980), discussed in Sil-
berman, supra note 998, at 112.
1032. N.Y.C.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 (1982); See Silber-
man, supra note 998, at 116.
1033. See Silberman, supra note 998, at 116.
1034. See id.
1035. Or. B.A. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Proposed Op. 79-46 (1980), discussed in Sil-
berman, supra note 998, at 112.
1036. Note, supra note 947, at 1311-12.
1037. Id. at 1312 (footnotes omitted).
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as mediators in that situation 038 In Levine v. Levine,1039 the New
York Court of Appeals refused to set aside a divorce agreement
that an attorney representing both parties drafted because: (1) the
parties freely agreed to the document after fully understanding its
terms, (2) the agreement was fair to both parties, and (3) the dis-
cussions preceding the agreement did not evidence unfair con-
duct.10 40 The court thus implied that it would have voided the
agreement if the attorney mediator had not treated his clients in a
neutral and fair manner.1 04 1 Although the court did not explicitly
label the attorney as a mediator, it significantly recognized that the




The Boston Bar also has addressed the ethical questions con-
fronting a lawyer who served as a divorce mediator and drafted the
resulting agreement.Y°' s The Boston Bar Committee condoned me-
diation by an attorney if he refrained from subsequently represent-
ing either party and also apprised the couple of the potential ethi-
cal conflicts accompanying his participation in mediation and the
alternative courses of action they could pursue to resolve their dif-
ferences.0 44 The Committee, however, recognized that attorney
mediators still must confront several potential problems. First,
parties of unequal power do not receive the protection of separate
counsel. Second, the clients may question the attorney's neutrality.
Last, the mediation agreement lacks finality if the parties become
displeased with the result and consult outside attorneys.os 5 Al-
though the Committee believed that these considerations were im-
portant, it countenanced the attorney's role as mediator because
the problems inherent in traditional dispute resolution mecha-
nisms presented even greater obstacles.04 8
1038. N.Y.S.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 258 (1972), reprinted in
44 N.Y.S.B.J. 556, 557 (1972).
1039. 56 N.Y.2d 42, 436 N.E.2d 476, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1982).
1040. Id. at 48-49, 436 N.E.2d at 478-79, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29.
1041. Id. at 49, 436 N.E.2d at 479, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 29. "ETihe idea that lawyers can
provide neutral advice when consulted by disputants is ... well established." Rich, supra
note 943, at 778; see MODEL CODE OF PROFssIoNAL RnsPoNsmmurrY EC 7-3 (1981).
1042. See Silberman, supra note 998, at 119.
1043. Boston B.A. Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 78-1 (1978), discussed in Silberman,
supra note 998, at 111-12.





(c) Canon Four Considerations
Canon Five does not present the only set of ethical rules that
attorneys who practice sole mediation must follow. Lawyers who
practice mediation also must comply with Canon Four, which gen-
erally requires the attorney to preserve the "confidences" and
"secrets" of his clients.1047 In extrajudicial situations, the lawyer
cannot divulge to any person confidences and secrets that either
party reveals to him during mediation. Furthermore, Canon Four
and the attorney-client privilege, an evidentiary rule, prevent a
lawyer from revealing to any court a client "confidence," which is
information that the attorney acquires while communicating with
his client.10 48 In certain circumstances, however, a tribunal may
compel the attorney to disclose to the court a client "secret,1
10 49
which is not a "communication" because it is information that the
lawyer discovers in his professional relationship with his client.1050
Bar associations have required that the attorney mediator
abide by Canon Four. The Colorado Bar, denouncing attorney me-
diation for divorces, held that any attorney divorce mediator prob-
ably would violate his Canon Four obligation to preserve his cli-
ents' confidences and secrets by representing both parties.10 51 The
1047. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILMY Canon 4 (1981) "A Lawyer
Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."
1048. See id. at DR 4-101; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 88-89
(2d ed. 1972). But see infra note 1054 and accompanying text (such communications are not
confidential if they occur when a third party is present).
1049. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1981).
1050. Id. at DR 4-101(A).
1051. Colo. B.A. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 47 (1972), reprinted in 1 COLO. LAw. 59
(1972). The Colorado Bar also held that such dual representation violates the lawyer's duty
under Canon 7 to represent his client zealously. Id. at 60. The Committee addressed the
interplay between Canons Four and Seven in a divorce mediation context. The Committee,
in recognizing the conflicts of interests inherent in divorce mediation situations, stated that
if the attorney attempts to represent both parties, he will have to compromise positions on
conflicting issues, thus failing to represent zealously each client to the best of his ability.
Attorneys zealously representing each party also should use all available information to ben-
efit their client. Confidences or secrets that one spouse reveals most probably would consti-
tute such information. The attorney mediator, therefore, must decide whether to use that
information for the benefit of one spouse in accordance with Canon Seven, or whether he
should preserve the other spouse's confidences as Canon Four provides.
In addition to Canons Four and Seven, which the Committee noted, attorneys serving
as divorce mediators might violate Canon Six, which requires competent representation by
attorneys. MODEL CODE OP PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmmY Canon 6 (1981). Withholding ad-
vantageous information or violating client confidences certainly exceeds the boundaries of
competent representation. The application of Canon Six and Seven to attorney mediators is
questionable, however, because ethics committees have ruled that attorney mediators do not
"represent" mediating parties. See, e.g., Or. BA. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Proposed Op. 79-
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New Hampshire Bar voiced similar concerns over the interplay be-
tween the attorney-client privilege and a Canon Four violation
within a mediation context.052 The concern centered upon the per-
ceived problem that the attorney-client privilege would not apply
to the mediation process because the attorney engaging in media-
tion was not acting as an attorney. Because the attorney mediator
could not rely on the attorney-client privilege to shield certain dis-
courses between himself and the mediating parties, judicially man-
dated disclosure of that information arguably could force the attor-
ney mediator to violate Canon Four. s053 Courts generally have held
that attorney-client communications are not confidential if the cli-
ent makes them in front of third parties.10" The presence of both
parties during mediation, therefore, arguably impairs the confiden-
tiality of the discussions. The current trend, however, allows infor-
mation to remain confidential if the client shows he had a reasona-
ble expectation of confidentiality. 1055 Mediating parties clearly
desire the communications to be confidential. The attorney media-
tor, therefore, must advise the mediating parties of the distinctions
between secrets and confidences. The mediating parties then
should designate clearly the information they intend to be confi-
dential. This method would allow attorney mediators to avoid vio-
lations of their duties under Canon Four.
(d) Canon Nine Considerations
Even if conflicting interests do not emerge during the media-
tion process and the lawyer follows Canons Four and Five, an at-
torney mediator still could violate Canon Nine of the Code if the
attorney creates an appearance of professional impropiety. Such a
situation can arise in a divorce mediation context in which the in-
terests inherently conflict. 05 The New Hampshire Bar has ruled
46 (1980), discussed in Silberman, supra note 999, at 112. Because Canons Six and Seven
clearly apply only to attorneys "representing" clients, these Canons should not apply to
attorney mediators. See MODEL CODE OF PROFSSIONAL RESPoNsmury Canon 7 (1981).
1052. N.H.S.B.A. Ethics Comm. (1982), reprinted in 8 N.H.L. WEEKLY 385 (1982).
1053. Id.
1054. E. J. IMwiNKELRIED, EvIDanmIaRy FOUNDATIONS 202 (1980); see, e.g., United
States v. Blackburn, 446 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972).
1055. See, e.g., United States v. Bigos, 459 F.2d 639, 643 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 847 (1972) ("While ... the presence of a third party commonly destroys the privilege, it
does so only insofar as it is indicative of the intent of the parties that their communication
not be confidential.").
1056. Callner, supra note 946, at 394-395. See MODEL CODE OF PROFsSIONAL REsPON-
smmrry Canon 9 (1981) ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety."). Although an attorney who mediates a divorce is not representing either
1984] 999
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that to avoid violating Canon Nine an attorney who had repre-
sented both parties previously should not serve as a divorce media-
tor for the couple. 10 57 An attorney may negotiate a settlement with
an unrepresented spouse, but the attorney first must inform the
unrepresented spouse of his right to seek counsel and that the at-
torney represents only the other spouse.10 5 8
2. Attorneys as Joint Mediators
Attorneys who believe they lack adequate counseling skills for
participation as sole mediators may engage in the process as joint
mediators. A joint mediation team usually consists of a trained
counselor and attorneys. This team can provide the mediating par-
ties with access to both psychological and legal advice. Addition-
ally, counseling mediators can serve as models to help attorney
mediators develop counseling skills.
Attorneys who participate in joint mediation confront ethical
obstacles similar to those that attorneys acting as sole mediators
encounter. 10 59 Attorneys serving as joint mediators must comply
with Canon Three, which encourages lawyers to help prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. 10 60 The Oregon Bar Committee ac-
knowledged that Canon Three presented grave ethical problems
for lawyers who work with counselors at mediation services. 1061 The
Committee found that DR 3-103,062 which prohibits a lawyer from
forming a law-related partnership with a non-lawyer, precluded
party, his status as an attorney may influence the mediating parties and observers to believe
that he is protecting both parties' interests. As a result the parties or observers may ques-
tion the neutrality of his position, thus creating the appearance of ethical improprieties. For
example, X and Y walk into mediating service; they expect a mediator to see them. Z enters
and introduces himself as an attorney. The parties understandably might assume the media-
tor also is serving as their legal counsel, thus creating the appearance of impropriety if con-
flicts should evolve. If Z clarifies from the start that he does not represent either party and
fully explains the mediation process, then Z avoids any Canon Nine violations.
1057. N.H.S.B.A. Ethics Comm. (1982), reprinted in 8 N.H. L. WEEKLY 385 (1982).
1058. Callner, supra note 946, at 395.
1059. Silberman, supra note 998, at 128.
1060. MODEL CODE OF PaOFESSIONAL REsioNsmimrry Canon 3 (1981) ("A Lawyer
Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law."). The Code also dictates
that a "lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law." MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsrONsmiLiTy DR 3-101(A) (1981).
1061. Or. B.A. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Proposed Op. 79-46 (1980), discussed in Sil-
berman, supra note 998, at 130-31. The Committee based its decision ont he rationale that
the general public needed protection from the unauthorized practice of law. Id.
1062. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmIrry DR 3-103 (1981). ("A lawyer shall
not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist
of the practice of law.").
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counselors and attorneys working at a mediation service from
forming a partnership. 0 3 The Committee stated, however, that
joint mediation is ethical if each team member played a specific,
designated role in the process."" The Oregon Bar Committee ob-
viously felt that if the mediation service clearly communicated the
structure of the team to the public, then mediating parties would
not mistake counselor mediators for attorneys and the entire pro-
cess would be less deceptive.1 0 5 The Committee also recognized
the potential fee splitting problem that the Code addresses in DR
3-102, which states that most attorneys cannot divide their legal
fees with non-lawyers. °10 " The Oregon Bar, however, approved the
mediation service because the payment plan specifically designated
a billable amount to each member of the mediation team.cs This
method of billing provided parties with a clear understanding of
the services the program offered and the fee it charged for each,
thereby reducing the likelihood of misrepresentation by the service
to the public.
If the courts or the various bar associations characterized the
work of joint mediators as the practice of mediation and not the
practice of law, thenimediators would not violate Canon Three be-
cause non-lawyer mediators would not be practicing law. If courts
label mediation as the practice of law, however, then mediators
who participate in joint mediation could avoid violating Canon
Three by ensuring that the program clearly discloses to the public
the available services and the fee which each team member re-
ceives. Because the joint mediation team offers a beneficial service
to the public, courts should endorse the program if parties freely
enter joint mediation with a clear understanding of the specific
services it offers and their right to separate legal counsel if they
deem it desirable.106 8
1063. Or. B.A. Comm. on Legal Ethics Proposed Op. 9-46 (1980), discussed in Silber-
man, aupra note 998, at 131.
1064. Id.
1065. See id.
1066. MODEL CODE OF PRornssION REsPONsmmTY DR 3-102 (1981).
1067. Although the mediation team charged an hourly rate of $60.00, the attorney and
the mediator received a specified rate of $25.00 an hour with the remainder covering the
service's overhead expenses. Or. B.A. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Proposed Op. 79-46 (1980),
discussed in Silberman, supra note 998, at 130.
1068. Silberman, supra note 998, at 134.
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3. Attorneys as Impartial Legal Advisors in Mediation
Even when attorneys do not function as mediators, they often
participate indirectly in the mediation process. Parties often re-
quire legal counseling both during and after mediation. A typical
mediation situation, for example, begins with a professionally
trained counselor meeting with a divorcing couple. If the parties
reach an agreement, the mediation counselor will solicit an impar-
tial legal advisor to answer the parties' legal questions and draft
the final agreement. If the process required each mediating party
to obtain separate legal counsel, many of the benefits that media-
tion has over a traditional dispute resolution system would dissi-
pate.108 9 Retention of mediation's benefits at a price that allows
parties to afford the legal advice necessary to reach an informed
agreement, therefore, requires the mediator to ask an impartial le-
gal advisor who represents neither party to provide neutral advice
to both.
Impartial legal advisors must confront ethical problems simi-
lar to the ones that single and joint mediating attorneys encoun-
ter.107 0 The New York City Bar, for example, has examined
whether a non-mediating attorney ethically could participate in a
divorce mediation program.1071 Specifically, the Committee ana-
lyzed whether a lawyer could: (1) join the mediating team, (2) give
impartial legal advice to the parties, or (3) draft a divorce or settle-
ment agreement after the parties approved its terms.10 72
In analyzing the situation, the Committee examined several
relevant Code provisions. Although the Committee recognized that
DR 5-1051073 permits a lawyer to represent clients whose interest
do not conflict, it noted that divorce proceedings addressed inter-
ests that inherently conflicted and, therefore, suggested that DR 5-
105 does not apply to divorce mediation.1074 The New York City
Bar Committee also cited EC 5-20, which provides that a lawyer
may serve as a mediator,1075 but noted that the Code did not spec-
ify which activities constituted mediation.10 7 6 The Committee rec-
ognized that an unlimited variety of factual situations arise in a
1069. See supra note 931, and accompanying text.
1070. Silberman, supra note 998, at 135.
1071. N.Y.C.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 (1982).
1072. Id.
1073. See supra note 1016.
1074. See supra notes 1017, 1021 & 1029 and accompanying text.
1075. See supra note 1026.
1076. N.Y.C.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 91982).
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divorce context which would determine the type of legal advice
that the divorcing couple would seek in the mediation process.1077
The Committee decided that the lawyer impartially may advise
mediating parties if the factual situation requires only minimal le-
gal evaluation, but felt that if the facts necessitated complex legal
analysis then mediation "virtually [cannot] achieve a just result
free from later recriminations of bias or malpractice, unless both
parties are represented by separate counsel."'1078 As a result, the
Committee established extremely detailed criteria that it would
use on an ad hoc basis to ascertain whether an attorney ethically
could render impartial legal advice to mediating parties if a media-
tor solicited such action. 079 Furthermore, an attorney may not par-
ticipate impartially in the mediation process unless the parties give
informed consent.080
The New York City Bar also examined the problem of a law-
yer who assists a lay organization in the "unauthorized practice of
1077. Id.
1078. Id.
1079. The Committee established the folowing criteria:
[1. T]he lawyer may not participate in the divorce mediation process where it appears
that the issues between the parties are of such complexity or difficulty that the parties
cannot prudently reach a resolution without the advicdrof separate and independent
legal counsel ....
[2. T]he lawyer must clearly and fully advise the parties of the limitations on his or her
role and specifically, of the fact that the lawyer represents neither party and that ac-
cordingly, they should not look to the lawyer to protect their individual interests or to
keep confidences of one party from the other ....
[3. T]he lawyer must fully and clearly explain the risks of proceeding without spearate
legal counsel and thereafter proceed only with the consent of the parties and only if the
lawyer is satisfied that the parties understand the risks and understand the significance
of the fact that the lawyer represents neither party ....
[4. A] lawyer may participate with mental health professionals in those aspects of me-
diation which do not require the exercise of professional legal judgment and involve the
same kind of mediation activities permissible to lay mediators ....
[5. L]awyers may provide impartial legal advice and assist in reducing the parties'
agreement to writing only where the lawyer fully explains all pertinent considerations
and alternatives and the consequences to each party of choosing the resolution agreed
upon ....
[6. T]he lawyer may give legal advice only to both parties in the presence of the other
[7. T]he lawyer must advise the parties of the advantages of seeking independent legal
counsel before executing any agreement drafted by the lawyer ....
[8. T]he lawyer may not represent either of the parties in any subsequent legal pro-
ceedings relating to the divorce.
N.Y.C.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 (1982) (emphasis in original).
1080. See Va. S.B. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Informal Op. 400 (1979); Md. S.B.A.
Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 80-55A (1980).
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law."108' Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D) permits an attorney to affiliate
with certain types of lay organizations. 08 2 An attorney who wishes
1081. N.Y.C.B.A. Comm. on Profesisonal Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 (1982). A lawyer
who helps a layman practice law usually violates DR 3-101. An attorney who serves as a
joint mediator also can violate Canon Three. See supra notes 1060-68 and accompanying
text.
1082. DR 2-103(D) states:
A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm
may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may cooperate with, one of the follow-
ing offices or organizations that promote the use of his services or those of his partner
or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm if there is no interfer-
ence with the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of his client
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school.
(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide nonprofit community
organization.
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association.
(2) A military legal assistance office.
(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar
association.
(4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided the following
conditions are satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and operated that no
profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal services by lawyers, and that, if the
organization is organized for profit, the legal services are not rendered by lawyers em-
ployed, directed, supervised or selected by it except in connection with matters where
such organization bears ultimate liability of its members or beneficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any other lawyer affili-
ated with him or his firm, nor any non-lawyer, shall have initiated or promoted such
organization for the primary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to such
lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring legal work or
financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner outside of the legal services
program of the organization.
(d) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are furnished, and not
such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the matter.
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal services furnished or
paid for by the organization may, if such member or beneficiary so desires, select coun-
sel other than that furnished, selected or approved by the organization for the particu-
lar matter involved; and the legal service plan of such organization provides appropri-
ate relief for any member or beneficiary who asserts a claim that representation by
counsel furnished, selected or approved would be unethical, improper or inadequate
under the circumstances of the matter involved and the plan provides an appropriate
procedure for seeking such relief.
(f) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such organization is in
violation of applicable laws, rules of court and other legal requirements that govern its
legal service operations.
(g) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary authority at least
annually a report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, showing its terms, its
schedule of benefits, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, and financial
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to participate impartially in a mediation program, therefore, must
decide whether an organization falls within the restrictive meaning
of DR 2-103(D). Mediation services do not satisfy the descriptions
of an organization under DR 2-103(D) (1)-(3).1013 To constitute an
"organization" under DR 2-103(D), therefore, a mediation service
must comply with subsection (D) (4) of the rule, which requires
the service to recommend, furnish, or pay for the legal services to
its members or beneficiaries.108 " The New York City Bar Commit-
tee concluded that mediating parties were beneficiaries of the me-
diation service because the city had created it to offer professional
guidance that would benefit divorcing couples. 085 The Committee
also indicated that to fall within the meaning of an "organization"
under DR 2-103(D)(4), the mediating service must satisfy the
Committee's detailed summation of the section's other require-
ments.108 6 Although the purpose of the rule is to protect society
results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to do so, the lawyer does not
know or have cause to know of such failure.
MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D) (1981).
1083. A mediation service is not a "legal aid office or public defender office," DR 2-
103(D)(1); a "military legal assistance office," DR 2-103(D)(2); or a "lawyer referral service
operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association." DR 2-103(D)(3).
1084. See supra note 1082.
1085. A more realistic evaluation of DR2-103(D) would not have classified mediating
parties as beneficiaries and thus would have precluded consideration of a mediation service
as a DR 2-103(D) organization: "The rule clearly was not designed with divorce mediation in
mind, and efforts to fit mediation programs under its rubric just do not work." Silberman,
supra note 998, at 141.
1086. The Committee summarized the conditions of DR 2-103(D)(4), as applied to the
divorce mediation program, as follows:
(1) The organization must derive no profits from the rendition of legal services....
(2) A lawyer must not initiate or promote the divorce mediation program for the pri-
mary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to the lawyer and the purpose of
the program must not be to procure legal work or financial benefit for lawyers-outside
of the legal services program of the organization....
(3) The beneficiary of the divorce mediation program... is recognized as the client of
the lawyer in the matter...
(4) Beneficiaries of the divorce mediation program are free to select counsel other than
those furnished or selected by the program, and the program provides appropriate re-
lief for any beneficiary who claims that representation by the lawyer furnished by the
program would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the circumstances of the
matter involved, and provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such relief...
(5) The lawyer does not know or have reason to know that the divorce mediation pro-
gram is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court or other legal requirements gov-
erning its legal service operations ....
(6) The lawyer does not know or have reason to know that the divorce mediation pro-
gram has failed to file, at least annually, with the appropriate disciplinary authority, a
report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, showing its terms, its schedule of
benefits, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel and financial results of its
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against the possibility that lay organizations will exert excessive
control over lawyers, committees qualify DR 2-103(D) to apply
only if a lawyer's affliation with the organization hinders his inde-
pendent professional judgment on behalf of his client.10 7 An attor-
ney need not comply with DR 2-103(D), therefore, unless the me-
diation service interferes with the lawyer's professional judgment.
4. The Attorney's Role in Mediation Under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(a) Rule 2.2
Similar to the Code, the ABA's newly adopted Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Rules")1088 fail to define the specific ethical
boundaries of attorneys who participate in the mediation process
as mediators, joint mediators, or non-mediators. Although the
Rules recognize the attorney's role as an "intermediary between
clients" in rule 2.2,1089 they provide inadequate guidance concern-
ing the ethical considerations that lawyers who participate in me-
diation typically encounter. Rule 2.2 fails to state specifically
whether its requirements apply to mediation, although the unoffi-
cial comments to rule 2.2 do mention mediation services.0 90 The
legal service activities.
N.Y.C.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 (1982).
1087. See id.
1088. See supra note 1003.
1089. Rule 2.2 states:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common
representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the at-
torney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the common
representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms com-
patible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately
informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to
the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be under-
taken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has
to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning
the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each
client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any
of the conditions stated in paragrah (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the
lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the
subject of the intermediation.
MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 2.2 (1983).
1090. The Comment states:
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comment to rule 2.2, which lists informal arbitration, mediation,
A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the lawyer represents two or
more parties with potentialy conflicting interests. A key factor in defining the relation-
ship is whether the parties share responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common
representation may be inferred from other circumstances. Because confusion can arise
as to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately represented, it is important
that the lawyer make clear the relationship.
The Rule does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or
among parties who are not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been ap-
pointed with the concurrence of the parties. In performing such a role the lawyer may
be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in
Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint Committee of the American Bar Association
and the American Arbitration Association.
A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship be-
tween clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping
to organize a business in which two or more clients are enterpreneurs, working out the
financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest,
arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate or mediating a dispute
between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially conflicting interests by devel-
oping the parties' mutual interests. The alternative can be that each party may have to
obtain separate representation, with the possibility in some situations of incurring ad-
ditional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, all
the clients may prefer that the lawyer act as intermediary.
In considering whether to act as intermediary between clients, a lawyer should be
mindful that if the intermediation fails the result can be additional cost, embarrass-
ment and recrimination. In some situations the risk of failure is so great that interme-
diation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common repre-
sentation of clients between whom contentious litigation is imminent or who
contemplate contentious negotiations. More generally, if the relationship between the
parties has already assumed definite antagonism, the possibility that the clients' inter-
ests can be adjusted by intermediation ordinarily is not very good.
The appropriateness of intermediation can depend on its form. Forms of interme-
diation range from informal arbitration, where each client's case is presented by the
respective client and the lawyer decides the outcome, to mediation, to common repre-
sentation where the clients' interests are substantially though not entirely compatible.
One form may be appropriate in circumstances where another would not. Other rele-
vant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a con-
tinuing basis and whether the situation involves creating a relationship between the
parties or terminating one.
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE
A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of intermedia-
tion is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. In a
common representation, the lawyer is still required both to keep each client adequately
informed and to maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation.
See Rules 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both requirements while acting as intermediary
requires a delicate balance. If the balance cannot be maintained, the common represen-
tation is improper. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is
that as between commonly represented clients the privilege does not attach. Hence, it
must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not
protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.
Since the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented cli-
ents, intermediation is improper when that impartiality cannot be maintained. For ex-
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and common representation as forms of intermediation, notes that
the type of case dictates which process the attorney should choose.
Decisionmaking bodies, whether courts or bar associations,
could interpret the comment in two ways. First, they could deem
informal arbitration, mediations, and common representation as
distinctive processes, unable to occur simultaneously.1091 This in-
terpretation would lead to the conclusion that, because of the re-
peated references to common representation, the drafters of official
rule 2.2 intended the rule to govern common representation and
not mediation. The alternative theory, premised on the assumption
that the vague working of the comment was an oversight, suggests
that mediation and common representation are not mutually ex-
clusive forms of intermediation and can occur concurrently. 109 2
This interpretation would indicate that rule 2.2 governs media-
tion-a likely conclusion because the comment mentions mediation
twice, first listing mediation as a form of intermediation and sec-
ond, stating that mediation between conflicting clients is an exam-
ple of intermediation. In addition, the comment to rule 2.2 justifies
the intermediary role by noting that attorneys can reduce unneces-
sary representation, legal expenses, and litigation for each party by
offering clients a choice between intermediation and the traditional
form of representation.109 Although the comment is vague, its ref-
erences to mediation indicate that the drafters probably intended
ample, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients for a long period and in a vari-
ety of matters might have difficulty being impartial between that client and one to
whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced.
CONSULTATION
In acting as intermediary between clients, the lawyer is required to consult with
the clients on the implications of doing so, and proceed only upon consent based on
such a consultation. The consultation should make clear that the lawyer's role is not
that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances.
Paragraph (b) is an application of the principle expressed in Rule 1.4. Where the
lawyer is intermediary, the clients ordinarily must assume greater responsibility for
decisions that when each client is independently represented.
WITHDRAwAL
Common representation does not diminish the rights of each client in the client-
lawyer relationship. Each has the right to loyal and diligent representation, the right to
discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16, and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning
obligations to a former client.
Id. at Rule 2.2 comment (emphasis added).
1091. See supra text accompanying notes 1031-33, 1038, 1043.
1092. See supra notes 1039-42 and accompanying text.
1093. See supra note 931 and accompanying text. These results are justifications that




to include the process of mediation within the meaning of rule 2.2.
Once courts and bar associations assume that rule 2.2 autho-
rizes attorney participation in mediation, they likely will question
whether it contemplated divorce mediation. Predictably, the Rules
do not state a clear position on divorce mediation. Earlier versions
of the comments to the Rules noted that "under some circum-
stances a lawyer may act as an intermediary between spouses in
arranging the terms of an uncontested separation or divorce settle-
ment," but the adopted version of the Rules does not contain this
passage. 109' Such a deletion certainly implies that the ABA does
not want attorneys to participate in divorce mediation.
Although the comments to rule 2.2 envision an intermediation
process that resolves potentially conflicting interests, they observe
that attorneys contemplating intermediation should know that if it
fails, additional costs, embarrassment, and recrimination often re-
sult.0 95 In fact, if litigation is imminent or the parties are antago-
nistic toward each other, the lawyer cannot assume dual represen-
tation.10 96 This view is consistent with rule 1.7, which prohibits a
lawyer from representing a client if the representation conflicts
with another client's interests.0 9 Both rules 1.7 and 2.2, however,
fail to indicate whether they govern divorce mediation. Arguably
the rules leave an attorney's decision to participate in divorce me-
diation cases in his discretion. They provide no evaluative stan-
dards to guide the attorney's decision,10 98 however, and this prob-
lem perpetuates a lack of uniformity in state bar association
committee decisions. While some committee rulings suggest that
rules 1.7 and 2.2 prevent an attorney from serving as a divorce me-
diator '0 99 other rulings imply that divorce mediation by attorneys
is ethical.1100 Only a clear indication of the ABA's view will resolve
these conflicting committee rulings and provide guidance to medi-
ating attorneys.
If rule 2.2 governs mediation, then its provisions can enable a
lawyer to ascertain which attorney roles in the mediation process
the ABA deems ethical. The comment to rule 2.2 states that a law-
1094. ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Rule 5.1, at 94 (Discus-
sion Draft 1980), quoted in Silberman, supra note 998, at 121.
1095. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFSSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 2.2 comment (1983).
1096. Id.
1097. Id. at Rule 1.7.
1098. Silberman, supra note 998, at 120-21. The Code similarly offers no guidelines.
See N.Y.C.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 80-23 (1982).
1099. See, e.g., supra notes 1016-21, 1029 and accompanying text.
1100. See, e.g., supra notes 1031, 1038, 1043-44 and accompanying text.
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yer acts as an intermediary if he represents two or more parties
with potentially conflicting interests. 110 1 The comment's repeated
references to an intermediary who "represents" the parties suggest
that the Rules reject the committee decisions which hold that
mediators do not represent the parties.1102 If attorney mediators
"represent" the mediating parties as rule 2.2 suggests, then argua-
bly the lawyer may have to perform the traditional functions of an
attorney, including protecting the parties' interests, giving legal
advice, drafting documents, and processing agreements through
the courts." 03 If bar associations adopt this view, then a mediator
no longer will serve merely as a neutral third party who facilitates
the mediation process.1104
Although rule 2.2 does not address specifically the intermedi-
ary's duty to maintain his client's confidences, the comment sug-
gests that an attorney serving as an intermediary must adhere to
rule 1.6, which prohibits a lawyer from revealing information that
relates to his client's representation.1103 Such a prohibition proba-
bly applies only to instances of common representation. Addition-
ally, the comment to rule 2.2 states that the attorney-client privi-
lege does not apply to common representation. 108 Neither rule 2.2
nor its comment, however, addresses whether the attorney-client
privilege protects statements that parties make during mediation.
Nor does the comment state whether mediating parties have the
right to diligent representation, even though the comment specifi-
cally grants such a right to commonly represented parties under
rule 1.3.10 Similarly, rule 2.2 and its comments do not address the
scope of a mediator's authority or restrict his conduct. If the ABA
wants practicing attorneys to follow rule 2.2 consistently, then it
must alter its ethical provision to distinguish clearly between com-
mon representation and mediation.
1101. See supra note 1090.
1102. See supra notes 1031, 1043-44 and accompanying text.
1103. See supra text accompanying note 1033.
1104. See id.
1105. MODEL RuLES OF PROFSSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.6 (1983). See supra note 1047
and accompanying text. Rule 1.6 does not recognize confidences and secrets individually as
does the CODE, see supra note 1048 and accompanying text, but applies to all information
relating to representation.
1106. See supra text accompanying note 1054.
1107. See supra note 1051 and accompanying text.
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(b) Other Pertinent Provisions
Although rule 2.2 represents the ABA's largest reform that ad-
dresses the ethical concerns of attorney mediators, other sections
of the new Rules also pertain to mediation. Rule 1.2(c) provides
that "[a] lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if
the client consents after consultation." 110 8 This rule arguably gives
the attorney significant discretion in defining his relationship with
his client.1 09 Although the rule anticipates that mediation limits
the attorney's objectives of representation, further interpretations
by the ABA are necessary to determine fully its scope. Moreover,
in recognizing attorneys' roles as advisors, rule 2.1 provides that
"[iln rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."111 0 These
moral and social considerations predominate the field of counseling
and represent an indispensable component of the mediation pro-
cess. By stating that an attorney should incorporate these consid-
erations into his counseling technique, the rule implicitly endorses
attorney mediation. Additionally, the comment to rule 2.1 notes
that "purely technical" legal counseling by an attorney sometimes
does not meet the client's needs.1  Thus, a lawyer should inform
the client of relevant moral and ethical considerations. The com-
ment also recognizes that the Rules limit the actions of an attorney
who serves in theexpanded capacity of being a mediator, a coun-
selor, and an advisor: "Matters that go beyond strictly legal ques-
tions may also be in the domain of another profession," and, if
necessary, the attorney properly should refer his client to other
services.1112 Although it does not explicitly sanction the counseling
functions of mediation, therefore, rule 2.1 does recognize implicitly
the lawyer's role in providing non-legal advice.
Another pertinent provision is rule 5.5, which prohibits law-
yers from engaging in or assisting others to participate in the un-
authorized practice of law.111 3 The comments to rule 5.5, however,
provide that the rule "does not prohibit lawyers from providing
professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employ-
1108. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2(c) (1983).
1109. Any agreement that the attorney and client reach must comply with the MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT and other law. Id. at Rule 1.2 comment (1983).
1110. Id. at Rule 2.1.
1111. MODEL RuLzs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 2.1 comment (1983).
1112. Id. at Rule 2.1 comment (emphasis added).
1113. Id. at Rule 5.5.
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ment requires knowledge of law .... "1114 The comments further
state that social workers are one type of nonlawyer which this ex-
ception contemplates.11 15 The occupational similarities between so-
cial workers and lay mediators, therefore, suggest that attorneys
ethically could advise lay mediators under rule 5.5. The rules, how-
ever, do not state clearly whether the attorney could give legal ad-
vice directly to mediating parties.
The Rules, therefore, fail to provide adequate ethical guidance
to attorneys who participate in mediation. As the number of medi-
ating parties who utilize attorneys in the process continues to in-
crease, the urgent public need for the ABA to develop appropriate
procedures for attorney mediators to follow will grow in concomi-
tant degrees. Amendments to and ethics committees' interpreta-
tions of the rules will define further the role that attorneys play in
mediation. The likelihood that the ABA will produce such guide-
lines, however, probably will coincide directly with the persistence
with which attorneys who participate in mediation demand them.
5. Lange v. Marshall
Because the Rules and Code inadequately address the ethical
considerations that govern the role of attorneys in the mediation
process, the courts must create their own standards of proper pro-
fessional conduct to apply in professional malpractice suits against
attorneys who participate in mediation proceedings. In Lange v.
Marshall""" a former client brought a civil malpractice suit against
her previous attorney for negligent representation. Plaintiff and
her former husband separately had approached defendant, a close
personal friend of the divorcing couple, requesting representation
in the divorce case. 1117 Defendant refused to serve as an advocate
but agreed to represent them jointly in a mediation process., 11 8
Plaintiff alleged "that defendant failed to: (1) inquire as to the
financial state of [plaintiff's husband] and advise plaintiff; (2) ne-
gotiate for a better settlement for plaintiff; (3) advise plaintiff she
would get a better settlement if she litigated the matter; and (4)
fully and fairly disclose to plaintiff her rights as to marital prop-
erty, custody and maintenance."111 9 Although the court found that
1114. Id. at Rule 5.5 comment.
1115. Id.
1116. 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
1117. Id. at 237.
111S. Id. at 237-38.
1119. Id. at 238.
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it "appeared" defendant had served as a mediator, the court did
not specify the criteria that it used to determine mediator status,
nor did the court decide what conduct for an attorney mediator is
ethically appropriate.11 20 The court avoided these issues by ruling
that even if defendant was negligent, plaintiff failed to prove that
she sustained any damage as a proximate result of that negli-
gence.112 1 The significance of the Lange decision lies in its illustra-
tion of the urgent need for the various branches of the legal com-
munity to clarify the ethical standards of conduct that lawyers who
engage in mediation procedures should follow.
6. Summary
Despite the ethical pitfalls awaiting attorneys who participate
in mediation processes, members of the legal profession must not
abandon their role in mediation and other alternative dispute reso-
lution procedures to return to the safe harbor of litigation. Such a
choice would be an egregious abdication of their professional and
ethical obligations. Attorneys and the courts should endeavor to
develop and refine the desirable and permissible role of lawyers in
nonadversarial processes. No inherent conflict exists between the
attorney as an advocate in one situation and as a counselor and
healer in another. Until courts and the ABA delineate the guide-
lines more clearly, the attorney may continue to participate in me-
diation with minimal risk of professional impropriety by observing
a few basic rules. By fully disclosing his function, obtaining the
participating parties' consent, and providing fair, honest, accurate,
and impartial legal advice, the attorney should be able to avoid
transgressing the rules of professional ethics. Meanwhile, the pro-
fession should watch for and analyze instances of commendable
and valuable services to clients that technically violate the rules of
professional responsibility. Such analysis should provide the pro-
fession with clues to defining and refining the principles that gov-
ern the attorney's role in alternative dispute resolution
processes.11
2 2
1120. Id. at 238 & n.2.
1121. Id. at 238-39.
1122. Legal education along with professional experience will shape the profession's
attitudes toward alternative dispute resolution and will influence attorneys' perceptions of
their role in these processes. Only a small percentage of American law schools offer media-
tion and alternative dispute resolution training. See Riskin, supra note 923, at 48. Cur-
rently, popular teaching methods and curricula reinforce the development of the adversarial
nature of the legal profession. See, e.g., Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation
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VIII. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Introduction
The tremendous growth in the amount of litigation in state
and federal courts during the last few decades, and the accompa-
nying problems of clogged court dockets and long trial delays, have
induced states to create and individuals to seek alternative meth-
ods of dispute resolution. Two prominent nonjudicial methods of
dispute resolution that have achieved considerable popularity in
recent years are state reference procedures, more commonly known
as rent-a-judge procedures, and ombudsmen complaint and prob-
lem handling offices. State rent-a-judge statutes typically authorize
parties to select, pay, and have their disputes resolved by a referee.
Ombudsman's offices, on the other hand, generally are administra-
tive bodies that governmental entities, nongovernmental institu-
tions, and media organizations create to handle and resolve in an
impartial manner the complaints which constituents and individu-
als bring against them.
This part of the Special Project first considers state rent-a-
judge programs. Part B highlights the procedures parties typically
must follow to resolve a dispute in a rent-a-judge proceeding. It
then discusses the advantages of rent-a-judge procedures to dis-
puting parties and to the judicial system. Finally, part B analyzes
potential constitutional due process, equal protection, and first
amendment challenges to these procedures. Part C then discusses
the expanding role of governmental, institutional, and media
ombudsmen and the benefits and problems of using ombudsmen as
complaint and problem handlers.
and Conciliation, 26 Am. J. Coup. L. 205, 215 (Supp. 1978), quoted in Riskin, supra note
923, at 48. To introduce alternative dispute resolution theories and methodologies into law
schools, legal educators will have to modify their schools curricula, design new courses, and
adjust teaching methods. See Harvard Curriculum to Include Dispute Settlement, 8 A.B.
A. DIspuTr RESOLUTION 2 (1982). Without these modifications, law schools will continue to
produce attorneys who lack the essential skills for successfully practicing nonadversarial dis-
pute settlement. See Gee & Jackson, Current Studies of Legal Education: Findings and
Recommendations, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 471, 482 (1982). Attorneys who feel uncomfortable
performing these services because of their educational background are unlikely to advocate
the development of these processes by the legal profession. The law schools alone are not
responsible for the emphasis on adversarial skills, however, the bar examiners-who rarely
test students on nonadversarial skills, Brown, A Memorandum on Nonadversarial Law
Practice and Preventive Law, 6 J. LEGAL PRor. 39, 44 (1981)-must
share the responsibility. Clearly, any appreciable shift in professional perspective away from
adversarial proceedings toward alternative dispute resolution will require cooperation from




1. The Rent-a-Judge Procedure
The rapidly expanding amount of litigation conducted in
United States courts has placed an enormous strain on the judicial
system's ability to process cases expeditiously.'12 3 As a result, par-
ties increasingly have become interested in seeking nonjudicial res-
olutions to their conflicts. Several states, including California
where the problem of court delay is particularly acute,"24 have
given litigants the option of seeking relief through a statutory case
reference procedure."2 5 For example, California's reference proce-
dures, more commonly known as rent-a-judge procedures," 2 ' au-
thorize parties to take their cases before retired judges that they
personally select and pay. The California statute has authorized
these retired judges to render decisions that have the effect on dis-
puting parties of trial court judgments. 27 Rent-a-judge proce-
dures, therefore, are not really nonjudicial alternatives but rather
an accommodation within the judicial system that allows disputing
parties to bypass the judicial system.
The California rent-a-judge statute is representative of several
1123. See S. REP. No. 117, 95th Cong, 2d Sess, 7-10, 15-19 (describing the recent in-
crease in the federal docket caseload), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3569,
3570-73, 3578-82; Note, The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Pol-
icy Considerations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1592 (1981). See generally
Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567 & n.2 (1975) (projecting, at
current rates, a million cases a year in courts of appeals by the early twenty first century);
Hufstedler, The Future of Civil Litigation, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 753. For a discussion on state
court backlog see Church, Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 166, 169-70
(1978); see Boyum, A Perspective on Civil Delay in Trial Courts, 5 JUST. Sys. J. 170 (1979).
Docket crowding problems also arise because of the increasing complexity of litigated cases
that results in longer trials. Janofsky, The "Big Case"-A "Big Burden" on Our Courts,
1980 UTAH L. REv. 719.
1124. The average civil suit in California Superior Courts takes aproximately 3.5 to 4.5
years to reach a trial calendar. Note, supra note 1123, at 1592. The Los Angeles Superior
Court has an estimated 73,000 case five year backlog. Christensen, Private Justice: Califor-
nia's General Reference Procedure, 1982 A.B.Fan'N. RESEARCH J. 79, 102; Myers, Rent-A-
Judge in California, 131 NEw L.J. 1042, 1043 (1981).
1125. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 638-45 (West 1976). At least five other states have stat-
utory provisions similar to the California general reference statute: New York (N.Y. Civ.
PRAc., LAw §§ 4301-4321 (McKinney Supp. 1980), Oregon (OF- REv. STAT. §§ 17.705-.990
(1979)), Rhode Island (R.L GEN. LAws §§ 9-15-1 to -21 (1969); R.L R. Civ. P. 53), South
Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-31-10 to -150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980)), Washington
(WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.48.010-.100 (1979)). Myers, supra note 1124, at 1044; Note,
supra note 1123, at 1595 & n.16.
1126. See, e.g., Hill, Rent-a-Judge, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1980, at 1; Yates, States's
Rent-a-Judge Plan Offers Speedy Justice, Chi. Tribune, Dec. 14, 1980, § 3, at 22.
1127. Note, supra note 1123, at 1592-93. See also Christensen, supra note 2, at 79.
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other currently existing state reference procedures. It allows
courts, with the consent of disputing parties, to submit an entire
case to a referee who the disputing parties mutually agree upon for
final disposition of all legal and factual issues.11 8 While the Cali-
fornia statute does not require referees to possess any special qual-
ifications,12" other state statutes do require referees to possess cer-
tain qualifications. 1"30  Under California's procedure, parties
frequently choose retired judges to referee their disputes.13 ' Be-
cause retired judges normally possess acknowledged judicial skills
and, in many instances, expertise in the substantive area of law at
issue, their selection usually enhances the likelihood of a fast and
fair trial." 2 The parties usually agree to pay referees compensa-
tion that ranges from about $50 to $100 an hour or $300 to $1,000
a day."33 Parties generally split referees fees equally but indepen-
dently bear other costs of resolving their dispute.1" 4
Rent-a-judge proceedings are similar to traditional judicial tri-
als and follow rules of civil procedure and evidence."3 ' Unlike
traditional trials, however, the parties and referee in California
rent-a-judge proceedings jointly agree upon the time and place of
the proceedings." 38 California also allows these parties to exclude
both the public and the press from the proceedings." 7 After com-
pletion of a rent-a-judge proceeding, a referee must file with a trial
court separate statements containing findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. A referee's decision becomes a judgment of the trial
1128. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638(1) (West 1976).
1129. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 81; Note, supra note 1123, at 1597. Although
section 640 of the CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE empowers courts to select a referee if the parties do
not agree, in practice the parties usually select the referee. Christensen, supra note 1124, at
81. The parties may select up to three referees to hear their case. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
640 (1976).
1130. For example, Connecticut authorizes referee trials, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
434 (West Cumm. Supp. 1981); however, only retired trial judges designated by the chief
justice of the state supreme court may serve as referees in adversarial proceedings. Christen-
sen, supra note 1124, at 108, 108 n.125.
1131. Id. at 81.
1132. Id.
1133. Id. at 83; Gnaizda, Rent-A-Judge: Secret Justice for the Priviliged Few, 66 Ju-
DICATURE 6, 11 (1982); Note, supra note 1123, at 1598. If the parties cannot come to an
agreement, the statute empowers the courts to set reasonable compensation rates for the
referee. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1023 (West 1980).
1134. Note, supra note 1123, at 1598 n.23.
1135. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 81; see Myers, supra note 1124, at 1042.
1136. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 81, 83.
1137. Id., at 81-82; Note, supra note 1123, at 1598.
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court when the referee files these statements with a court clerk.11 "
The parties may take exception to the judgment by moving for a
new trial before a trial court judge. If the trial judge denies this
motion, the losing party can appeal the final judgment to an appel-
late court.1 3
2. Advantages of the Rent-a-Judge Procedure
Rent-a-judge procedures offer disputing parties substantial
advantages over traditional trials. The most obvious advantage to
parties is the opportunity for speedier dispute resolution, particu-
larly in jurisdictions suffering from overcrowded court dockets. Al-
though the precise amount of time that litigants save in a rent-a-
judge trial is uncertain, parties who elect this option generally re-
solve their disputes much faster than those who seek places on a
court calendar.11 40 For example, one case in which the attorneys
expected a two-and-one-half year contest at a cost of $250,000 in
attorney fees required only four months to resolve in a rent-a-
judge proceeding and cost only $50,000.1141 This time saving results
from the parties' freedom to select referees who can hear their
cases immediately and the inherent scheduling flexibility that al-
lows referees to run efficient proceedings and avoid long continu-
ances.1 142 This scheduling flexibility benefits all participants in
rent-a-judge proceedings because, unlike participants in judicial
proceedings who must follow court-imposed deadlines and timeta-
bles, 1143 rent-a-judge proceeding participants are statutorily per-
1138. CAL. Cirv. PRoc. CODE § (West 1976).
1139. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 81; Myers supra note 1124, at 1042; Note,
supra note 1123, at 1598-99.
1140. Note, supra note 1123, at 1599.
1141. See Janofsky, supra note 1123, at 725; Hill, supra note 1126, at 1; Retired
Judges Hired to Decide Lawsuits in Private, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1980, at A25, col. 1 [here-
inafter cited as Retired Judges]; see also Christensen, supra note 1124, at 83 (predicting
that rent-a-judge procedures may reduce the time required to litigate cases for years to
months or even weeks).
But see Myers, supra note 1124, at 1043. In a controversy between the California Attor-
ney General's Office and a number of oil companies, the parties never achieved their objec-
tive of obtaining a speedy trial. The referee they chose already was busy with another dis-
pute and a year elapsed before he was free to try their case. The lawyers expected their
hearing to last no more than two days because they already had submitted extensive briefs
to the referee. Nevertheless, the referee ordered both sides to read into the record all of the
administrative records that he was to consider. The procedure took nineteen days and
caused both parties to incur enormous expense. Id.
1142. Note, supra note 1123, at 1599. For example, a referee also may decide to hold
the hearings at night or on weekends.
1143. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 81, 83.
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mitted to schedule trial time tables at their own convenience. 114'
The accelerated disposition of the controversy also contributes to
the quality of the judgments by giving the referees fresher evi-
dence on which to base their decisions." 45
The ability of parties to select referees who possess expertise
in the subject matter of the litigation under rent-a-judge statutes
helps to improve the quality and efficiency of trials."4 The ability
to select judges according to their expertise is particularly helpful
in litigation, such as product deficiency claims, that requires analy-
sis of highly technical apparatus. These statutory provisions give
parties greater assurance that referees will adjudicate their dis-
putes competently"1'4 and expeditiously. " 4 The presence of spe-
cially selected referees also should reduce trial time because the
parties often would not need to present basic explanatory material
that judges frequently request when they have limited knowledge
of the litigation's technical subject matter.""9 The substantial re-
duction in the amount of time spent preparing, trying, and appeal-
ing cases should decrease overall litigation costs." 50 In this regard,
one attorney noted that the rent-a-judge procedure had "saved
80% of the delays, 80% of the legal fees and 80% of the aggrava-
tion" associated with trying cases in the judicial system.
1 5
The privacy of rent-a-judge proceedings is another advantage
that these statutes give disputing parties. The rent-a-judge proce-
dure provides no mechanism for giving the public or press notice of
the times or places of trials." 2 In many cases, the parties may pre-
fer this feature because they desire to keep the hearing and find-
ings private." 53 Recently, a well-known television personality and
his employer referred a contract dispute to a referee through the
1144. Id.
1145. Note, supra note 1123, at 1601.
1146. Note, supra note 1123, at 1599.
1147. A referee who is familiar with the subject matter of a dispute is less likely to
analyze the evidence erroneously than a referee whose initial exposure to that subject mat-
ter comes during the proceedings. Note, supra note 1123, at 1599.
1148. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 83.
1149. One reference procedure user observed: "Sometimes judges are not sophisticated
in a certain area. I prefer not to start with the basics, but to get right to the heart of the
matter." Id. at 83-84.
1150. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 84; Note, supra note 1123, at 1599. But see
supra note 1141.
1151. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 84 (citing Hill, supra note 1126, at 12); see
Gnaizda, supra note 1133, at 11.




California rent-a-judge statute and stipulated that the referee not
disclose the time or place of the hearing.11" In that case, and prob-
ably in many other cases, the rent-a-judge procedure gave the par-
ties a dispute resolution option that probably facilitated a prompt
settlement without causing the embarrassment and negative pub-
licity that often attends traditional trials.1155
The users of rent-a-judge procedures may not be its only bene-
ficiaries, especially if this procedure gains broader popularity. Be-
cause rent-a-judge trials divert cases from court dockets to private
referees, disputes resolved through these procedures should help to
unclog overcrowded court dockets. Consequently, litigants should
enjoy less crowded court calendars with earlier trial dates. 158 In
addition, rent-a-judge trials spare states the expense of judicial tri-
als because these parties privately pay referees' fees and other ex-
penses they incur in the dispute resolution process.
1157
3. Constitutional Objections to Rent-a-Judge
Procedures
Despite the question whether rent-a-judge procedures consti-
tute state action1 58 and the apparent advantages these procedures
1154. Note, supra note 1123, at 1600; Hill, supra note 1126, at 15; Retired Judges,
supra note 1141, at A25, col. 1. See Myers, supra note 1124, at 1043.
1155. Note, supra note 1113, at 1599-1600.
1156. Note, supra note 1123, at 1600. See also Weisman, Shortcut to Trial: Use of
Orders of Reference and Judges Pro Tern, 3 A. Bus. TRIAL LAW REP. 3 (1980). But see
Christensen, supra note 1124, at 84-85; Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D.
111, 113-14 (1976) (the "[p]rice of an improved scheme of dispute processing may well be a
vast increase in the number of disputes being processed.").
1157. Note, supra note 1123, at 1600.
1158. Before reaching the substantive merits of first amendment, due process, and
equal protection challenges to rent-a-judge procedures, courts must determine whether
these procedures consitute "state action." See J. NowAi, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 451 (1978). The fourteenth amendment protects individuals against state in-
fringment of due process and equal protection liberties. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The
Supreme Court, through the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), also protects individuals against state infringement of their first amendment free
speech liberties. The first amendment and the fourteenth amendment due process and equal
protection clauses, however, only protect individuals from the actions of state governments,
not those of private individuals and entities. See McCoy, Current State Action Theories,
the Jackson Nexus Requirement, and Employee Discharges by Semi-Public and State-
Aided Institutions, 31 VAND. L. REv. 785 (1978); Burke & Reber, State Action, Congres-
sional Power, and Creditor's Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1003, 1034 (1973). Absent a finding of state action, rent-a-judge procedures would be
unassailable on federal due process, equal protection, and first amendment grounds. Other
commentators who have discussed state statutorily created rent-a-judge procedures failed to
mention this state action issue. See Christensen supra note 1124; Note, supra note 1123.
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offer disputing parties, critics have assailed these statutes as un-
constitutional. The costliness of rent-a-judge trials, they argue,
precludes the poor from using these procedures in violation of the
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection
clauses. 1159 The critics further contend that the private nature of
These commentators, by discussing constitutional challenges to rent-a-judge procedures, im-
plicitly presumed that these procedures constituted state action. Most courts probably
would agree with this presumption in light of current, but confusing, judicial analysis of
state action issues. See, e.g., L. TRmE, AmmxucAN CoNsTrrUMoNAL LAW 1148-49 (1978);
Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. Rxv. 69, 95 (1967); McCoy, supra, at 788.
Although courts and commentators largely agree that the question whether any particu-
lar challenged activity constitutes state action is answerable "[o]nly by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances," Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961), case law and commentary concerning state action issues reveal numerous identifiable
circumstances and factors that tend to support findings of state action. See generally, J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra, at 451-75 & 1979-80 Pocket Part, 54-57; L. TRIBE,
supra, at 1147-74; McCoy, supra, passim; and Reber & Burke, supra, passim. Arguably, a
state legislature's passage of a rent-a-judge procedure statute alone qualifies as state action
because the government has recognized the legitimacy of, if not encouraged, rent-a-judge
procedures. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 461; L. TrmB, supra, at 1147;
see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934-35 (1982) (holding that a statutory
procedural scheme concerning prejudgment attachments of property obviously was the
product of state action). But see Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that a
state statute which authorized creditor self-help techniques did not convert the creditor's
statutorily authorized activities into state action). Additionally, public function and mutual
contacts concepts of state action support a finding that rent-a-judge proceedings are state
action. See J. NowAK, J. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 456-60, 464-68. The following cases
contain discussion and analyses of the public function test: Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946). The statutory authorization and definition of a proceeding that is al-
most identical to traditional trials and which receives the judicial imprimatur of the state
creates a sufficiently strong nexus to government that reasonably seems to constitute state
action. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) and Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (discussing the degree of entanglement between private
actors and government necessary to classify the challenged activity as state action).
Although some state rent-a-judge procedures arguably could constitute state action,
neither courts nor commentators have intimated an answer to this question for the variety
of rent-a-judge programs that states have enacted. See Note, supra note 1123, at 1594-99.
Undoubtedly, some rent-a-judge procedures, which would be lawful dispute resolution
methods if characterized as private action, would fail under constitutional scrutiny if char-
acterized as state action. If courts adopt a liberal analysis of state action issues under which
any governmental authorization or encouragement of private procedure is state action, see,
e.g., L. TamE, supra, at 1171-74 they will impede the efforts of states to formulate effective
dispute resolution alternatives to judicial litigation. Under constitutional scrutiny, courts
might invalidate or modify the attractive characteristics of rent-a-judge procedures, such as
private proceedings. This judicial reformation of rent-a-judge proceedings into the image of
formal judicial trials inevitably would undercut their foundational policies and diminish
their practical utility.
1159. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 90-93; see Gnaizda, supra note 1133, at 11;
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the trials may infringe upon the public's first amendment right 1160
of access to judicial proceedings.""' Prevailing constitutional doc-
trine, however, suggests that courts will reject these equal protec-
tion and due process arguments. Courts faced with the first
amendment right of access argument, however, must answer two
difficult questions before resolving the access issue. First, they
must decide whether the right of access to criminal trials also ap-
plies to civil trials, and second, if this right applies to civil trials,
whether it also should extend to private rent-a-judge proceedings.
(a) Equal Protection
Critics argue that the rent-a-judge statutes improperly dis-
criminate between wealthy and low income litigants because only
wealthy litigants can afford the costs of these procedures.11 62 These
critics contend that wealthy litigants reap all the inherent advan-
tages of rent-a-judge trials while low income litigants must endure
the disadvantages of the traditional judicial system. This de facto
legislative classification, they argue, determines which judicial re-
sources are available to different economic classes of litigants, and
offends the equal protection clause.""
This equal protection challenge appears doomed to fail be-
cause strict scrutiny review of these statutes is inappropriate for
several reasons. First, the Supreme Court never has acknowledged
a right of access to the civil court system.1 " In Boddie v. Connect-
icut,116 5 for example, the Court stated that "access for all individu-
als to the courts is [not] a right that is, in all circumstances, guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Note, supra note 1123, at 1601-08.
1160. Gnsizda, supra note 1133, at 11; Note, supra note 1123, at 1608-10; see Chris.
tensen, supra note 1124, at 90.
1161. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (core purpose behind first amendment guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and
petition is freedom of communication about government functions).
1162. Note, supra note 1123, at 1601-02. See Christensen, supra note 1124, at 91-92.
Indigents, for example, who cannot afford to pay private counsel for legal services would be
unable to hire a referee. Note, supra note 1123, at 1601.
1163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; Note, supra note 1123, at 1602-03; Gnaizda, supra
note 11 at 11. For a comprehensive discussion of the equal protection doctrine see L. TRIE,
supra note 1158, at 991-1135 (1978).
1164. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 92; Note, supra note 1123 at 1603. See Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U S. 371 (1971) (the Court invalidated the application of state filing fee
requirement to indigents seeking divorce as unconstitutional but refused to recognize a gen-
eral right of access to the courts).
1165. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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... "1 Second, neither the language of rent-a-judge statutes nor
their application evidence an intentional effort to discriminate
against low income litigants. 11 7 Last, the Court repeatedly has
held that legislative classifications based solely upon wealth are
not suspect." 5i e Indeed, the Court has approved access to advan-
tages resulting from a person's financial situation. In abortion-
funding cases, for example, the Court has held that although indi-
gent women enjoy the right to have abortions, the government has
no obligation to finance them.11 9
Some rent-a-judge critics argue that courts should subject
these statutes to intermediate level scrutiny because low income
litigants constitute at least a semisuspect class. Rent-a-judge stat-
utes would be unconstitutional under intermediate level scrutiny
unless a state could demonstrate a substantial relationship be-
tween its important governmental interest in creating the proce-
dure and the de facto, wealth based classification the procedure
contains. 1 7 0 This position is weak because the Supreme Court has
never held that state action containing a wealth based classifica-
tion deserves intermediate level scrutiny, '1 7  and because the
courts probably would agree that the state's interest in reducing
court calendar backlogs and providing alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms justifies the incidental unequal treatment of low
income litigants. 17 2 Thus, courts faced with equal protection chal-
1166. Id. at 382-83.
1167. Note, supra note 1123, at 1602. See Christensen, supra note 1124, at 92; Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976).
1168. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
471 (1977); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
1169. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See
Note, supra note 1123, at 1602 n.54 ("Considered in light of the abortion-funding cases
alone, the use of privately paid referees by a privileged few cannot be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Poor plaintiffs litigating in state courts have not been compelled to make a choice
comparable to that of the pregnant indigents in McRae and Maher, who were forced by
their poverty to relinquish their right to one protected activity altogether. At least the indi-
gents unable to attain reference are not expelled from the court system entirely.").
1170. See Christensen, supra note 1124, at 92; Note, supra note 1123, at 1603-06.
1171. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 92; Note, supra note 1123, at 1604.
1172. But see Note, supra note 1123, at 1606 ("Requiring a substantial relationship
between the state's interest in easing overcrowded dockets and a classification of parties
based on wealth would probably invalidate a litigant-financed reference system. While
overburdened courts are a major problem for many states, allowing only wealthy litigants to
opt out of the courts does not substantially advance the cause of decreasing docket load.
First, reference may not actually reduce overall docket load appreciably .... [Second],
cases that reference removes from the docket are only those in which the parties can afford
to pay extra for referees. They are not necessarily complex or difficult to process.").
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lenges to rent-a-judge statutes probably will defer to the states' de-
termination that these statutes relate rationally to some legitimate
state objective and uphold their constitutionality.
(b) Due Process
Critics of rent-a-judge programs also argue that these pro-
grams violate due process because they inherently favor plain-
tiffs.1117 These critics contend that the private payment of the
referees induces the referees to favor plaintiffs to encourage plain-
tiffs to bring them more business.17 4 These critics rely primarily
on State ex rel. McCleod v. Crowe"7 5 and Shrewsbury v.
Poteet,"76 two state supreme court decisions which held unconsti-
tutional on due process grounds statutes that permitted justices of
the peace and magistrates to collect fees for trying or settling civil
and criminal cases even if payment did not depend upon the case's
outcome. 1 77 The due process problems that infected Crowe and
Shrewsbury, however, are not present in rent-a-judge proceedings.
In hearings before justices of the peace and magistrates, plaintiffs
have complete control over bringing an action. Defendants in these
cases, on the other hand, involuntarily must appear before the
decisionmaker. Thus, justices of the peace and magistrates who
collect privately paid fees sometimes may have a genuine induce-
ment toward favoring a plaintiff."78 The parties to rent-a-judge
trials, on the other hand, share equally the responsibility of select-
ing, paying, and appearing voluntarily before a referee."17 9
Rent-a-judge critics maintain that despite these distinctions
referees nonetheless may tend to rule in favor of frequent users of
the rent-a-judge system to induce these parties to use the system
again in the future."180 A judge, however, who earns a reputation
for bias is unlikely to gain the consent of both parties to a contro-
versy. 181 Furthermore, the contention that infrequent users of
1173. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 90-91; see Note, supra note 1123, at 1607-08.
1174. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 90-91.
1175. 272 S.C. 41, 249 S.E.2d 772 (1978).
1176. 202 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1974).
1177. See Christensen, supra note 1124, at 90-91; Note, supra note 1123, at 1607-08.
1178. See Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d at 631.
1179. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 91.
1180. Note, supra note 1123, at 1608.
1181. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 91. Moreover, "[a]ny temptation to decide in
favor of frequent users of the procedure and against one-time users is likely to be substan-




rent-a-judge procedures will not perceive the biases of perspective
referees'1 82 unfairly assumes that lawyers who represent these par-
ties in the rent-a-judge proceedings will fail to investigate a pro-
spective referee's past decisions and reputation for fairness. The
potential for this type of attorney incompetence should not be a
sufficient basis for courts to determine that rent-a-judge proceed-
ings violate due process.
1 83
(c) The First Amendment Right of Access to Judicial
Proceedings
A third constitutional objection to private rent-a-judge trials is
that the ability of parties to exclude the press and public from
these proceedings infringes the press' and public's right of access
to judicial proceedings."" This argument potentially is the rent-a-
judge critics' strongest suit even though the Supreme Court has
not recognized explicitly a public right to attend civil trials." 55 The
court, however, laid the foundation for this argument in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia" 8 when it held that the first amend-
ment implicitly guarantees the public the right to attend criminal
trials.11 7 Courts must answer two questions before granting the
press and the public a first amendment right to attend rent-a-
judge proceedings. First, whether the first amendment right of ac-
cess to criminal trials should guarantee the press and public a fun-
damental right to attend civil trials. Second, if courts extend this
right to civil trials, they must decide whether private rent-a-judge
proceedings are sufficiently similar to civil trials to warrant exten-
sion of the access right to these proceedings.
1182. See id.; Note, supra note 1124, at 1608 ("[T]heir opponents, the one-time cus-
tomers, would not be aware of the subtle systematic bias working against them.").
1183. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 91.
1184. See id. at 93; Gnaizda, supra note 1133, at 11; Note, supra note 1123, at 1608-
09; Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment as a
Sword, 1980 Sup. CT. Rzv. 1, 20 & nn. 150-51; Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceed-
ings To Richmond Newspapers and Beyond,16 HAav. C.R.-C.L. L. RPv. 415, 430 (1981);
Note, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia A New But Uncertain "Right to Access", 32
SYRAcusz L. Rav. 989, 1028 n. 190 (1981).
1185. See Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Address to
Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1899 (1978). But see Christensen, supra note 1124,
at 93; Gnaizda, supra note 1133, at 11; Note, supra note 1123, at 1609.
1186. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
1187. Id. at 580.
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(1) Applicability of the Right of Access to
Civil Trials
In holding that the first amendment implicitly guarantees the
press and the public a right of access to criminal trials, the Su-
preme Court suggested that this right also would apply to civil tri-
als. Chief Justice Burger based his plurality opinion in Richmond
Newspapers upon the Anglo-American tradition of open court-
rooms in criminal trials.""" He further articulated important pub-
lic policy objectives that open courtrooms and public scrutiny of
proceedings promote, such as ensuring that the courts function
properly and fairly1 89 and providing an "outlet for community
concern, hostility, and emotion."1190 Although the Richmond
Newspapers plurality conceded in a footnote that the question of
the public's right to attend civil proceedings was not before the
court,11 91 the same footnote also observed that "historically both
civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open. ' 11 2 Justice
Stewart, concurring, stated less equivocally that "the First . . .
Amendment clearly give[s] the press and the public a right of ac-
cess to trials . . . , civil as well as criminal."1193 Justice Stewart
justified this statement by characterizing a trial courtroom as a
public forum in which individuals traditionally have engaged in
first amendment activity. "119  In addition, he emphasized that
1188. Id. at 564-69.
1189. Id. at 569.
1190. Id. at 571.
1191. Id. at 580 n.17.
1192. Id.
1193. Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
1194. Justice Stevens, however, emphasized in the following statement that the first
amendment right of access to civil trials would not be absolute:
But this does not mean that the First Amendment right of members of the public and
representatives of the press to attend civil and criminal trials is absolute. Just as a
legislature may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the exer-
cise of First Amendment freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable limitations
upon the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press and
members of the public. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333. Much more than a city
street, a trial courtroom must be a quiet and orderly place. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532.
Moreover, every courtroom has a finite physical capacity, and there may be occasions
when not all who wish to attend a trial may do so. And while there exist many alterna-
tive ways to satisfy the constitutional demands of a fair trial, those demands may also
sometimes justify limitations upon the unrestricted presence of spectators in the
courtroom.
Id. at 600 (footnotes omitted). Justice Stevens added that "preservation of trade secrets, for
example, might justify the exclusion of the public from at least some segments of a civil
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
courtrooms, even more than city streets, sidewalks, and parks, are
places "where representatives of the press and of the public are not
only free to be, but where their presence serves to assure the integ-
rity of what goes on."11 95 Thus, based upon the Court's comments
in Richmond Newspapers, the public and the press probably will
enjoy a first amendment right to attend civil trials in the future.
(2) Applicability of the Right of Access to
Rent-a-Judge Proceedings
Although one commentator has argued that if courts apply the
Richmond Newspapers first amendment right of access to civil tri-
als they also should apply it in rent-a-judge proceedings,1196 the
distinctions between rent-a-judge proceedings and civil trials, and
the implications of this application of the access right arguably
weigh against this argument. This commentator argued that rent-
a-judge courts are "functionally" identical to trial courts even
though parties privately fund rent-a-judge proceedings. 19 7 This
commentator emphasized that rent-a-judge referees are less ac-
countable to the public than are trial judges because trial judges
bind the general public with their decisions while rent-a-judge
referees bind only the parties to a dispute and their decisions have
little if any precedential value.1 9 8 After noting that rent-a-judge
decisions sometimes have widespread public impact, this commen-
tator concluded that if the argument for giving the public "a first
amendment right of access to supervise governmental functions
has any force, it is even more compelling in matters in which the
public is affected and governmental authority 19 9 is exercised by
those who, but for public scrutiny, would have no other
accountability.'
' 20 0
Despite superficial similarities between civil trials and rent-a-
judge proceedings, several differences between these two methods
of adjudicating disputes strongly suggests that the press and public
should not enjoy an absolute constitutional right to attend rent-a-
judge proceedings even if courts expand this right to cover civil
trial." Id. at n.5.
1195. Id. at 600.
1196. Note, supra note 1123, at 1608-10.
1197. Id. at 1610.
1198. Id. at 1610-12.
1199. See supra note 1158 for an analysis of whether rent-a-judge proceedings consti-
tute state action.
1200. Note, supra note 1123, at 1610.
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trials. First, unlike state funded civil trials, rent-a-judge parties
privately pay their referees and all expenses of the proceedings.12 1
Second, rent-a-judge parties choose mutually agreed upon referees
to resolve their disputes1 202 while litigants in civil trials have little,
if any, ability to select the judges that hear their cases. Third, un-
like judgments in civil trials that are binding precedent upon the
public in future cases, rent-a-judge decisions, like arbitration
awards, generally bind only the disputing parties and have very
little precedential value.1 203 Last, the Anglo-American tradition of
open courtrooms that has given the press and public the relatively
unrestricted freedom to attend civil and criminal trials 2 04 does not
also underlie the development of rent-a-judge procedures. Rather,
rent-a-judge procedures developed as novel, privately funded alter-
natives to formal civil trials designed to unclog congested court cal-
endars and to provide disputing parties with an expeditious, effec-
tive, inexpensive, and private method of resolving disputes.120 5
Moreover, if courts extend the right of access to rent-a-judge pro-
ceedings they would destroy the private nature of these proceed-
ings-a characteristic that is partially responsible for the growing
popularity of these dispute resolution tribunals. Thus, courts
should not grant the press and the public an absolute first amend-
ment right to attend rent-a-judge proceedings.
Because allowing the press and public to attend rent-a-judge
trials would not harm several important characteristics of these
proceedings, such as inexpensiveness and expeditiousness, and be-
cause the public probably does have an interest in observing the
resolution of certain disputes,120 the public and the press should
receive a qualified right of access to these proceedings. One com-
mentator proposed a palatable solution to this problem.12 07 This
commentator suggests that when parties decide to settle their dis-
pute in a rent-a-judge proceeding, "a presumption should arise
that the case contains matters of public interest and that the trial
should be open to the public."1 10 8 The parties to rent-a-judge pro-
ceedings then should bear the burden of demonstrating that the
1201. See supra notes 1133-34 and accompanying text.
1202. See supra note 1128 and accompanying text.
1203. Note, supra note 1123, at 1611 & nn. 106-07, 1612-13.
1204. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-69 (1980).
1205. See supra notes 1140-57 and accompanying text.
1206. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 97-98.
1207. Id. at 99.
1208. Id.
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public has no compelling interest in observing the proceeding "and
that they have legitimate reasons for secrecy.' 1209 If the parties fail
to satisfy this burden, they should bear an additional burden of
giving the press and the public suitable notice of the times and
places of the proceeding. 210 This presumptive right of access is
palatable because it probably would result in the holding of public
proceedings when the resolution of disputes has important societal
implications and only a minimal need for secrecy, and conversely,
in the holding of private proceedings when disputes do not signifi-
cantly affect society and the need for privacy is important to the
parties.
4. Policy and Practical Objections to Rent-a-Judge Procedures
Rent-a-judge critics supplement their attack on the constitu-
tionality of these procedures with policy arguments decrying these
programs as intrinsically unfair. These policy arguments, which
often resemble the constitutional objections to rent-a-judge proce-
dures, may persuade legislatures to enact laws designed to remedy
the social infirmities in these programs even though they probably
can withstand constitutional attack. Commentators have criticized
rent-a-judge programs as unfair because they offer swift, efficient,
and private remedies only to disputing parties who are able to af-
ford the cost of hiring a referee, while less affluent parties must
suffer inconvenient delays in the judicial system.121 California Su-
preme Court Chief Justice Bird, for example, denounced the rent-
a-judge program as "a quasi-private judicial system for the
wealthy"'212 that allows affluent disputing parties "to play by dif-
ferent rules"1  in settling their disputes.
Supporters of rent-a-judge proceedings advocate that these
procedures are available to any party whose claim is sufficiently
large to justify the procedures' expense. 21 4 Moreover, rent-a-judge
proponents present evidence that resolving disputes through rent-
a-judge proceedings frequently is less expensive than traditional
1209. Id.
1210. Id.
1211. Id. at 94.
1212. Coulson, Rent-A-Judge: Private Settlement for the Public Good, 66 JuDIcATURE
7 (1982); Gnaizda, supra note 1133, at 11; Hager, 'Rent a Judge' Procedure Draws Interest,
Criticism, L. Times, December 22, 1981. Some lawyers have called the rent-a-judge pro-
gram "legal apartheid." Coulson, at 7 (citing L.A. Times, December 22, 1981).
1213. Gnaizda, supra note 1133, at 11.
1214. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 94.
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trials.12 15 Some rent-a-judge proponents more cavalierly argue that
these procedures are not unfair merely because some people
financially cannot afford them.12 1 6 The judicial system, they argue,
contains similar inequities. Wealthy litigants, for example, argua-
bly have an advantage in court because they can afford more and
better legal representation than lower income litigants.
Rent-a-judge programs also potentially threaten to lower the
quality of judging in the judicial system. The potential for earning
lucrative wages as a private referee117 might lure judges away from
the judicial system especially if legislatures do not pass statutory
limitations on referees' salaries and prevent the demand for com-
petent referees from driving up rent-a-judge fees. Consequently,
refereeing could become an enticing alternative to serving as a
judge, especially for jurists whose reputation for competence and
fairness would allow them to charge premium refereeing fees. At
this early stage in the development of rent-a-judge procedures, the
reality and scope of this threat is speculative at best. The present
ability of judges to earn lucrative salaries as private attorneys
presents a similar threat to the quality of judges in the judicial
system. 218 The trappings of judgeships, including prestige, author-
ity, and challenging work, probably help to minimize the flow of
competent judges from the bench to private practice. Refereeing
disputes, unlike practicing law, however, could give referees some
of the same satisfaction judges experience while presiding over tri-
als. Thus, the monetary and professional attraction of refereeing
may jostle the ranks of judges somewhat more than the allure of
private practice. In light of these concerns, state legislatures may
need to design and modify rent-a-judge procedure statutes with an
eye toward maintaining a balance of competence between the
judges and referees who resolve disputes in judicial and rent-a-
judge proceedings.
1215. Id. at 84, 94; see supra notes 1150, 1151 and accompanying text.
1216. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 95; see also Myers, supra note 1124, at 1044
(quoting Joseph A. Wapner, former presiding judge at the Superior Court in Los Angeles:
"If the rich get something the poor can't, that's not different from anything else in our
society, the poor don't drive Mercedes either.").
1217. See supra note 1133.
1218. See generally Flaherty, Judges are Militant, Bitter Over Pay, NAT'L L.J., April




Undoubtedly, rent-a-judge procedures offer an attractive alter-
native to dispute resolution in the judicial system. Litigants using
rent-a-judge procedures enjoy prompt, private, and convenient
proceedings, potential time and expense savings, and the opportu-
nity to try their cases before a referee with expertise in the subject
matter of litigation. The future success of rent-a-judge procedures,
however, probably depends more upon their benefit to society in
general rather than just their benefit to individual disputing par-
ties. Although proponents of rent-a-judge procedures proclaim that
they help unclog overcrowded court dockets, critics of these proce-
dures deny that they have any significant impact on court conges-
tion.12119 For example, rent-a-judge critics estimate that in Los An-
geles County, California, where litigants file more than 230,000 new
cases every year, rent-a-judge proceedings annually absorb only
two percent of this case load.1220 According to this estimation, the
average filing to trial period for most cases would decrease only 15
days, from 59 to 58.5 months. 2 1 These estimates probably do not
reflect accurately the potential for growth in the level of participa-
tion in rent-a-judge proceedings that could develop as the public
becomes more aware of this alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nism. If rent-a-judge proceedings do not relieve court congestion
more significantly in the future, however, the other advantages of
rent-a-judge programs alone might be unable to withstand the con-
stitutional and social policy attacks on the procedures. If, however,
rent-a-judge procedures appreciably soothe the problem of court
backlogs, the courts and legislatures probably would embrace these
procedures as legally acceptable and necessary adjuncts to the ju-
dicial system.
1219. Gnaizda, supra note 1133, at 12-13.
1220. Id. Gnaizda derived this percentage by first assuming that parties will refer 500
cases each year. He then gave each case a weight ten times that of all civil cases tried be-
cause he assumed that rent-a-judge cases probably are more complex than most civil cases.
Id. Christensen estimated that cases referred to private judges each year in Los Angeles
County account for only about 2V4 % of all tried civil cases and only 1 % of all tried cases.
He calculated the percentage assuming that 8,800 civil cases and 6,900 domestic relations
cases go to trial each year (11% of the cases filed annually), and that parties refer 200 cases
to private judges annually. Christensen, supra note 1124, at 102.




1. The Role of the Ombudsman
In 1809 the Swedish government created the office of
ombudsman, an administrative body that helped disgruntled citi-
zens resolve complaints about specific government practices and
policies. 1222 The use of ombudsmen did not become popular in the
United States until the mid-1960s.'22 3 The duties of ombudsmen
include providing information to citizens with complaints or
problems, referring them to appropriate governmental agencies or
departments, helping them formulate complaints, forwarding their
complaints to appropriate offices, and monitoring the governmen-
tal actions taken in response to their complaints. 122  The following
common characteristics of ombudsmen making them particularly
good at resolving citizens' problems and complaints: independence
from the political influences of governmental bodies,'2 2 5 impartial-
ity concerning the complaints and problems they handle,'2 exper-
tise concerning the governmental body for whom they handle citi-
zens' complaints, universal accessibility to citizens, and the power
to make problem solving recommendations and publish their
findings.'2 2
7
Although governments typically do not empower ombudsmen
1222. W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CrruSNs' PRoTECroRS i Nnm CouN-
TRES 194 (1966).
1223. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM.
L. Rzv. 845, 845 (1975). Professor Walter Gellhorn is credited with popularizing the concept
of an ombudsman in the United States. Id. at 845, 861. Two of his books remain the defini-
tive works on this subject. See W. GELLHORN, supra note 1222; W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMm-
CANS COMPLA N/GovwRNMENTAL GRmvANCE PRoCEDURES (1966). For further reading on the
ombudsman see S. ANDERSON, OmBuDsmAN PAPERS: AMEmcAN EXPERENCE AND PROPoSALS
(1969), D. ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN: CroZN's DEFENDER (2d ed. 1968), and ESTABmsHNa
O tMUDSMAN OFFIcEs: RacENT EXPERNCE iN THE UNITED STATES (S. Anderson &
J. Moore eds. 1972).
1224. See Cramton, A Federal Ombudsman, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1, 3.
1225. An ombudsman for government agencies should be independent of the govern-
ment and partisan politics. Cramton, supra note 1224, at 4. For example, in Nebraska an
ombudsman cannot hold elected office or participate in partisan political activities. NEB.
Rzv. STAT. § 81-8, 242 (1976).
1226. The ombudsman is not an advocate or a government adversary, but rather a
mediator or an intermediary who recommends changes in administrative structure and pro-
cedure to remedy individual or general problems within the system. See Broderick, One-
Legged Ombudsman in a Mental Hospital: An Over-the-Shoulder Glance at an Experi-
mental Project, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 517, 522 (1973). Although attorneys possibly could fill
the role of ombudsman because of their training and work experience, professional ethical
concerns may inhibit them from acting in this capacity. See supra notes 1003-1115 and
accompanying text.
1227. S. ANDERSON, supra note 1223, at 3-4.
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to change official decisions,1228 policy, and regulations, their au-
thority to recommend corrective action12 29 to decisionmakers en-
ables ombudsmen to offer significant benefits to conflicting parties.
By facilitating dispute resolution between disgruntled citizens and
government, ombudsmen may spare citizens the typical discom-
fort, frustration, and expense of resolving problems and litigating
disputes with bureaucratic organizations.1 23 0 Thus, citizens with
complaints about administrative mistakes and abuses of power1 231
should have an incentive to turn to ombudsmen because
ombudsmen frequently facilitate dispute resolution and because
using ombudsmen does .not preclude citizens from resorting to a
legal remedy at a later time.1232 In some instances, however, dis-
pute resolution by ombudsmen is the only road to relief because
legal technicalities or sovereign immunity from suit may preclude a
citizen from obtaining a judicial remedy.12 33
Governmental bodies similarly benefit from the services of
ombudsmen. The ombudsman process instills within citizens a
feeling of confidence and goodwill toward government,1 234 sup-
plants more expense problem solving techniques such as litiga-
tion,123" and enables governmental bodies to identify and remedy
efficiently and inexpensively their functional problems.1236 These
advantages of ombudsman programs have encouraged govern-
ments,'12 3 7 and other institutions1288 such as large corporations,1 239
1228. See Cramton, supra note 1224, at 8.
1229. See Frank, State Ombudsman Legislation in the United States, 29 U. MLOM L.
Rzv. 397, 399 (1975).




1234. Cramton, supra note 1224, at 8.
1235. Frank, supra note 1229, at 398-99.
1236. Id.
1237. See Bingham, Ombudsman: "The Dayton Model" 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 807
(1972); Frank, supra note 1229; Wyner, Complaint Resolution in Nebraska: Citizens, Bu-
reaucrats and the Ombudsman, 54 NEB. L. Rav. 1 (1975).
1238. See, e.g., Broderick, supra note 1226; Foegen, An Ombudsman as Complement
to the Grievance Procedure, 23 LAB. L.J. 289 (1972) (labor disputes); Hannigan, The News-
paper Ombudsman and Consumer Complaints: An Empirical Assessment, 11 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 679 (1977) (consumers); King, The Consumer Ombudsman, 79 CoM. L.J. 355 (1974)
(consumers); Moore, Ombudsman and the Ghetto, 1 CoNN. L. REV. 244 (1968) (the poor);
Regan, When Nursing Home Patients Complain: The Ombudsman or the Patient Advo-
cate, 65 GEo. L.J. 691 (1977) (nursing homes); Silbert & Sussman, The Rights of Juveniles
Confined in Training Schools and the Experience of a Training School Ombudsman, 40
BaOoKLYN L. REv. 605 (1974) (juveniles in training schools); Warren, Ombudsman Plus Ar-
bitration: A Proposal for Effective Grievance Administration Without Public Employee
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prisons,140 and universities 2411 to create ombudsman offices. Citi-
zens' use of ombudsmen to resolve problems and complaints they
have with government probably yields better results than appeal-
ling to legislators because legislators often lack the expertise,
funds, personnel, power, and impartiality needed to resolve the in-
dividual problems of their constituents. 24 ' Ombudsmen also prob-
ably decrease the caseload burden on trial courts because they of-
fer potential litigants a less expensive and less stressful avenue of
relief.
2. State and Local Government Ombudsmen
State1243 and local governments1244 in the United States have
Unions, 29 LAB. L.J. 562 (1978) (labor organizations).
1239. Several large American corporations including Chrysler, RCA, Xerox, and Chase
Manhattan Bank have established ombudsman programs. Warren, supra note 1238, at 563-
64. Ford Motor Company has seven consumer appeals boards throughout the United States
that handle over 5,000 complaints a year. Taylor, When Business Tries to Regulate Itself,
U.S. Naws & WORLD REPORT, 65, 66, May 17, 1982. The Major Appliance Consumer Action
Panel ("MACAP") handles nearly 2,000 consumer complaints each year, 70% of which focus
on poor performance of appliances or shoddy repair jobs by dealers. Id. MACAP officials
typically resolve complaints within two and one half months. Id.
Virginia Knauer, the White House consumer adviser, is trying to encourage other indus-
tries to establish complaint-handling offices. Id. at 67. More than 85% of the nation's top
500 companies have toll free telephone numbers to handle customer complaints. Id. Accord-
ing to American Telephone & Telegraph officials, at least half of the 1.6 billion "800" phone
calls in 1981 concerned customer service. Id.
1240. Tibbles, Ombudsmen for American Prisons, 48 N.D. L. Rav. 383 (1972); Note,
The Penal Ombudsman: A Step Toward Penal Reform, 3 PAc L.J. 166 (1972).
1241. See Stieber, Resolving Campus Disputes: Notes of a University Ombudsman,
37 ARB. J. June 1982, at 5. Verkuil, supra note 1223, at 850-51.
1242. Frank, supra note 1229, at 398-99.
1243. In 1967 Hawaii became the first state to establish its own ombudsman's office.
Wyner, supra note 1237, at 2. Currently, four states have enacted ombudsman statutes. See
ALAsiA STAT. §§ 24.55.010-.340 (1978); HAwI Rzv. STAT. §§96-1 to -19 (1976); IowA CODE
ANN. §§ 601g-1-23 (West 1975 and West Supp. 1983-84); NEn. REv. STAT. §§81-8,240 to 8,254
(1981). These statutes follow the classic Swedish model See W. GELLHORN, supra note 1222,
at 194-255. Nine states have established ombudsman offices by executive order: Colorado,
Florida, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. XI
INTERNATIONAL OMauDSMAN INSTITUTE, OMBUDSN AND OTHER COMPLAINT-HANDLiNG SYs-
TrMs SuRVZY 27-28 (July 1, 1981-June 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as OMBUDSMAN INSTi-
TUTE]. Additionally, some states have statutory provisions for specialized offices. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5231 (Supp. 1973) (correctional institutions).
1244. In 1971 Dayton, Ohio established the first local ombudsman. In the program's
first year, the ombudsman succeeded in resolving almost 3,000 complaints (15 complaints a
day) about the city's public services. Approximately 42 % of the calls for assistance came
from the poor, who typically complained of deficiencies in basic municipal housing services.
The ombudsman received phone calls, kept a log of the progress of research, completed
cases, and reviewed the results. The Dayton ombudsman made a substantial impact upon
the operation of municipal public services. In the first year, for example, the City Manager
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experimented with the use of ombudsmen as dispute handlers.12 '
The proliferation of model ombudsman statutes and advisory
statements about ombudsmen reflect a growing recognition that
government ombudsmen are legitimate dispute handlers. In 1965
the Harvard Student Legislative Bureau drafted the first model
ombudsman statute.1246 Two years later, Professor Walter Gellhorn
composed a model statute entitled the "Annotated Model
Ombudsman Statute.11 247 Soon thereafter, the American Assembly,
a Columbia University conference, urged the establishment of
ombudsman offices in state and local governments,24 and the
American Bar Association ("ABA") suggested twelve essential
characteristics of an ombudsman statute.2 4 Finally, in a joint ef-
fort, the ABA Ombudsman Committee and the Yale Law School
Legislative Services Bureau suggested a comprehensive statute us-
ing the Gellhorn and ABA models as guidelines.1250 These propos-
als supplied ample guidance for the legislators who drafted many
of the currently effective ombudsman statutes. 2 5'
Although government ombudsmen function at both state and
overhauled the municipal water department and the Board of City Commissioners author-
ized welfare benefits for couples without children. For a complete description of the "Day-
ton Model," see Bingham, supra note 1237.
1245. Despite the ABA House of Delegates recommendation in 1969 that the federal
government implement an experimental ombudsman program, no official federal
ombudsman exists. The United States Senate considered the possibility of a federal
ombudsman office in 1966. See Hearings on S. Res. 190 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Seass.
(1966). Congress currently is contemplating passage of a statute creating a federal criminal
procedure ombudsman. The proposed act outlines the responsibilities, salary, and tenure of
this ombudsman. In an article commenting about the proposed act, the author argued that a
federal ombudsman would be an effective mechanism for enforcing constitutinal and other
limitations on police practices. Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J.
CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982).
National governments that have created ombudsman offices include: France, North Ire-
land, Israel, Jamaica, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Mauritius, Netherland, Norway, Papua, New
Guinea, Philippines, Sweden, and Tanzania. INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN INsTrrrrE,
OMBUDSMAN OFFicE PRopIsS: A CoMPAATIVE ANALYSIS OF OMBUDSMEN OFFIcES (April 16,
1982).
1246. Frank, supra note 1229, at 399.
1247. Id. See OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GovRmNusrr? 159-73 (S. Anderson ed. 1968)
for a reprint of Gellhorn's model.
1248. THE AMERIcAN ASSEMBLY, THE OMBUDSMAN: REPORT OF THE THmRTY-SEcoND
AMERIcAN ASSEMBLY (1967).
1249. See Frank, supra note 1229; at 400-01, for a reprint of the ABA resolution.
1250. Id. at 444.
1251. The ABA Ombudsman Committee, for example, mailed a copy of its Model
Ombudsman Statute for State Governments to the state legislative reference bureaus, li-
braries, and other interested persons. Frank, supra note 1229, at 401.
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local levels of government, the duties and power of these officials
typically are the same. Government ombudsmen review a variety
of citizens' complaints including: complaints about inadequate ad-
ministrative procedures and laws, inappropriate administrative ac-
tivities and decisions, and official misconduct. 5'2 As an officer of
the legislature that created its office, an ombudsman's jurisdiction
normally is limited to reviewing that government's administrative
agencies and departments.1253 Ombudsman statutes usually em-
power the ombudsman to request information from government
agencies, issue subpoenas, and examine pertinent records or docu-
ments.1 254 If a government agency within an ombudsman's jurisdic-
tion refuses to comply with an ombudsman's proposed solution to
a specific complaint or general recommendation concerning an
agency's policies and practices, that ombudsman may report his
findings and recommendations directly and publicly to the
legislature.1255
Although one of an ombudsman's primary objectives is to help
complaining citizens circumvent bureaucratic red tape,56
ombudsman offices, especially offices that serve large numbers of
citizens, sometimes suffer from the bureaucratic maladies that his-
torically have plagued governments. Ombudsmen probably can
function more effectively when government limits their jurisdiction
to governmental bodies with smaller constituencies. Thus, local
governments are fertile ground for the growth of the ombudsman's
role in the United States.
1 25 7
1252. See Wyner, supra note 1237, at 16. A legislatively established ombudsman, how-
ever, also might serve in a dispute resolution capacity between a complaining citizen and a
nongovernmental entity. For example, an ombudsman might handle consumer complaints,
see infra notes 1270-73 and accompanying text, and disputes between private citizens. See
Wyner supra note 1237, at 16.
1253. See, e.g., NEB. Rav. STAT. §81-8,245 (1976). The Nebraska statute directs its
ombudsman to focus on administrative acts that might be:
1. Contrary to law or regulation;
2. Unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or inconsistent with the general course of an ad-
ministrative agency's judgments;
3. Mistaken in law or arbitrary in ascertainment of facts;
4. Improper in motivation or based on irrelevant considerations;
5. Unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been revealed; or
6. Inefficiently performed.
Id. at §81-8,146.
1254. See, e.g., id. at §§ 81-8,240(1) and -8,245.
1255. Tibbles, supra note 1240, at 387.
1256. Foegan, supra note 1238, at 289.
1257. In 1972, The Ombudsman Committee Report to the American Bar Association
listed only three functional community ombudsman programs: Dayton, Ohio, Seattle-Kings
10351984]
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The prospects for increasing interest in the development of lo-
cal ombudsmen are significant not only because the job might be
more manageable than that of state ombudsmen, but also because
citizens have a greater voice in local government than they do in
state and federal government. With the cooperation of the local
government, citizenry, news media, and local business, local
ombudsmen could become invaluable institutions of community
service. At this level, funding by private businesses and founda-
tions, local organizations, and the government could cultivate pub-
lic confidence in the political independence and impartiality of
ombudsmen and stimulate continued community support and in-
volvement in these programs.25 8 Coincidentally, heightened com-
munity participation in ombudsman programs probably would
make the task of ombudsmen easier because they would be per-
forming in an atmosphere of cooperation. The ombudsman pro-
grams that American cities have created in recent years have re-
ceived favorable review.12 59 Greater public awareness of these
positive responses undoubtedly will fuel the growth of ombudsmen
as local government complaint-handlers.
3. The Institutional Ombudsman
The notion that governmental ombudsmen probably function
most effectively when handling citizen disputes with local govern-
ments and small constituencies, suggests that smaller nongovern-
mental institutions also could benefit by using ombudsmen to han-
dle complaints leveled against them. Institutional use of
ombudsmen to perform services similar to those that governmental
ombudsmen render,"1 0 has increased in popularity over the past
fifteen years. 261 The types of institutions that presently use
ombudsmen to handle complaints about their services vary in size
County, Washington, and Newark, New Jersey. Frank, American Bar Association
Ombudsman Committee Development Report 15-16 (June 30, 1972) (unpublished manu-
script). Dallas, Texas, Montgomery County, Maryland, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania have
established ombudsmen programs in their school systems. Id. at 16. Several other cities and
counties recently have created ombudsman programs, including: Anchorage, Alaska, Detroit,
Michigan, Flint, Michigan, Wichita, Kansas, Berkeley, California, Lexington-Fayette
County, Kentucky, New York, New York, and Jamestown, New York. OMBUDSMAN INSTn-
TUT, supra note 1243, at 19-21. Some communities had an ombudsman but later discontin-
ued the program. Id. at 19 (e.g., Atlanta).
1258. See Bingham, supra note 1237, at 807-08.
1259. See, e.g., id. at 809-10; Lincoln Star, January 21, 1972, editorial page.
1260. See supra note 1252 and accompanying text.
1261. Verkuil, supra note 1223, at 850.
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and function. For example, one recent study shows that at least
100 colleges and universities in the United States have established
ombudsmen offices. The increased use of institutional ombudsmen
is especially visible in large, tax supported schools that have exper-
ienced rapid growth in the past few decades.126 2 Most of these
schools created ombudsman offices in the late 1960s in response to
the many serious administrative problems that then were testing
academia.126 3 Today, college and university ombudsmen are fre-
quently the first school officers to address the problems and com-
plaints associated with matters ranging from tenure denials to stu-
dent anxiety over course offerings and grades.
264
The use of ombudsmen in prisons is becoming an increasingly
popular means of supplementing judicial review of prisoner com-
plaints about improper action or inaction of prison offi-
cials1265 -particularly in cases concerning relatively minor, yet irri-
tating, day-to-day problems. The prisoner complaints that
ombudsmen typically handle include dissatisfaction with parole
procedures, prisoner transfer and classification, legal matters, and
medical treatment.126 6 In addition, prison ombudsmen also could
handle prisoner complaints about racial and religious discrimina-
tion by prison officials. 2 67 Prison ombudsmen serve prisoners in
three ways. First, they can help resolve specific problems that
prison officials could not or would not resolve on their own. Sec-
ond, because prison ombudsmen are independent of the correc-
tional system they can address sensitive problems or field com-
plaints that prisoners would rather not raise with prison officials
for fear of retaliation. Last, these ombudsmen can use the knowl-
1262. Ombudsman Directory, 1981, San Jose State University, cited in Stieber, supra
note 1241, at 6. Eastern Montana College established the first campus ombudsman in Octo-
ber 1966. In 1967, Michigan State University became the first major university to adopt this
idea.
1263. See, e.g., FAcT FINDING COMMISSION ON COLUMBIA DISTURBANCES (Cox Commis-
sion), CRISIS AT COLUMBIA Uvmirry (1968), cited in Verkuil, supra note 1223, at 850.
1264. Id. At Michigan State University, 1,000 students seek the ombudsman's assis-
tance annually. Stieber, supra note 1241, at 10.
1265. In 1971 the Philadelphia prisons experimented with an ombudsman and the
Maryland Legislature established an Inmate Grievance Commission. That same year, Cali-
fornia became the first state to pass legislation providing for a correctional ombudsman, but
Governor Reagan vetoed the bill. Many states currently use correctional institution
ombudsmen: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, and Wisconsin. OMBUDsMAN INsTrrUT, supra note 1243, at 35-38. Numerous
commentators have called for broader use of prison ombudsmen. Davidow, supra note 1245.




edge they obtain through interaction with prisoners and prison of-
ficials as a basis for making recommendations to improve the cor-
rectional system as a whole.1268 Conversely, this knowledge also
would enable ombudsmen to help protect prison officials from un-
founded allegations of dereliction.126
4. The Media Ombudsman
Media ombudsmen, unlike governmental and institutional
ombudsmen, do not handle complaints about the institution or
governmental body that established their offices. Rather, media
ombudsmen facilitate dispute resolution between two other parties
such as consumers and merchants. 2 70 By the mid-1970s over 300
newspapers and television news programs featured an ombudsman
service for individuals with complaints about businesses and gov-
ernmental agencies. Through their capacity to publish accounts
of citizens' complaints and their ability to capture and command
the attention of large public audiences, media ombudsmen success-
fully have sensitized businesses and governmental agencies to spe-
cific complaints about and general problems with their opera-
tions. 1 7 2 Businesses and government agencies also should benefit
from the efforts of media ombudsmen. When fairness and dispute
resolution are principal concerns of ombudsmen the businesses and
agencies that are targets of citizens' complaints can learn to serve
and cultivate goodwill with their clients and constituents more
effectively.
As overzealous advocates of any position, however, media
ombudsmen risk legal liability in business tort and defamation
lawsuits. 127 The overzealousness of media ombudsmen also could
1268. Id. at 184.
1269. Id. at 189.
1270. The consumer ombudsman, which the Swedish government created in 1971,
handles disputes between consumers and merchants. King, supra note 1238, at 355. The
consumer ombudsman acts as a watchdog over business practices, scrutinizing the accuracy
and truthfulness of advertising, overseeing market practices and contractual agreements,
and working closely with consumer protection agencies. Id. at 357. Although organizatins
such as the Better Business Bureau perform similar services for American consumers, the
concept of a government created consumer ombudsman's office has not gained any measura-
ble acceptance in the United States. Id. at 360.
1271. See Hannigan, supra note 1238, at 681.
1272. An interview of the users of a Canadian newspaper's ombudsman service indi-
cated that almost 75 percent of the people interviewed who previously had used the
ombudsman service stated that they would use it again if they had another problem. Id. at
694.
1273. Cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 765 (4th ed. 1971). For a dis-
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undermine their effectiveness in resolving disputes. If media
ombudsmen demonstrate bias in the process of resolving disputes,
they probably will aggravate the dispute to a greater extent than
governmental and institutional ombudsmen because media
ombudsmen sometimes air the dispute resolution process to large
public audiences and because the complaint targets might view
them as interlopers. The actions of government ombudsmen, on
the other hand, probably are less likely to exacerbate disputes be-
tween governmental bodies and their constituents, even if their ef-
forts are critical of government, because the government previously
created and empowered these ombudsmen to perform this dispute
resolution function. Businesses and governmental agencies, on the
other hand, are more likely to treat media ombudsmen with hostil-
ity because they neither created or empowered these ombudsmen
nor requested their services.
5. Summary
American society generally has responded favorably to the ex-
panded use of ombudsmen as a method of handling disputes and
complaints between individuals and consumers on one hand, and
businesses, governmental entities, and nongovernmental institu-
tions on the other. Ombudsmen served disputing parties as impar-
tial third parties who facilitate dispute resolution. Utilizing
ombudsmen is generally a much faster, less stressful, and less ex-
pensive method of resolving disputes and complaints than using
more traditional techniques, such as petitioning congressmen and
filing lawsuits. Institutional and governmental ombudsmen also
benefit the entities that establish them by building public confi-
dence and trust for the institutions and governmental entities they
serve. Although ombudsmen occasionally exacerbate disputes by
acting partially or overzealously, the overriding benefits govern-
mental, institutional, and media ombudsmen provide society
should make the ombudsman's office an increasingly important fo-
rum for dispute resolution in the future.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Special Project has examined the individual's opportu-
nity within contemporary American society to prevent and cure le-
gally redressable injuries by means other than civil and criminal
cussion of media liability, see Wade, The Tort Liability of Investigative Reporters, 37
VmDi. L. Rzv. (1984).
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litigation. The self-help measures on which this article has focused
illustrate the variation in the origins and development of existing
self-help practices, and the diversity in the measures that the law
recognizes as permissible and tolerable self-help conduct. Self-help,
once the law of the land, gradually has been supplanted in many
respects by the increasing sophistication of the organized criminal
and civil justice systems which have become the hallmark of Amer-
ican society. Under this scheme, the government has assumed
enormous responsibilities and burdens as peacekeeper, guardian of
public safety and order, arbiter of disputes, and enforcer of the
laws. This Special Project, however, demonstrates that the state is
not the only actor in the play. The citizens may participate more
actively by exercising numerous self-help rights, privileges, and
remedies. To be sure, self-help alternatives pose the troubling
prospects of lawlessness. Yet, the Special Project has proposed
that the societal and personal benefits of many forms of self-help
favor the inclusion of self-help as an ingredient in the evolution of
the American legal system. The thoughtful and reasoned examina-
tion by scholars, judges, lawyers, legislators, and citizens of the po-
tential contributions and hazards of self-help can ensure that self-
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